Suchergebnisse

Gegenwärtig formiert sich weltweit eine unfreiwillige Allianz von Gegnern der Verschlüsselung. Neben autoritären Regimen setzen auch immer mehr westliche Demokratien darauf, die Kommunikationsverschlüsselung zu schwächen und Spionage-Software auf Smartphones zu nutzen. Damit wird ein globaler Normsetzungsprozess beschleunigt, der die Bemühungen um Cyber-Sicherheit konterkariert. Deutschland sollte sich diesem Trend entgegenstellen und seine Ambitionen als Verschlüsselungsstandort Nummer eins verstärken. Dabei gilt es auch, alternative Ermittlungswege zu finden, damit Terrorverdächtige von Behörden überwacht werden können, ohne dass die Software-Sicherheit der ganzen Bevölkerung leidet. (Autorenreferat)

Die Bundesregierung diskutiert derzeit die Frage, inwiefern von staatlicher Seite auf Cyber-Angriffe mit digitalen Gegenschlägen reagiert werden kann und soll. Befürworter solcher Maßnahmen argumentieren, der Staat müsse in der Lage sein, eine Cyber-Attacke durch Zerstörung des Ursprungsrechners zu beenden - vor allem in Krisensituationen, etwa wenn wichtige Infrastrukturen bedroht sind. Bei genauerer Betrachtung zeigt sich indes, dass Gegenangriffe problematisch sind. Erstens lässt sich in der Praxis nicht schnell genug ermitteln, wer der Verursacher einer Attacke ist. In zeitkritischen Situationen sind Gegenschläge mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit wirkungslos. Zweitens ist unklar, zu welchen Ergebnissen schnelle Gegenangriffe führen. Und drittens stellen sich Fragen nach den globalen politischen Implikationen eines solchen Vorgehens. (Autorenreferat)

An inadvertent worldwide alliance against encryption is emerging, as Western democracies join authoritarian regimes in weakening communication encryption and exploiting spyware. This accelerating global trend undermines efforts to enhance cyber-security. Germany should oppose such developments and intensify its efforts to champion encryption. This will also mean finding alternative instruments to keep terrorism suspects under surveillance without degrading the software security of the entire population. (author's abstract)

Die Attribution von Cyberangriffen ist ein souveräner Akt der EU-Mit­gliedstaaten. Diese haben jedoch unterschiedliche technische und geheim­dienstliche Fähigkeiten. Das führt zu Inkohärenzen in der europäischen Cyberdiplomatie, etwa bei der Verhängung von Cybersanktionen. Die Analyse der politischen Reaktionen auf die Cybervorfälle WannaCry, Not‑Petya, Cloud Hopper, OVCW und Bundestag-Hack offenbart folgende Probleme: Die Attribution dauert lange und ist auf Erkenntnisse von Nato-Partnern angewiesen; die technischen Realitäten und die rechtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmale zur Klassifikation und Verfolgung von Cyber­angriffen passen nicht immer zusammen; die Gewichtung der Tatbestands­merkmale ist unklar. Cybersanktionen sollen gezielte Maßnahmen und vor allem in ihrer Intensität verhältnismäßig sein: Destruktive Angriffe wie WannaCry oder NotPetya sollten härtere Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen als alltägliche Fälle von Cyberspionage wie Cloud Hopper oder Bundestag-Hack. Hier muss die EU ihre Werkzeuge genauer konfigurieren. Die EU sollte die rechtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmale schärfen und Beweis­standards zur Attribution vereinheitlichen. Die Gemeinsame Cyber-Stelle der EU und EU INTCEN im Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst sollten ge­stärkt werden, um den Austausch forensischer Informationen zu verbessern und die Politik der Attribution effektiver koordinieren zu können. Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und ihre alliierten Partner müssen Angreifer häu­figer gemeinsam verurteilen, damit die davon ausgehende politische Bot­schaft wirklich deutlich wird. Dazu wäre es sinnvoll, für den Erlass von Cybersanktionen qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidungen zuzulassen. (Autorenreferat)

