Suchergebnisse

ObjectivesThis article examines whether Barack Obama has a Constitutional philosophy and, if so, what those ideas are.MethodsThe article notes contrasting scholarly views on whether Obama's career exhibits consistent ideas and on the content of his ideas. It uses interpretive exposition of Obama's major writings, speeches, and presidential initiatives, based on all of Obama's writings and speeches through 2010, to identify Obama's ideas.ResultsObama generally expresses and acts on views that accord with modern democratic pragmatist philosophic beliefs in deliberative democracy. It has not been fully recognized that Obama interprets the meaning of the U.S. Constitution as embodying these beliefs; that he blends this Constitutional view with egalitarian commitments that he identifies with black church social justice values; and that he sees the American Constitutional system's central goal as building greater public unity without effacing diversity.ConclusionsObama belongs to the modern democratic pragmatist tradition elaborated by American thinkers and political leaders since the Progressive era, but his distinctive Constitutional version of this outlook stresses deliberative democratic processes, black church social justice values, and the contention that the goal of the American Constitutional system is "e pluribus unum," "out of many, one."

The two books that have occasioned this symposium represent efforts to research thoroughly, think rigorously, and argue honestly about complex and significant issues of race and ethnicity in America. There is much to be learned from them on many topics. I read them chiefly for insights about whether and how a defensibly democratic politics of egalitarian change can be achieved by, for, and with racial minorities in a country whose majorities, like most majorities, have long been reluctant to pursue policies that did not predominantly benefit themselves. I raise some challenges to the perspectives offered in these books, but only as an effort, kindred in aim if not achievement, to carry forward the work they have thus far so nobly advanced.

My thanks to Rafael Alarcón, Edwina Barvosa, and Louis DeSipio for their thoughtful responses to my essay, and to Perspectives on Politics for occasioning this discussion. The respondents each highlight crucial challenges for my argument—but their essays also suggest how I might address those challenges more adequately. I will review the contributions of each writer and sketch the lessons I draw from them in turn.

Controversies over Mexican immigrants and undocumented aliens in Arizona and elsewhere show the need for fresh approaches to immigration. The "principle of constituted identities" holds that the more a government has coercively constituted the identities of non-citizens in ways that have made having certain relationships to it fundamental to their capacities to lead free and meaningful lives, the greater the obligations that government has to facilitate those relationships–all else being equal. The U.S. has coercively constituted the identities of many persons of Mexican descent, inside and outside its boundaries, in ways that have fostered aspirations for dual economic, cultural, and political "citizenships." It has also shaped the identities, values, and interests of many whites in immigrant-receiving states in ways that make Mexican immigrants seem threatening, even as it has made those states pay most of the costs of absorbing immigrants. In consequence, the U.S. should adopt policies that give priority to Mexicans in immigration and that facilitate dual citizenships, while providing more aid to immigrant-receiving states.