Suchergebnisse

El artículo hace una crítica a las políticas neoliberales que usualmente se aplican para solucionar las distintas crisis y problemas económicos de las últimas décadas. Argumenta que tales acciones no se basan en la realidad económica, por lo que no son efectivas ni se enfocan en las formas en que afectan negativamente a distintos grupos sociales —como desempleo, aumento de desigualdad, crisis de vivienda—, pues sólo se conciben como daños colaterales. Aterriza esta reflexión en las políticas económicas aplicadas a dos fenómenos actuales: la crisis por la pandemia de covid-19 y la inflación, que han dejado en evidencia la necesidad de una intervención más activa del gobierno.

This paper provides a critique of the DSGE models that have come to dominate macroeconomics during the past quarter-century. It argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong microfoundations, which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour, e.g. incorporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics. Inadequate modelling of the financial sector meant they were ill-suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis; and a reliance on representative agent models meant they were ill-suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality. The paper proposes alternative benchmark models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them.

This paper shows that there is a presumption that Pareto-efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital. When tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset, those effects need to be taken into account, reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution. The paper extends the 1976 Atkinson-Stiglitz results to a dynamic, overlapping generations model, correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax. That result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in (fixed) labor productivities. In a general equilibrium model, one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self-selection constraints. In a simple model with time separability but with non-separability between consumption and leisure, capital taxation depends on the complementarity/substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption. The final section constructs a simple two class model, capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement, whose productivity can be enhanced by (publicly provided) education. It derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax, which is positive, so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high.

For almost three quarters of a century, the US had led the world into a rules-based system of trade-globalization, culminating in the creation of the WTO in 1995 and a rash of subsequent bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Trump thus proposed a major change to US international economic policy. This paper assesses the extent to which, more than one year on, he has fulfilled those promises, and describes the likely consequences of what has happened. The central thesis of the paper is that it is fortunate that Trump has largely failed to deliver on what he has promised; these failures are in part based on a flawed understanding of the determinants of trade deficits, including the role of trade agreements, and on the political economy of trade agreements themselves. The likelihood is that over time, Trump will continue to move the US towards a more protectionist stance. While the chances are small that he will succeed in any major revision of, say, NAFTA or the WTO—beyond an updating of these agreements, such as by making them more relevant for the 21st century by including provisions related to the digital economy—there are some chances of nightmare scenarios where Trump pulls the US out of NAFTA. In virtually all likely scenarios, the trade deficit will increase and American workers, including those who had been adversely affected by globalization and turned to Trump in desperation, will be worse off. Moreover, while he has by and large failed to deliver (so far) on his campaign promises, there are likely to be significant adverse effects of what he has already done, both to the global trade regime and to US geo-political interests. Section 1 explains the major "accomplishments" to date, including the state of play of some of the trade negotiations. Section 2 identifies flaws in understandings of international trade that underlay Trump's failures. Section 3 explains why Trump is unlikely to succeed in meaningful renegotiations of US trade relations. Section 4 argues that Trump policies are likely to lead to increased trade deficits and shows that, more broadly, his policies, to the extent that they are successful, are likely to lead to decreased competitivity of the US and a lowering of standards of living. Section 5 discusses the global response to America's new protectionism, the likely impact on US economic and geo-political interests, and the long-run impact of Trump's policy on the global international economic order.

For the past decade or more China has been engaged in a major reform of the economy, moving away from the manufacturing export led growth model to one based on domestic demand. Too much of China's growth over the past decade (and even earlier) was financed by debt. There is an increasing consensus that the rate of accumulation of debt is not sustainable. High levels and rates of increase of debt are associated with a higher probability of having a crisis. Resources get wasted in crises, and there is typically much suffering. But there is also typically a waste of resources before a debt crisis hits. At the local level, to too large an extent, there is an alternative finance mechanism which is problematic in still other ways: selling off government land. It has been associated with corruption, poorly managed urban areas, and, again, the misallocation of resources. In the private sector, there has been considerable institutional innovation in the provision of finance, but many of these innovations have resulted neither in increased efficiency or stability. While there is a need to tighten financial regulations, ensuring that more lending is intermediated by well-regulated banks, and on-lending is not allowed, it is important to look for other ways of financing domestically driven expenditures. This paper looks at two such ways, taxation for the financing of public sector expenditures and equity for that in the private sector. There is much scope for increased tax financed growth in China. Well-designed taxes can actually increase—or at a minimum do not impede—the efficiency of the economy, stimulate domestic demand, and address other key problems facing the Chinese economy and are consistent with principles of equity. The paper looks at the benefits to be achieved from carbon taxes, a financial transactions tax, including on cross-border capital flows, capital and inheritance taxation, and property, land, and natural resource taxes. The paper explains the advantages of equity finance over debt finance, but success in this area requires a better institutional framework for ensuring transparency and good accounting standards, with strong systems of accountability. The shift to greater reliance on taxation and equity finance can not only enhance economic and financial stability; it can even improve the efficiency and equity of the economic system. And this would be the best way I believe, for China to continue in its 40 years of reform.