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NATO is neither in deep trouble nor destined to fall apart. The 'NATO-in-crisis perspective', which has gained currency in recent years, correctly identifies three centrifugal forces that threaten to undermine the Alliance: strategic divergence, a declining ability to act militarily and fading public support. These problems are partly of NATO's own making because they stem from the creation of a generally benign security environment devoid of clear and present existential threats. While the absence of a clear, unifying existential threat has made it impossible for the Alliance to agree on a common core purpose, this does not mean that NATO will fall apart. Three centripetal forces that will continue to keep it together trumps the three centrifugal forces identified by the NATO-incrisis perspective: converging national security interests, a strong sense of community and US leadership.

Denne introduktionsartikel giver et signalement af den eksisterende litteratur om dansk udenrigspolitisk aktivisme. Vi argumenterer for, at begrebet aktivisme er nyttigt, når det gælder om at sætte en overordnet etikette på dansk udenrigspolitik, men vi er samtidig af den opfattelse, at begrebet stiller sig i vejen for en nuanceret forståelse af karakteren af den samlede danske udenrigspolitik. Dette skyldes et meget ensidigt fokus på sikkerhedspolitikken, hvor der har været en tendens til at generalisere fra aktivisme i sikkerhedspolitikken til de øvrige områder i den danske udenrigspolitik. Afsættet for en mere finkornet analyse af aktivismen i dansk udenrigspolitik må dels være en mere præcis operationalisering af aktivismebegrebet, dels en mere kompartmentaliseret forståelse af udenrigspolitikken. Begge dele udvikler vi i artiklens andet hovedafsnit, hvor vi også præsenterer en typologi til analyse af aktivisme. I artiklens tredje og sidste hoveddel sammenligner vi udviklingen i aktivismen inden for fire institutionelle hovedspor i dansk udenrigspolitik: EU, NATO, FN og Norden.

The Trump Administration has adopted a more confrontational and transactional approach to burden-sharing in NATO. It has threatened to "moderate" its commitment to the Alliance unless the European members increase their defence spending (US Mission to NATO 2017), and contribute more to out-of-area operations. Since President Trump entered the office, European defence spending has risen at a quicker pace, and the nature of the defence debate in Europe has changed. The Europeans are no longer debating whether they need to increase their spending; the questions discussed are how fast and how much. Is this evidence of a "Trump effect", and will it last? This is the question addressed in this policy brief. Because it is hard to predict the future, we adopt an historical perspective. ; The Trump Administration has adopted a more confrontational and transactional approach to burden-sharing in NATO. It has threatened to "moderate" its commitment to the Alliance unless the European members increase their defence spending (US Mission to NATO 2017), and contribute more to out-of-area operations. Since President Trump entered the office, European defence spending has risen at a quicker pace, and the nature of the defence debate in Europe has changed. The Europeans are no longer debating whether they need to increase their spending; the questions discussed are how fast and how much. Is this evidence of a "Trump effect", and will it last? This is the question addressed in this policy brief. Because it is hard to predict the future, we adopt an historical perspective.

Much to their own surprise, successive Danish governments have succeeded in maintaining the highest level of public support among the nations contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, while suffering the highest number of fatalities per capita. We explain this puzzle in a parsimonious fashion manner using a novel analytical framework derived from elite-competition theory, the event-driven school and the literature on strategic narratives. The Danish government initially built strong political and popular support by making a case for war that resonated with broadly shared pre-existing interests and values (national defence and support for democracy and human/women's rights), and role conceptions (supporting NATO and US-led military operations as a responsible member of international society). Succeeding governments subsequently maintained a high level of political consensus on Afghanistan through a process of continuous consultation and consensus-building. The political elites supporting the mission then sustained the high level of public support by defining success in ways that did not involve 'winning' but focused instead on the attainment of realistic short-term, tactical objectives such as police training and building of schools, and by speaking with one voice to the media. This effectively reduced the Danish media to a conveyor belt passively transmitting the positive views of the political parties supporting the Afghanistan operation and the officers and soldiers carrying it out.

En vestlig exit-strategi må basere sig på dannelsen af en slagkraftig afghansk hær og en duelig afghansk politistyrke. Jo før afghansk militær og politi kan overtage de funktioner ISAF-styrkerne udfører i dag, jo før kan den vestlige militære tilstedeværelse reduceres.