The attribution of cyberattacks is a sovereign act by the EU Member States. However, these all have different technical and intelligence capabilities. This leads to a lack of coherence in European cyber diplomacy, for exam­ple when imposing cyber sanctions. Analysis of policy responses to the WannaCry, NotPetya, Cloud Hopper, OPCW, and Bundestag hack cyber incidents reveals the following problems: Attribution takes a long time and relies on intelligence from NATO partners; the technical realities and the legal facts for classifying and pros­ecuting cyberattacks do not always match; the weighting of the criteria for establishing what constitutes a crime is unclear. Cyber sanctions should be proportionate, targeted measures and destructive attacks, such as WannaCry or NotPetya, should result in harsher punishment than everyday cases of cyber espionage, such as Cloud Hopper or the Bundestag hack. The EU must adapt its tools accordingly. The EU should tighten the legal criteria and harmonise the standards of evidence for attribution. The EU Joint Cyber Unit and EU INTCEN, part of the European External Action Service, should be strengthened to improve the exchange of forensic information and to coordinate attribution policy more effectively. EU Member States and their allied partners should better coordinate political signalling to condemn cyberattacks. To this end, it would make sense to allow qualified majority voting for the adoption of cyber sanctions. (author's abstract)

One year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, certain assumptions about the utility of cyber operations during wartime can now be put to the test. Russian cyber salvos opened this war, but they failed to achieve their objectives in the face of a resilient cyber defender. Joint cyber/conventional warfighting is still hard to implement due to its uncertain effects, the potential for spill-over, malware development cycles, and differing operational tempos. Cyber operations against Ukraine have not (yet) achieved major strategic effects in reducing Ukraine's capacity to resist. Additionally, Russian information operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences fell on deaf ears. The greatest value of cyber operations therefore still appears to lie in their intelligence and reconnaissance functions. (author's abstract)

Im Mai 2019 finden Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (EP) statt. Politik und Exper­ten fürchten, dass der Wahlprozess mit Desinformationskampagnen und Cyber­angriffen empfindlich gestört wird. Die Europäische Kommission hat im Dezember 2018 einen Aktionsplan gegen Desinformation vorgelegt und will 5 Millio­nen Euro zur Verfügung stellen, um Wähler und Verantwortliche in der Politik für Mani­pulationen zu sensibilisieren. Es geht auch darum, die Cybersicherheit von Wahl­systemen und -pro­zes­sen zu erhöhen. Kurzfristige Selbst­regulierungsansätze der Internet­konzerne reichen dazu bei weitem nicht aus. Um mittelfristig die Integrität von Wahlen zu schützen, gilt es, unabhängige Forschung als Basis für tech­ni­sche, recht­liche und marktregulierende Reformen zu stärken. Ziel muss sein, die Funk­tions­fähigkeit von Demo­kratien und Wahlen in der Digitalisierung zu bewahren. (Autorenreferat)

Elections to the European Parliament (EP) will take place in May 2019. Politicians and experts fear that the election process might be disrupted by disinformation cam­paigns and cyber attacks. In December 2018, the European Commission presented an action plan against disinformation. It provided 5 million euros for raising awareness amongst voters and policymakers about manipulation, and for increasing the cyber security of electoral systems and processes. The strategy relies on voluntary and non­binding approaches by Internet companies to fight disinformation. To protect the integrity of elections in the medium term, independent research into technical, legal and market-regulating reforms must be boosted. The objective should be to preserve the functionality of democracies and elections in the age of digitalisation. (author's abstract)

Im September 2017 hat die EU ihre Strategie zur Cybersicherheit aus dem Jahr 2013 aktualisiert. Damit soll Europas kritische Infrastruktur besser geschützt und die digitale Selbstbehauptung gegenüber anderen Weltregionen befördert werden. Doch die erneuerte Strategie lässt Fragen offen, wenn es darum geht, die selbstgesetzten Ziele eines "offenen, freien und sicheren Cyberraums" nach innen wie außen glaubhaft zu vertreten. Weder formuliert die EU eine klare Definition von Widerstandskraft und Abschreckung, noch wird deutlich genug, wie die institutionelle Fragmentierung und rechtliche Unverbindlichkeit in Cybersicherheitsfragen auf EU-Ebene überwunden werden sollen. Zudem bleiben kontroverse Themen ausgespart, wie die Harmonisierung des Strafrechts oder die Nutzung von Verschlüsselung. Die Mitgliedstaaten sollten ihre nationalen Alleingänge aufgeben und die gesetzliche Regulierung zur Cybersicherheit auf Ebene der Union beschleunigen. (Autorenreferat)

