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Ce document est une annexe au rapport n°1 de l'assistance méthodologique du Cemagref à l'évaluation ex post du PDRN (tache 1). Il est constitué de 72 fiches détaillées des indicateurs du cadre commun calculables. Chaque fiche est déclinée en 3 parties : caractéristiques générales, calculs et bilan dans lequel est précisée la pertinence de l'indicateur pour évaluer des dispositifs politiques (CTE/ CAD, PHAE). 5 fiches se présentent de façon un peu différentes, car les indicateurs, qui les composent, ont été identifiés comme particulièrement pertinents pour la mise en ½uvre de la méthode d'évaluation des effets propres proposée en tache 3. Il s'agit des fiches n°01, 20, 31, 32 et 38. En haut à droite de chaque fiche est indiqué le numéro de l'indicateur ainsi que l'enjeu qu'il évalue.

Ce document est l'annexe 1 du rapport de synthèse de l'assistance méthodologique du Cemagref à l'évaluation ex post du PDRN (tache 1). Il est constitué par la liste de l'ensemble des indicateurs du cadre commun et par 72 fiches détaillées des indicateurs calculables. Chaque fiche est déclinée en 3 parties : caractéristiques générales, calculs et bilan dans lequel est précisée la pertinence de l'indicateur pour évaluer des dispositifs politiques (CTE/ CAD, PHAE, ). 5 fiches se présentent de façon un peu différentes, car les indicateurs, qui les composent, ont été identifiés comme particulièrement pertinents pour la mise en oeuvre de la méthode d'évaluation des effets propres proposée en tache 3. Il s'agit des fiches n°01, 20, 31, 32 et 38. En haut à droite de chaque fiche est indiqué le numéro de l'indicateur, que l'on retrouve dans la 1ère colonne de la liste, ainsi que l'enjeu qu'il évalue.

Ce document est une annexe au rapport n°1 de l'assistance méthodologique du Cemagref à l'évaluation ex post du PDRN (tache 1). Il est constitué de 72 fiches détaillées des indicateurs du cadre commun calculables. Chaque fiche est déclinée en 3 parties : caractéristiques générales, calculs et bilan dans lequel est précisée la pertinence de l'indicateur pour évaluer des dispositifs politiques (CTE/ CAD, PHAE). 5 fiches se présentent de façon un peu différentes, car les indicateurs, qui les composent, ont été identifiés comme particulièrement pertinents pour la mise en ½uvre de la méthode d'évaluation des effets propres proposée en tache 3. Il s'agit des fiches n°01, 20, 31, 32 et 38. En haut à droite de chaque fiche est indiqué le numéro de l'indicateur ainsi que l'enjeu qu'il évalue.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

National audience ; Using original data collected from 181 small farmers in the State of Para in Brazil in 2010 and 2014, we show that REDD+ pilots using positive economic and agricultural incentives can slow down deforestation rates in areas dominated by smallholder properties, where command-and- control policies arise political and equity concerns. In the present paper we analyze, using an econometric approach based on DID-matching, the forest conservation impacts of a REDD+ pilot program in the Transamazon highway that combines Payments for Environmental Services (PES) with environmental sensitization and agricultural technical assistance. Although the program attracted farmers who do not depend on livestock and often have a higher wage income than non-participants, a potential limitation to maximizing the environmental additionality of the project, we find a significant conservation impact of the project. Yet at its early implementation stage, our results show that program participants devoted on average 66% of their land to forest in 2014 while it would have decreased to an estimated 61% without the project. We find that the forest conservation impact is even higher for the subset of farmerswho had previously participated in a similar program, suggesting a process of time-cumulative learning and confidence on external support that acts as a facilitator for reaching positive conservation outcomes. Moreover, our results show that the forest area has been preserved at the expense of pastures, not of croplands. Extending the average estimate to all participants, we conclude that the project avoided the emission of around 830 000 tCO2.

