Suchergebnisse

The politics of international law / Wayne Sandholtz and Christopher A. Whytock -- Compliance: actors, context and causal processes / Courtney Hillebrecht -- The effectiveness of international law and stages of governance / Rachel Brewster -- International law in domestic courts / David Sloss and Michael P. van Alstine -- Treaty law and national legislative politics / Kevin L. Cope -- Modes of domestic incorporation of international law / Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg -- Regime complexes as governance systems / Benjamin Faude and Thomas Gehring -- The power of the implementers: global financial and environmental standards / Walter Mattli and Jack Seddon -- The European Court of Human Rights and the politics of international law / Mikael Rask Madsen -- The law and politics of WTO dispute settlement / Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig and Sergio Puig -- The politics of international intellectual property law / Susan K. Sell -- Non-state actors and human rights: legalization and transnational regulation / Suzanne Katzenstein -- The "war" on terror and international law / Jordan J. Paust -- An emerging international legal architecture for cyber conflict / William C. Banks -- Who runs the internet? / Anupam Chander -- Politics and law in international environmental governance / M.J. Peterson.

Significant challenges to core international norms have prompted debate over whether or not norms decay, decline, or die. We argue that claims of norm death are empirically incorrect and theoretically misleading. Norms rarely die, and the processes that happen instead are far more complex. The idea of norm death embodies two misconceptions borne out of methodological incentives in empirical constructivism; that norms are single entities that exist separately from larger structures, and that compliance is the most effective way to measure if a norm is under challenge. We argue that the literature on "norm death" epitomizes the pitfalls of this approach, and as a result neither empirically or theoretically captures what happens when norms are under challenge. Norms are fundamentally resilient and can withstand even high levels of non-compliance. We examine four cases of alleged norm death—the norms against mercenary use, unrestricted submarine warfare, and torture, and the norm requiring declarations of war—and demonstrate that in these cases norms are not disappearing, but are rather subject to processes of obsolescence, replacement, and modification. We further argue that once we recognize that norms are embedded in wider structures, and move away from the notion that compliance indicates norm strength, it is possible to see why norms are generally resilient.

A transnational legal order (TLO) authoritatively shapes "the understanding and practice of law" in a specific area of social activity, involving both state and civil society actors, and linking national, regional, and international levels. We argue that a TLO has emerged and settled since 1945 around capital punishment. Our analysis of the death penalty TLO treats "bottom-up" and "top-down" effects as interconnected, addresses the creation of legal order at both national and international levels, and emphasizes the recursivity linking developments at both levels. We trace the development of death penalty abolition from its origins in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Because the practical effects of abolition—in shaping legal and penal practice—necessarily occur at the national level, the analysis focuses on the international, transnational, and domestic factors that lead states to end capital punishment. After describing the emergence of a TLO abolishing the death penalty, we offer a new way of measuring the global and country-specific activities of transnational advocacy groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). We incorporate that measure in an analysis of data from about 150 countries. The central hypothesis is that making the TLO on capital punishment effective through abolition in national law requires modes of political action that overcome majoritarian public support for retention. We suggest two domestic institutional features that make abolition more likely despite retentionist popular opinion: proportional representation in the legislature and independent courts. We also suggest that transnational non-governmental organizations (NGO) and some regional organizations can support the move to abolish. The data analysis is largely consistent with these propositions and brief case studies illustrate the principal mechanisms.

Airbus strategies in Asia operate in an environment shaped by three forces: the technical constraints of building modern aircraft, the demands of world and regional markets, and the structure and objectives of the consortium itself. These factors map onto an integrated strategy analysis. The positional analysis for Airbus must focus on its status as the challenger to the dominant firm, on the consortium's peculiar organizational structure, and on the opportunities and constraints offered by its nonmarket context (multiple national governments plus the European Union). One way of looking at Airbus's experience is as a continual series of disruptions aimed at creating openings for Airbus to enter markets dominated by well-established competitors, in particular, Boeing. These strategic moves have involved both market and nonmarket elements. This article assesses the market and nonmarket strategies that Airbus has employed to establish itself in the crucial Asian market.

Although corruption poses fundamental challenges to both democratic governance and market economies, surprisingly little political science research addresses corruption in a comparative context. In this article we explain variation in the perceived level of corruption (defined as the misuse of public office for private gain) across fifty countries. We propose a set of hypotheses that explain variation in corruption levels in terms of domestic political-economic structures, democratic norms, and integration into the international economy. Levels of corruption, we propose, are higher: 1) the greater the extent of state control of the economy, 2) the weaker the democratic norms and values, and 3) the lower the degree of integration into the world economy. The multivariate data analysis broadly confirms our predictions, each of the independent variables is significant in the direction we expected.

Under the banner of "1992," the European Communities aim to remove all barriers to the movement of persons, capital, and goods among the member countries. The 1992 movement comprises a set of bargains among European elites. Structural change (relative U.S. decline and Japanese ascent) provoked a rethinking of European roles and interests. The 1992 project emerged as a response because of: (1) the policy leadership exercised by the Commission of the European Communities, with support from a transnational business coalition; and (2) a changed domestic political context in several key countries—specifically, the failure of previous national economic strategies and the transformation of the left. The changes under way will alter regional business competition and politics and will affect the world economic system.