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Abstract
This article analyses how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that 'populist foreign policy' looks radically different in analyses of the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly 'populist' foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practise a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability to make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case-studies of the politician Bernie Sanders in the United States and the political party Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions, but is a way of formulating and performing—in these cases—leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism's alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy, and shows that populism neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power.

This article analyzes how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that populist foreign policy looks radically different when analyzing the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly 'populist' foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practice a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability to make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case studies of Bernie Sanders in the United States and Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions but is a way of formulating and performing - in these cases - leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism's alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy and shows that "populism" neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power.

The chapter intervenes in current public debates about German security policy. Many observers in the media have argued that the Russian invasion has triggered a revolution in German military affairs, de facto putting an end to German pacifism. The chapter takes issue with this argument. It draws on public opinion polls and prior research of parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag to show that neither German foreign policy elites nor the German public could ever aptly be described as pacifist in a strict sense; neither elites nor the general public as a whole were ever fundamentally opposed to the military. And while German society could (mostly) be adequately described as antimilitarist (reluctant to get militarily involved abroad), since the 1990s there has been a significant shift among foreign policy elites towards increased support for military operations outside the NATO area. Even public opinion, commonly seen as sceptical of military involvement, is much more differentiated than commonly assumed, in particular among the media. Thus, while the German government has only haltingly and somewhat hesitantly expanded its military support for Ukraine, this is does not appear to be primarily a result of a lack of public support.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Analyzing the Nexus Between Populism and International Relations -- Populism Research and IR: The Missing Link -- The Case for Increased Dialogue -- Plan of the Book -- References -- Part I Theoretical Issues in Global Populism Research -- Chapter 2 Populism Beyond the Nation -- Populism: Extremely Popular -- The Mainstream (Media) Discourse: When in Doubt, Call It Populist -- The Academic Discourse: A Highly Ambiguous Concept -- Contemporary Definitions of Populism and Their Notion of the Nation -- Populism as the Logic of the Political -- The Possibility, the Perils and the Promises of a Global Populist Movement -- References -- Chapter 3 How to Become a Leader: Identifying Global Repertoires for Populist Leadership -- Introduction -- Populist Leadership and the Construction of "Outsider-Ness" -- The Patriotic Military Man -- The Social Leader -- The Successful Businessman -- The Strong Woman -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4 Populism and Contemporary Global Media: Populist Communication Logics and the Co-construction of Transnational Identities -- Introduction -- Understanding Today's Global Media Ecology -- Understanding Populism and the Media -- Populist Communication Logics-Three Case Studies -- Legacy Media Evolution: The Emergence of the Indy100 -- Grassroots Campaign Organisations: The Case of the Syrian Opposition -- International Broadcasting: The RT Network -- Conclusions -- References -- Part II Populism and Foreign Policy -- Chapter 5 Sedimented Practices and American Identity in Donald J. Trump's Election Campaign -- Introduction -- Sedimented Practices as an Analytical Tool -- Sedimented Practices in US Foreign Policy -- Sedimented Practices in Trump's Campaign Speeches -- Conclusions -- References.

This volume is the first to analyze populism's international dimension: its impact on, and interaction with, foreign policy and international politics. The contributions to this volume engage conceptual theoretical issues and overarching questions such as the still under-specified concept of populism or the importance of leadership and the mass media for populism's global rise. They zoom in on populism's effect on both different countries' foreign policies and core international concerns, including the future of the liberal world order and the chances for international conflict and cooperation more generally. Frank A. Stengel is Research Fellow at the Research Group on International Political Sociology, Kiel University, Germany. David B. MacDonald is Professor of Political Science and Research Leadership Chair, College of Social and Applied Human Sciences, at the University of Guelph, Canada. Dirk Nabers is Professor of International Political Sociology at Kiel University, Germany.--

Der vorliegende Beitrag verfolgt zwei Ziele: Zum einen setzt er sich kritisch mit den vorliegenden konstruktivistischen Erklärungen der wankelmütigen deutschen Außenpolitik im Kontext des Afghanistan- und des Irakkriegs (2001-2003) auseinander. Zum zweiten bietet er die hegemoniethoretisch orientierte, poststrukturalistische Diskurstheorie als alternativen Rahmen zur Deutung dieser Politik an und stellt das hieran angelehnte methodische Vorgehen der Hegemonieanalyse dar. Im Kern kritisieren wir an den bisherigen Erklärungsversuchen, dass sie Ideen zumeist als vorgängig gegeben betrachten (nur so ergibt die Rede davon, dass Ideen erklärende Faktoren sein können, ja Sinn) und dann ihre Forschung darauf ausrichten, diese rekonstruierten Ideen mit der stattfindenden Politik abzugleichen. Eine diskurstheoretisch informierte Perspektive, wie wir sie vorschlagen, geht stattdessen einerseits von der Instabilität der Ideen aus und andererseits von der daraus resultierenden Notwendigkeit, die konkreten Kämpfe und Auseinandersetzungen um die je konkrete Artikulation von Bedeutungszusammenhängen genau zu analysieren. Der Blick, der das bessere Verstehen des Wankelmuts erlauben soll, richtet sich also weniger auf die Ideen, sondern auf die konkreten artikulatorischen Kämpfe, die die je relevante Idee immer aufs Neue herstellen. Wir illustrieren dies durch eine beispielhafte Hegemonieanalyse eines Ausschnitts des parlamentarischen Regierungsdiskurses zwischen September 2001 und März 2003.

Am 16. Juli 2008 verabschiedete das Bundeskabinett den zweiten Umsetzungsbericht zum Aktionsplan "Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung". Mit diesem Aktionsplan, der die Koordination im Politikfeld Krisenprävention verbessern sollte, hat die rot-grüne Bundesregierung 2004 ein Instrument geschaffen, das internationalen Vorbildcharakter hat. Das Besondere am deutschen Aktionsplan ist, dass er zivile Aspekte der Krisenprävention betont und zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure systematisch einbindet. Vier Jahre nach seiner Verabschiedung harrt der Aktionsplan allerdings immer noch seiner konsequenten Umsetzung. Insbesondere die mangelhafte Ausstattung der neu geschaffenen Institutionen mit Kompetenzen und Ressourcen sowie das sinkende politische Interesse leisten dem drohenden Ende einer koordinierten zivilen Krisenpräventionspolitik Vorschub. Angesichts der politischen und administrativen Zurückhaltung der schwarz-roten Bundesregierung, den Aktionsplan "Zivile Krisenprävention" umzusetzen, kann nur eine starke parlamentarische Initiative einen Neustart für den Aktionsplan ermöglichen. In Anbetracht immer komplexerer friedenspolitischer Herausforderungen wie etwa in Afghanistan sind nachhaltige Erfolge nur zu erzielen, wenn die Koordination zwischen allen beteiligten Akteuren verbessert wird. (GIGA)