AbstractB. Nyambuu. Eh Ornoo l Gesen Irgen Bi ('A citizen of the motherland I am'). Ulaanbaatar: Mongolyn Uls Töriin Helmegdegsediin Holboo. 2004, 260 pages. S. Jalan-Aajav, Tuulsan Zamd Törsön Bodol ('Thoughts born on the passed road') 2004. Ulaanbaatar: Sodpress, 144 pages.
After Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes in 1956, the Mongolian People's Republic, following in the footsteps of the "fraternal" Soviet Union, also succumbed to the "thaw." Khrushchev used de Stalinization to discredit his hardline opponents. Mongolia's leader, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, was a Stalin-era holdover who came under criticism from his rivals for being unenthusiastic about political reforms. Tsedenbal had good reason to downplay de-Stalinization:He shared responsibility with Marshal Horloogiyn Choibalsan for violent repressions in the 1940s. But Tsedenbal outmaneuvered and eliminated his opponents in the late 1950s and early 1960s and consolidated his grip on power by 1964.Toward the end of that year, however, Tsedenbal once again was challenged, this time from an unexpected direction. Several members of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) used the precedent of Khrushchev's forced retirement from his leadership posts in Moscow in October 1964 as a pretext to overthrow Tsedenbal. At a plenum of the MPRP Central Committee in December 1964, Tsedenbal was accused of incompetence, corruption, disrespect for principles of "party democracy," lack of economic discipline, and overreliance on the Soviet Union for credits. But Tsedenbal rebuffed the "anti-party group" and depicted the affair as an attempted coup engineered by pro-Chinese sympathizers and spies. Soviet leaders were wary of Chinese efforts to "subvert" Moscow's in fluence in the socialist camp and were therefore willing to endorse Tsedenbal's version of events.
After Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes in 1956, the Mongolian People's Republic, following in the footsteps of the "fraternal" Soviet Union, also succumbed to the "thaw." Khrushchev used de Stalinization to discredit his hardline opponents. Mongolia's leader, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, was a Stalin-era holdover who came under criticism from his rivals for being unenthusiastic about political reforms. Tsedenbal had good reason to downplay de-Stalinization: He shared responsibility with Marshal Horloogiyn Choibalsan for violent repressions in the 1940s. But Tsedenbal outmaneuvered & eliminated his opponents in the late 1950s & early 1960s & consolidated his grip on power by 1964. Toward the end of that year, however, Tsedenbal once again was challenged, this time from an unexpected direction. Several members of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) used the precedent of Khrushchev's forced retirement from his leadership posts in Moscow in October 1964 as a pretext to overthrow Tsedenbal. At a plenum of the MPRP Central Committee in December 1964, Tsedenbal was accused of incompetence, corruption, disrespect for principles of "party democracy," lack of economic discipline, & overreliance on the Soviet Union for credits. But Tsedenbal rebuffed the "anti-party group" & depicted the affair as an attempted coup engineered by pro-Chinese sympathizers & spies. Soviet leaders were wary of Chinese efforts to "subvert" Moscow's influence in the socialist camp & were therefore willing to endorse Tsedenbal's version of events. Adapted from the source document.
After a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep biploar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the new atomic age: now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt and atomic wartime diplomacy -- The great game -- Truman, the bomb, and the end of World War II -- Responding to Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- The Baruch Plan and the onset of American Cold War -- Stalin and the burial of international control
This paper examines the full cycle of political power transitions and the dynamics of party competition during the 2016 parliamentary and 2017 presidential elections in Mongolia. It argues that the existence of multiple interlinked patronage networks and factionalism explains the persistence of the electoral democracy in Mongolia. The article focuses on the internal politics of the Democratic Party.