Trade and Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3543
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3543
SSRN
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 255-265
ISSN: 1467-9485
ABSTRACTWe employ a model of n heterogenous profit‐maximizing clubs to analyze the impact of revenue sharing in professional sports leagues on competitive balance. Revenues of each club depend on absolute quality, relative quality and on competitive balance itself so that our model captures much of the preceding literature as special cases. We show that revenue sharing always increases competitive balance if clubs differ only with respect to the impact of absolute quality on revenues. On the contrary, revenue sharing reduces competitive balance if only clubs' relative qualities play a role for revenues or if only two teams are considered.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2867
SSRN
As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this game emerge; and if the cost difference between domestic and foreign firms is 'significant', all equilibria induce the same allocation, where production exclusively takes place in the cost-efficient country. Moreover, these equilibria are Pareto efficient if this cost difference is 'substantial'. Only if cost differences are 'insignificant', may production take place in both countries in equilibrium.
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In: Journal of economics, Band 74, Heft 1, S. 79-101
ISSN: 1617-7134
This paper discusses environmental policies which aim at a sustainable use of domestic resources which are mobile. It assumes that one country introduces such a policy but the other country does not. If a resource is mobile, strict domestic environmental policies may increase the resource imports from other countries. This paper shows that a unilateral environmental policy may even imply an increased resource use. In this case, a large part of the sustainability objective is met by substituting domestic resource extraction by imports. When sustainability is modelled in an inter temporal, competitive framework, the paper shows that the sustainability rule will not lead to a slower rate of extraction of the resource.
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In: Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht: ZfU ; Beiträge zur rechts-, wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Umweltforschung = Journal of environmental law and policy = Revue de la politique et du droit d'environnement, Band 18, S. 205-230
ISSN: 0931-0983
In diesem Papier beschäftigen wir uns mit den Möglichkeiten einer globalen Umweltpolitik, die eine Minderung der CO2-Emissionen zum Ziel hat. Wir konzentrieren uns hierbei auf die im Rahmen des joint-implementation- Ansatzes in die Diskussion eingebrachten Vorschläge und diskutieren diese am Beispiel der Volksrepublik China. Die im Rahmen von Joint Implementation vorgesehenen Direktinvestitionen stellen Realtransfers dar, die prinzipiell in der Lage sind, internationale Reduktionskostenunterschiede auszunutzen und einen Beitrag zur Lösung der Spuveränitätsproblematik zu leisten. Wir diskutieren die Rolle der Volksrepublik China für eine globale Umweltpolitik und evaluieren anschließend die Möglichkeiten dieser Realtransfers. Anhand eines einfachen Transfermodelles und einer Beispielrechnung läßt sich dann zeigen, daß Joint implementation keineswegs allein in der Lage ist, eine effektive globale Klimapolitik zu gewährleisten.
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In: Journal of economics, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 177-195
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Kiel working paper no. 1013
This paper discusses environmental policies in response to foreign direct investment (FDI) in a symmetrie two-country setting, where firms' behavior affects government policy decisions. We show that two alternative equilibria with FDI are possible: (i) one with unilateral FDI, where one firm is a multinational firm, and the other firm is a national firm; (ii) and one with bilateral FDI, where both firms become multinational firms. With regard to strategic environmental policies, we show that the country attracting FDI introduces a Pigouvian environmental tax, whereas the country served by the local firm only levies a smaller tax rate. Hence, FDI does not lead to ecological dumping. With regard to welfare, we show that the impact on welfare is negative for the country hosting the national firm; positive for the country hosting the multinational firm, if FDI is unilateral; and ambiguous, for both countries, if FDI is bilateral.
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8268
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Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 159-166
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Climate Policy and Nonrenewable Resources, S. 151-170
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 166, Heft 2, S. 205
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 479-488