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The conventional narrative surrounding the post-9/11 'War on Terror' tends to characterize the US Congress as a mostly inactive and compliant bystander, bowing to an aggressive assertion of unilateral presidential authority and power by the Bush administration. However, clarifying the conceptual framework used to examine legislative-executive interactions and congressional foreign policy behavior to account for varying patterns of interaction and varying avenues of influence yields an alternative explanation. While there is some truth to the conventional wisdom about a Congress rallying to support the president in time of war, applying the refined conceptual framework brings a more complex story into sharper focus. Viewed through this alternative lens, we see that members of Congress, and the institution as a whole, played a more discriminating and substantial-yet still predictable-role consistent with the context of the situation and the broad historical forces and patterns that combine to shape congressional foreign policy behavior and influence. Once the context and forces shaping congressional behavior and legislative-executive interactions are understood, congressional engagement (or lack thereof) in the War on Terror from 2001 to 2009 emerges as a relatively predictable sequence of initial compliance, (rallying) giving way first to competition and then to confrontation. Adapted from the source document.

"Institutional Actors in Foreign Policy Analysis" published on by Oxford University Press.

In the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the Republican-controlled Congress was able to use the International Monetary Fund's need for capital to press for major reforms within that organization. The debate became more complicated when antiabortion advocates attempted to add antiabortion language to appropriation bills. In a showdown between the executive & legislative branches, Congress ultimately dropped the abortion language, but the issue of linking funding to abortion policy continues to surface in budgetary debates concerning international organizations.

This article examines the characteristics of individual members of Congress who become "foreign policy entrepreneurs." Rather than simply responding to an administration's foreign policy requests, such legislators try to lead Congress by initiating action on the foreign policy issues they care about rather than awaiting administration action. This study examines foreign policy entrepreneurs across a number of factors, including the parties to which they belong, the chambers in which they serve, the various legislative access points they employ, and the different legislative tactics they use. Also examined are the changes in such patterns over time. We test hypotheses about the characteristics and behavior of entrepreneurs using a data set of 2,621 instances of entrepreneurial behavior across the post‐World War II period. We conclude that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are increasingly salient players in the foreign policy process and are driven by policy disagreements and partisan calculations.

This article examines the characteristics of individual members of Congress who become "foreign policy entrepreneurs." Rather than simply responding to an administration's foreign policy requests, such legislators try to lead Congress by initiating action on the foreign policy issues they care about rather than awaiting administration action. This study examines foreign policy entrepreneurs across a number of factors, including the parties to which they belong, the chambers in which they serve, the various legislative access points they employ, & the different legislative tactics they use. Also examined are the changes in such patterns overtime. We test hypotheses about the characteristics & behavior of entrepreneurs using a data set of 2,621 instances of entrepreneurial behavior across the post-WWII period. We conclude that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are increasingly salient players in the foreign policy process & are driven by policy disagreements & partisan calculations. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 95 References. Adapted from the source document.