In September 2017 the EU updated its 2013 Cyber Security Strategy. The new version is intended to improve the protection of Europe's critical infrastructure and boost the EU's digital self-assertiveness towards other regions of the world. But the reformed strategy leaves open a number of questions as to how its objective of an "open, safe and secure cyberspace" will be credibly defended, both internally and externally. The EU has neither properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues. Moreover, controversial topics – such as the harmonisation of criminal law or the use of encryption – have been entirely omitted. Member states should abandon their standalone efforts and speed up the legal regulation of cybersecurity at the EU level. (Autorenreferat)

Auch nach dem Gipfeltreffen von US-Präsident Donald Trump und Nordkoreas Staatschef Kim Jong Un am 12. Juni 2018 in Singapur zählt die Krise um Nordkoreas Atom- und Massenvernichtungswaffenprogramm zu den gefährlichsten und komplexesten der Welt. Im Zentrum des Konflikts steht das ungeklärte, angespannte Verhältnis zwischen Nordkorea und den USA, fokussiert auf das Thema Atomwaffenbesitz. Darum gruppieren sich weitere Konfliktlagen, die durch gegenläufige Interessen Chinas, Japans, Nordkoreas, Russlands, Südkoreas und der USA gekennzeichnet sind. Zudem gibt es etwa zwischen Konfliktlagen in der Sicherheits-, Menschenrechts- und Wirtschaftspolitik vielfältige Wechselwirkungen. Für Deutschland und Europa ist eine friedliche Lösung des Konflikts - oder zumindest die Vermeidung einer militärischen Eskalation - von zentraler Bedeutung. Europa kann und sollte darauf hinwirken, dass Nordkorea als Herausforderung für die globalen Ordnungsstrukturen behandelt wird. Eine Bearbeitung der unter den Begriff "Nordkorea-Konflikt" subsumierten Problemlagen, die darauf zielt, einen Krieg zu vermeiden, die globalen Ordnungsstrukturen zu festigen und die Situation der Menschen in Nordkorea zu verbessern, erfordert einen langen Atem und wird nur schrittweise Erfolge zeitigen.

For complex traits, most associated single nucleotide variants (SNV) discovered to date have a small effect, and detection of association is only possible with large sample sizes. Because of patient confidentiality concerns, it is often not possible to pool genetic data from multiple cohorts, and meta-analysis has emerged as the method of choice to combine results from multiple studies. Many meta-analysis methods are available for single SNV analyses. As new approaches allow the capture of low frequency and rare genetic variation, it is of interest to jointly consider multiple variants to improve power. However, for the analysis of haplotypes formed by multiple SNVs, meta-analysis remains a challenge, because different haplotypes may be observed across studies. We propose a two-stage meta-analysis approach to combine haplotype analysis results. In the first stage, each cohort estimate haplotype effect sizes in a regression framework, accounting for relatedness among observations if appropriate. For the second stage, we use a multivariate generalized least square meta-analysis approach to combine haplotype effect estimates from multiple cohorts. Haplotype-specific association tests and a global test of independence between haplotypes and traits are obtained within our framework. We demonstrate through simulation studies that we control the type-I error rate, and our approach is more powerful than inverse variance weighted meta-analysis of single SNV analysis when haplotype effects are present. We replicate a published haplotype association between fasting glucose-associated locus (G6PC2) and fasting glucose in seven studies from the Cohorts for Heart and Aging Research in Genomic Epidemiology Consortium and we provide more precise haplotype effect estimates. ; Generation Scotland: Generation Scotland received core funding from the Chief Scientist Office of the Scottish Government Health Directorate CZD/16/6 and the Scottish Funding Council HR03006. Genotyping of the GS:SFHS samples was carried out by the Genetics ...

