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In this text, Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews focus on the law and politics of rights protection in democracies, and in human rights regimes in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. After introducing the basic features of modern constitutions, with their emphasis on rights and judicial review, the authors present a theory of proportionality that explains why constitutional judges embraced it. Proportionality analysis is a highly intrusive mode of judicial supervision: it permits state officials to limit rights, but only when necessary to achieve a sufficiently important public interest. Since the 1950s, virtually every powerful domestic and international court has adopted proportionality analysis as the central method for protecting rights.

An introduction to Immanuel Kant's constitutional theory, and to the European system of rights protection, this book explains how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has become the most active and important rights-protecting court in the world through its manifestation as a Kantian cosmopolitan legal order.

An introduction to Immanuel Kant's constitutional theory, and to the European system of rights protection, this work explains how European Court of Human Rights has become the most active and important rights-protecting court in the world through its manifestation as a Kantian cosmopolitan legal order.

This book charts and assesses the extent to which the major arbitration houses, including the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, are evolving governance functions that would normally be associated with state courts.

The development of international arbitration as an autonomous legal order is one of the most remarkable stories of institution building at the global level over the past century. Today, transnational firms and states settle their most important commercial and investment disputes not in courts, but in arbitral centres, a tightly networked set of organisations that compete with one another for docket, resources and influence. In this work, Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel show that international arbitration has undergone a self-sustaining process of institutional evolution that has steadily enhanced arbitral authority

This title examines the process through which the European Convention on Human Rights, along with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, has been interpreted and applied in the Member States, and how this has impacted upon their domestic legal orders

This book compares the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on the domestic law and politics of eighteen States: Ireland-UK; France-Germany, Italy-Spain, Belgium-Netherlands, Norway-Sweden, Greece-Turkey, Russia-Ukraine, Poland-Slovakia, and Austria-Switzerland. As the ECHR has evolved, many States have decided to "incorporate" the Convention directly into their own legal systems, often with disruptive and transformative effects. Today, the ECHR has asignificant presence in national law and politics across Europe, altering how State officials - including governments, legislatures, and courts - make law and policy. Convention on Human Rights, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, has been interpreted and applied in the MemberStates, and how it has impacted upon their domestic legal orders.

This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions and their.

This study of the EU aims to demonstrate that a nascent transnational society and supranational institutions have played decisive roles in constructing the EU.

AbstractInternational trustee courts embody a specific form of delegation, in which state principals confer on such courts the authority to interpret and apply treaties agreed by the states in order to realize specific values and interests. Human rights courts help states resolve commitment and enforcement problems that are inherent in human rights treaties. This study seeks to answer the question, what happens when states parties seek to reduce or eliminate the authority of a human rights court? To answer these questions, the article assesses six human rights treaty regimes: the Council of Europe; the Organization of American States; the African Union; the Economic Community of West African States; the East African Community; and the Southern African Development Community. The article identifies four types of de‐delegation possible with respect to international human rights courts and assesses the extent to which states have sought to de‐delegate from them. With one exception (the SADC Tribunal), the regimes examined here have so far successfully withstood the challenge of de‐delegation.