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Documenting the relationship between Agreeableness and political conservatism has proven elusive. We address this anomaly by showing that two aspects of Agreeableness – politeness and compassion – have countervailing relationships with political conservatism through right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). To test this, we analyzed data from a nationally representative sample of New Zealanders (N = 4,553). Politeness was positively, but compassion was negatively, correlated with political conservatism. Consistent with the differential mediation hypothesis derived from the dual process model of ideology and prejudice, these opposing relationships were differentially mediated by RWA and SDO. This attenuated the bivariate relationship between the higher-order trait of Agreeableness and political conservatism. These results demonstrate the complex relationship between personality and political orientation.

New Zealand society is unique in that New Zealanders of European descent (the majority group) are regularly labeled in institutional and popular discourse using an ethnic group label created by Maori (the indigenous minority group). This label is "Pakeha." Endorsement of this label is by no means consensual, and opposition to its use is often claimed on the grounds that the term is pejorative. We tested the validity of this concern in a national sample (N = 6,507) by assessing differences in the ingroup and outgroup evaluations of Maori and New Zealanders of European descent based on their label preferences. We found no support for the claim that the term "Pakeha" is associated with a negative evaluation of the majority group. Rather, Maori expressed positive attitudes toward New Zealanders of European descent regardless of the label they preferred to describe them. For Maori, use of the term "Pakeha" was instead indicative of ingroup cultural engagement, including the use of Maori language, and had little to do with outgroup attitudes. New Zealanders of European descent who preferred the term "Pakeha," in contrast, expressed more positive attitudes toward Maori than those who preferred the terms "New Zealand European," "New Zealander," or "Kiwi.". Adapted from the source document.

The cross‐lagged effects of dangerous and competitive social worldviews on Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) were examined over a five‐month period (N = 165). Analyses indicated that the motivational goal for group‐based dominance and superiority indexed by SDO changed as a function of the degree to which the social world was perceived as a competitive place characterized by inequality and resource scarcity. The motivational goal for ingroup conformity and collective security indexed by RWA, in contrast, changed as a function of the degree to which the social world was perceived as a dangerous and threatening place prone to high levels of crime and immoral behavior. These findings are consistent with the causal pathways between social worldviews and ideological attitudes predicted by Duckitt's (2001) model of the dual motivational and cognitive processes underlying prejudice. An unexpected reciprocal effect in which RWA predicted longitudinal change in dangerous worldview was also identified, suggesting that the relationship between these two constructs may be more complex than previously hypothesized.

Although trust in, and cooperation with, the police is critical to effective crime prevention, the relationship between citizens and police can be tenuous, especially for ethnic minorities. However, the impact that membership in multiple marginalised groups has on attitudes toward the police has received limited attention. We address this oversight using a national probability sample of New Zealand adults ( N = 11,669) to examine how the intersection between ethnicity and socioeconomic status (SES) affects trust in, and willingness to cooperate with, the police. As hypothesised, minorities trusted the police less than did ethnic majority group members. However, ethnic group differences in trust in the police were heightened at low (vs. high) levels of SES. In turn, trust in the police mediated the relationship between minority status and willingness to cooperate with the police. These results demonstrate that (low) SES exacerbates the already fragile relationship between ethnic minorities and the police.

The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) measures five universal moral foundations of Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. This study provided an independent test of the factor structure of the MFQ using Confirmatory Factor Analysis in a large New Zealand national probability sample (N = 3,994). We compared the five-factor model proposed by Moral Foundations Theory against alternative single-factor, two-factor, three-factor, and hierarchical (five foundations as nested in two second order factors) models of morality. The hypothesized five-factor model proposed by Moral Foundations Theory provided a reasonable fit. These findings indicate that the five-factor model of moral foundations holds in New Zealand, and provides the first independent test of the factor structure of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire.

A theory of the historical anchoring and mobilization of political attitudes is proposed, arguing that culture-specific symbols, configured by historical charters, are an important resource in defining nationhood and legitimizing public opinion in a way that makes some political attitudes difficult to change. Five studies in New Zealand and Taiwan using diverse methods converged to show that historical events with 'charter status' have an additive effect in explaining variance in political attitudes regarding biculturalism in New Zealand and independence in Taiwan even after controlling for the effects of Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, relevant social identities, and collective guilt. Field and lab experiments showed that the impact of historical symbols did not depend on the mobilization of social identity (e.g., increasing mean scores and indirect effects), but the historical anchoring of political attitudes in representations was resistant to change. Manipulations of the salience of historical events changed levels of social identification, but did not change mean levels of support for New Zealand biculturalism or Taiwanese independence. Even an intense and immersive pretest/posttest design taking high school students on a national museum tour failed to change attitudes towards biculturalism in New Zealand. Adapted from the source document.

A theory of the historical anchoring and mobilization of political attitudes is proposed, arguing that culture‐specific symbols, configured by historical charters, are an important resource in defining nationhood and legitimizing public opinion in a way that makes some political attitudes difficult to change. Five studies in New Zealand and Taiwan using diverse methods converged to show that historical events with "charter status" have an additive effect in explaining variance in political attitudes regarding biculturalism in New Zealand and independence in Taiwan even after controlling for the effects of Social Dominance Orientation, Right‐Wing Authoritarianism, relevant social identities, and collective guilt. Field and lab experiments showed that the impact of historical symbols did not depend on the mobilization of social identity (e.g., increasing mean scores and indirect effects), but the historical anchoring of political attitudes in representations was resistant to change. Manipulations of the salience of historical events changed levels of social identification, but did not change mean levels of support for New Zealand biculturalism or Taiwanese independence. Even an intense and immersive pretest/posttest design taking high school students on a national museum tour failed to change attitudes towards biculturalism in New Zealand.

New Zealanders' implicit projections of the national category differ dramatically from those of Americans and Australians. In these latter nations, research using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) indicates that the majority (White/European) group is privileged in automatic or nonconscious concepts of nationhood relative to other ethnic groups. In New Zealand, however, Whites/Europeans and Maori (the Indigenous peoples) are equally associated with cognitive representations of the nation. This difference has been attributed to the strong and consensual integration of Maori culture and identity with national identity. The present research provided a novel test of this argument by demonstrating, in a large undergraduate sample (N = 142), that self‐rated opposition versus support for symbolic but not resource‐specific aspects of bicultural social policy was associated with New Zealanders' generalized pro‐European versus pro‐Maori implicit ethnic‐national associations (estimated using two IATs). This finding provides converging evidence suggesting that the unique pattern of ethnic‐national associations observed in New Zealand owes its genesis to relatively consensual support for the incorporation of symbolic aspects of Maori culture: The ways in which groups are symbolically represented within a nation affects the extent to which they are automatically projected within the inclusive or national prototype. This in turn has important implications for promoting intergroup tolerance.