Dietary flavanols and flavonols, flavonoid subclasses, have been recently associated with a lower risk of type 2 diabetes (T2D) in Europe. Even within the same subclass, flavonoids may differ considerably in bioavailability and bioactivity. We aimed to examine the association between individual flavanol and flavonol intakes and risk of developing T2D across European countries. The European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC)-InterAct case-cohort study was conducted in 8 European countries across 26 study centers with 340,234 participants contributing 3.99 million person-years of follow-up, among whom 12,403 incident T2D cases were ascertained and a center-stratified subcohort of 16,154 individuals was defined. We estimated flavonoid intake at baseline from validated dietary questionnaires using a database developed from Phenol-Explorer and USDA databases. We used country-specific Prentice-weighted Cox regression models and random-effects meta-analysis methods to estimate HRs. Among the flavanol subclass, we observed significant inverse trends between intakes of all individual flavan-3-ol monomers and risk of T2D in multivariable models (all P-trend < 0.05). We also observed significant trends for the intakes of proanthocyanidin dimers (HR for the highest vs. the lowest quintile: 0.81; 95% CI: 0.71, 0.92; P-trend = 0.003) and trimers (HR: 0.91; 95% CI: 0.80, 1.04; P-trend = 0.07) but not for proanthocyanidins with a greater polymerization degree. Among the flavonol subclass, myricetin (HR: 0.77; 95% CI: 0.64, 0.93; P-trend = 0.001) was associated with a lower incidence of T2D. This large and heterogeneous European study showed inverse associations between all individual flavan-3-ol monomers, proanthocyanidins with a low polymerization degree, and the flavonol myricetin and incident T2D. These results suggest that individual flavonoids have different roles in the etiology of T2D. ; The EPIC-InterAct Study was supported by the European Union (Integrated Project LSHM-CT-2006-037197 in the ...

BACKGROUND: Whether and how n-3 and n-6 polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFAs) are related to type 2 diabetes (T2D) is debated. Objectively measured plasma PUFAs can help to clarify these associations. METHODS AND FINDINGS: Plasma phospholipid PUFAs were measured by gas chromatography among 12,132 incident T2D cases and 15,919 subcohort participants in the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC)-InterAct study across eight European countries. Country-specific hazard ratios (HRs) were estimated using Prentice-weighted Cox regression and pooled by random-effects meta-analysis. We also systematically reviewed published prospective studies on circulating PUFAs and T2D risk and pooled the quantitative evidence for comparison with results from EPIC-InterAct. In EPIC-InterAct, among long-chain n-3 PUFAs, α-linolenic acid (ALA) was inversely associated with T2D (HR per standard deviation [SD] 0.93; 95% CI 0.88-0.98), but eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) were not significantly associated. Among n-6 PUFAs, linoleic acid (LA) (0.80; 95% CI 0.77-0.83) and eicosadienoic acid (EDA) (0.89; 95% CI 0.85-0.94) were inversely related, and arachidonic acid (AA) was not significantly associated, while significant positive associations were observed with γ-linolenic acid (GLA), dihomo-GLA, docosatetraenoic acid (DTA), and docosapentaenoic acid (n6-DPA), with HRs between 1.13 to 1.46 per SD. These findings from EPIC-InterAct were broadly similar to comparative findings from summary estimates from up to nine studies including between 71 to 2,499 T2D cases. Limitations included potential residual confounding and the inability to distinguish between dietary and metabolic influences on plasma phospholipid PUFAs. CONCLUSIONS: These large-scale findings suggest an important inverse association of circulating plant-origin n-3 PUFA (ALA) but no convincing association of marine-derived n3 PUFAs (EPA and DHA) with T2D. Moreover, they highlight that the most abundant n6-PUFA (LA) is inversely associated with T2D. The detection of associations with previously less well-investigated PUFAs points to the importance of considering individual fatty acids rather than focusing on fatty acid class. ; Funding for the InterAct project was provided by the EU FP6 programme (grant number LSHM_CT_2006_037197). In addition, InterAct investigators acknowledge funding from the following sources: Medical Research Council Epidemiology Unit MC_UU_12015/1 and MC_UU_12015/5, and Medical Research Council Human Nutrition Research MC_UP_A090_1006 and Cambridge Lipidomics Biomarker Research Initiative G0800783; FLC and TJK: Cancer Research UK; JMH and MJT: Health Research Fund of the Spanish Ministry of Health; Murcia Regional Government (Nº 6236); MG: Regional Government of Navarre; -IS, DLvdA, AMWS, YTvdS: Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands; Verification of diabetes cases in EPIC-NL was additionally funded by NL Agency grant IGE05012 and an Incentive Grant from the Board of the UMC Utrecht; PWF: Swedish Research Council, Novo Nordisk, Swedish Diabetes Association, Swedish Heart-Lung Foundation; RK: German Cancer Aid, German Ministry of Research (BMBF); KTK: Medical Research Council UK, Cancer Research UK; PMN: Swedish Research Council; KO and AT: Danish Cancer Society; JRQ: Asturias Regional Government; OR: The Västerboten County Council; RT: AIRE-ONLUS Ragusa, AVIS-Ragusa, Sicilian Regional Government; ER: Imperial College Biomedical Research Centre.