National audience ; Using original data collected from 181 small farmers in the State of Para in Brazil in 2010 and 2014, we show that REDD+ pilots using positive economic and agricultural incentives can slow down deforestation rates in areas dominated by smallholder properties, where command-and- control policies arise political and equity concerns. In the present paper we analyze, using an econometric approach based on DID-matching, the forest conservation impacts of a REDD+ pilot program in the Transamazon highway that combines Payments for Environmental Services (PES) with environmental sensitization and agricultural technical assistance. Although the program attracted farmers who do not depend on livestock and often have a higher wage income than non-participants, a potential limitation to maximizing the environmental additionality of the project, we find a significant conservation impact of the project. Yet at its early implementation stage, our results show that program participants devoted on average 66% of their land to forest in 2014 while it would have decreased to an estimated 61% without the project. We find that the forest conservation impact is even higher for the subset of farmerswho had previously participated in a similar program, suggesting a process of time-cumulative learning and confidence on external support that acts as a facilitator for reaching positive conservation outcomes. Moreover, our results show that the forest area has been preserved at the expense of pastures, not of croplands. Extending the average estimate to all participants, we conclude that the project avoided the emission of around 830 000 tCO2.

National audience ; Using original data collected from 181 small farmers in the State of Para in Brazil in 2010 and 2014, we show that REDD+ pilots using positive economic and agricultural incentives can slow down deforestation rates in areas dominated by smallholder properties, where command-and- control policies arise political and equity concerns. In the present paper we analyze, using an econometric approach based on DID-matching, the forest conservation impacts of a REDD+ pilot program in the Transamazon highway that combines Payments for Environmental Services (PES) with environmental sensitization and agricultural technical assistance. Although the program attracted farmers who do not depend on livestock and often have a higher wage income than non-participants, a potential limitation to maximizing the environmental additionality of the project, we find a significant conservation impact of the project. Yet at its early implementation stage, our results show that program participants devoted on average 66% of their land to forest in 2014 while it would have decreased to an estimated 61% without the project. We find that the forest conservation impact is even higher for the subset of farmerswho had previously participated in a similar program, suggesting a process of time-cumulative learning and confidence on external support that acts as a facilitator for reaching positive conservation outcomes. Moreover, our results show that the forest area has been preserved at the expense of pastures, not of croplands. Extending the average estimate to all participants, we conclude that the project avoided the emission of around 830 000 tCO2.

Using original data collected from 181 small farmers in the State of Para in Brazil in 2010 and 2014, we show that REDD+ pilots using positive economic and agricultural incentives can slow down deforestation rates in areas dominated by smallholder properties, where command-and- control policies arise political and equity concerns. In the present paper we analyze, using an econometric approach based on DID-matching, the forest conservation impacts of a REDD+ pilot program in the Transamazon highway that combines Payments for Environmental Services (PES) with environmental sensitization and agricultural technical assistance. Although the program attracted farmers who do not depend on livestock and often have a higher wage income than non-participants, a potential limitation to maximizing the environmental additionality of the project, we find a significant conservation impact of the project. Yet at its early implementation stage, our results show that program participants devoted on average 66% of their land to forest in 2014 while it would have decreased to an estimated 61% without the project. We find that the forest conservation impact is even higher for the subset of farmerswho had previously participated in a similar program, suggesting a process of time-cumulative learning and confidence on external support that acts as a facilitator for reaching positive conservation outcomes. Moreover, our results show that the forest area has been preserved at the expense of pastures, not of croplands. Extending the average estimate to all participants, we conclude that the project avoided the emission of around 830 000 tCO2.

National audience ; Using original data collected from 181 small farmers in the State of Para in Brazil in 2010 and 2014, we show that REDD+ pilots using positive economic and agricultural incentives can slow down deforestation rates in areas dominated by smallholder properties, where command-and- control policies arise political and equity concerns. In the present paper we analyze, using an econometric approach based on DID-matching, the forest conservation impacts of a REDD+ pilot program in the Transamazon highway that combines Payments for Environmental Services (PES) with environmental sensitization and agricultural technical assistance. Although the program attracted farmers who do not depend on livestock and often have a higher wage income than non-participants, a potential limitation to maximizing the environmental additionality of the project, we find a significant conservation impact of the project. Yet at its early implementation stage, our results show that program participants devoted on average 66% of their land to forest in 2014 while it would have decreased to an estimated 61% without the project. We find that the forest conservation impact is even higher for the subset of farmerswho had previously participated in a similar program, suggesting a process of time-cumulative learning and confidence on external support that acts as a facilitator for reaching positive conservation outcomes. Moreover, our results show that the forest area has been preserved at the expense of pastures, not of croplands. Extending the average estimate to all participants, we conclude that the project avoided the emission of around 830 000 tCO2.