Suchergebnisse

Recent cross-country empirical analysis has found that privately produced ratings of the performance of the central government bureaucracy in areas such as corruption and red tape are significant predictors of economic performance. We argue that several relatively simple, easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict these ratings: competitive salaries, internal promotion and career stability, and meritocratic recruitment. We collect a new data set on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries. Controlling for country income, level of education, and ethnolinguistic diversity, we find that our measures of bureaucratic structure are statistically significant determinants of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies. Meritocratic recruitment is the most important structural feature for improving bureaucratic performance, followed by internal promotion and career stability. The importance of competitive salaries could not be clearly established

Abstract
We draw on household survey data from countries of all income levels and document that average unemployment rates increase with gross domestic product per capita. This is accounted for almost entirely by low—rather than high—educated workers. We interpret these facts in a model with frictional labour markets, a traditional self-employment sector, skill-biased productivity differences across countries, and unemployment benefits that become more generous with development. A calibrated version of the model does well in explaining the cross-country patterns that we document. Counterfactual exercises point to skill-biased productivity differences as the most important factor in explaining the cross-country unemployment patterns.