Suchergebnisse

Interaction between business and the state and its effects on investment and production during the radical neoliberal period (1975-82), the pragmatic neoliberal period (1983-89), and the transition to democracy (1990-94).

Chile's return to democratic rule with sustained economic growth provided the opportunity for some much-welcomed political space that, it was hoped, would permit the country to attend, at long last, to a number of pressing issues which had been long deferred, if not ignored, by the previous military government. Some of those issues, such as the consolidation of democracy, poverty, and human rights, had been the subject of considerable study by scholars. Much less studied, however, although also on the agenda, was the promise to address Chile's environmental problems, which had become much exacerbated under the laissez-faire economic model favored by the military regime. Because the new democratic administrations have followed through on that promise, the Chilean example lends support to that hypothesis which holds that environmental concerns in developing countries can be addressed more effectively under economically stable democratic regimes than by authoritarian political systems.

ABSTRACTThis article examines a number of factors which facilitate the adoption and success of policies and projects to promote grassroots sustainable development – that is, the sustainable, multiple use of forests at the community level, including aspects of local self‐reliance and control of economic resources. I will argue that the extractive reserve legislation in Brazil and community forestry projects in Mexico and Peru depended on the formation of pro‐grassroots development coalitions. The exact make‐up of those coalitions depended on three factors: (1) the initial disposition of key governmental and dominant class actors to such policies; (2) the intensity of local conflicts and the extent of community organization; and (3) the involvement of international actors. The cases suggest that in the absence of serious government or upper class opposition, the adoption and durability of such policies and projects can be promoted by the formation of a coalition of organized communities, domestic non‐governmental organizations (NGOs), some allied government agencies, and support from international actors. However, when key government agencies and socio‐economic élites are fundamentally opposed to sustainable development initiatives at the grassroots level, much higher levels of community organization, conflict, and domestic and international support appear to be necessary.

This article argues that a high degree of relative state autonomy and ideology, while necessary, was not sufficient to explain fully the change from import-substitution industrialization to an open, free-market economy in Chile. A comparison across three distinct policy periods in authoritarian Chile reveals that shifting coalitions of businessmen and landowners, with varying power resources, also played an important part in the outcome. This approach does not seek to vitiate other interpretations of economic change in Chile and elsewhere. The question is not so much which factor is most important, but how and when the different factors matter.

Chile is Often portrayed as an exceptional case among recent transitions from authoritarian rule for a number of reasons. It was the last of the "bureaucratic authoritarian" regimes to democratize; the transition followed the timetable and conditions set by the military more closely than in Argentina and Uruguay; the prognosis for economic and political stability seems optimistic relative to the rest of the region. An important reason for Chilean exceptionality was the fact that, unlike in other cases, Chile's business and landowning elites supported the military government to the end. Why did they do so?