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Minorities and Storable Votes
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 247-282
How often are propositions on the effects of regional trade agreements theoretical curiosa?
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 129-148
OPTIMAL EDUCATION POLICIES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
In: Pacific economic review, Band 16, Heft 5, S. 538-552
ISSN: 1468-0106
AbstractWe consider the optimal education policies of a small economy whose government has a limited budget. Initially, the economy is closed and the government chooses its education policy to maximize welfare under autarky. When the economy trades with the rest of the world the government chooses a new education policy that maximizes welfare under trade. Is it ever optimal for the government to choose its new policy so that it reverses the economy's comparative advantage? We find that if the budget stays fixed when it is optimal to 'move up the skills chain' it is not feasible. In such a case, a foreign loan is welfare improving. A move in the opposite direction can be optimal, and when it is optimal it is also feasible.
Minorities and Storable Votes
In: Quarterly journal of political science, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 165-200
ISSN: 1554-0626
The paper studies a simple voting system that can increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency or treating voters asymmetrically. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions and thus elicit voters strength of preferences. The potential of the mechanism is particularly clear in the presence of systematic minorities: by accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that the minority's preferences are represented, while aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises, relative to simple majority voting. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory. Adapted from the source document.
Chapter 10 Pareto-Improving Trading Clubs without Income Transfers
In: Frontiers of Economics and Globalization; Globalization and Emerging Issues in Trade Theory and Policy, S. 139-162
How reasonable are assumptions used in theoretical models? Computational evidence on the likelihood of trade pattern changes
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 781-789
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract In theoretical literature it is common to make the assumption that in a multi‐country, multi‐good world, the direction of trade (import and export by commodity) is predetermined and fixed for each good for each country. We consider a simple three‐country, three‐good, pure‐exchange model with CES preferences. We compute free trade competitive equilibria, three‐country non‐cooperative Nash equilibria, and customs union equilibria for randomised parameterizations, and find that trade pattern changes between free trade and customs union equilibria in around 35% of cases.
How often are propositions on the effects of regional trade agreements theoretical curiosa?
In: Journal of international economics, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 59-78
ISSN: 0022-1996
Metrics capturing the degree to which individual economies are globalized
We discuss metrics of globalization for individual economies as distance measures between fully integrated and trade restricted equilibria in economies initially operating under less than full integration with the global economy. Such metrics can be used to construct country globalization metrics reflecting the distance of economies from full global integration due to trade barriers, barriers to factor flows, barriers to international financial intermediation, solved technological diffusion and other economy specific features yielding less than full integration into the global economy. Many distance metrics present themselves and none are wholly satisfactory since they each behave differently across various displacements from integration. Distance measures can, for instance, be small in goods space but large in price space. We present alternative measures constructed for eight OECD economies and comment in a concluding section on other measures used elsewhere in the literature such as trade / GDP ratios.
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Private Information and Optimal Infant Industry Protection
In: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2022-13
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The Dynamics of Outsourcing: From Labor Cost-Saving to Preference-Based Outsourcing
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8264
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The Quantitative Importance of Openness in Development
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4412
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International Trade and the Negotiability of Global Climate Change Agreements
In: NBER Working Paper No. w14711
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Optimal Education Policies and Comparative Advantage
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2631
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