This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from Public Library of Science via http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002094. ; ${\bf Background:}$ Whether and how n-3 and n-6 polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFAs) are related to type 2 diabetes (T2D) is debated. Objectively measured plasma PUFAs can help to clarify these associations. ${\bf Methods~and~Findings:}$ Plasma phospholipid PUFAs were measured by gas-chromatography among 12,132 incident T2D cases and 15,919 sub-cohort participants in EPIC-InterAct study across 8 European countries. Country-specific hazard ratios (HR) were estimated using Prentice-weighted Cox regression and pooled by random-effects meta-analysis. We also systematically reviewed published prospective studies on circulating PUFAs and T2D risk and pooled the quantitative evidence for comparison with results from EPIC-InterAct. In EPIC-InterAct, among long-chain n-3 PUFAs α-linolenic acid (ALA) was inversely associated with T2D (HR per SD 0.93; 95%CI 0.88,0.98), but eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) were not significantly associated. Among n-6 PUFAs, linoleic acid (LA) (0.80; 0.77,0.83) and eicosadienoic acid (EDA) (0.89; 0.85,0.94) were inversely related, arachidonic acid (AA) was not significantly associated, while significant positive associations were observed with γ-linolenic acid (GLA), dihomo-GLA, docosatetraenoic acid (DTA) and docosapentaenoic acid (n6-DPA), with HRs between 1.13 to 1.46 per SD. These findings from EPIC-InterAct were broadly similar to comparative findings from summary estimates from up to 9 studies including between 71 to 2,499 T2D cases. Limitations included potential residual confounding and the inability to distinguish between dietary and metabolic influences on plasma phospholipid PUFAs. ${\bf Conclusions:}$ These large-scale findings suggest important inverse association of circulating plant-origin n-3 PUFA (ALA) but no convincing association of marine-derived n3 PUFAs (EPA, DHA) with T2D. Moreover they highlight that the most abundant n6-PUFA (LA) is inversely associated with T2D. The detection of associations with previously less well investigated PUFAs points to the importance of considering individual fatty acids rather than a focus on fatty acid class. ; Funding for the InterAct project was provided by the EU FP6 programme (grant number LSHM_CT_2006_037197). In addition, InterAct investigators acknowledge funding from the following sources: Medical Research Council Epidemiology Unit MC_UU_12015/1 and MC_UU_12015/5, and Medical Research Council Human Nutrition Research MC_UP_A090_1006 and Cambridge Lipidomics Biomarker Research Initiative G0800783; FLC and TJK: Cancer Research UK; JMH and MJT: Health Research Fund of the Spanish Ministry of Health; Murcia Regional Government (Nº 6236); MG: Regional Government of Navarre; -IS, DLvdA, AMWS, YTvdS: Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands; Verification of diabetes cases in EPIC-NL was additionally funded by NL Agency grant IGE05012 and an Incentive Grant from the Board of the UMC Utrecht; PWF: Swedish Research Council, Novo Nordisk, Swedish Diabetes Association, Swedish Heart-Lung Foundation; RK: German Cancer Aid, German Ministry of Research (BMBF); KTK: Medical Research Council UK, Cancer Research UK; PMN: Swedish Research Council; KO and AT: Danish Cancer Society; JRQ: Asturias Regional Government; OR: The Västerboten County Council; RT: AIRE-ONLUS Ragusa, AVIS-Ragusa, Sicilian Regional Government; ER: Imperial College Biomedical Research Centre.