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South Korea and Taiwan have gone through similar experience of political and economic development in the past several decades. Both countries have achieved miraculous economic developments under the government-led development paradigm and have gone through democratization process in the 1990s. Despite the similarity in developing history, the 1997 financial crisis experiences are quite different between the two countries. South Korea was hit hard by the crisis, whereas the crisis barely touched Taiwan. What caused the difference? The authors argue that the difference in the impacts of the crisis and the resulting outcomes on South Korea and Taiwan is a result of existing political and economic institutions and structures and the choices that were made within those institutions. They support this argument by using institutional explanation, such as growth strategy, market liberalization, and political development.

Other works have asked whether parties matter; this article asks whether parties' dominant factions matter. Special focus is placed on whether change in dominant faction or coalition within the party tends to produce other significant party change, and under what circumstances. Three specific hypotheses are developed and tested, one involving motivation for change and the other two involving 'resources' which are necessary to make dramatic change possible. Empirical analysis rests upon original data covering seven changes in dominant faction and several dimensions of party change within five parties in the United Kingdom and Germany for the period 1950 to 1990. The authors conclude that not all of the hypothesized factors have equal impact on degree of party change, with ability of the newly dominant faction to control its coalition being primary. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Since Lipset's seminal study, some scholars have believed that economic development leads to democratization. Theoretically, however, more democratized political systems can also stimulate economic growth & development. Thus, democracy may lead to economic growth, while economic development may also lead to democratization. A Granger causal analysis is used to investigate the causal direction between the two variables; the analysis draws on data for 32 developing countries for the period 1948-1982. The results of the analysis reveal that the causal direction between democracy & economic development cannot be generalized in either way. 2 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

La région du Pacifique étant de plus en plus contestée sur le plan stratégique, les puissances régionales ont intensifié leur recours à la diplomatie de la défense. En conséquence, le nombre et l'ampleur des déploiements militaires d'assistance humanitaire et d'aide en cas de catastrophe naturelle, des exercices et des projets de sécurité coopérative entrepris dans le Pacifique Sud ont considérablement augmenté. Pourtant, malgré l'hypothèse selon laquelle la diplomatie de la défense fait avancer les objectifs politiques des États initiateurs et bénéficie aux pays insulaires du Pacifique (PIP), peu d'études ont examiné la réalité de ces affirmations. Ce manque de recherche est préoccupant, surtout si l'on considère les impacts à long terme que ces activités peuvent avoir sur le développement régional, la stabilité et la sécurité dans le Pacifique Sud. Dans cet article, nous évaluons la diplomatie de la défense dans le Pacifique Sud. Des études de cas comparatives ont été entreprises sur l'Australie, la Chine et la Nouvelle-Zélande, car ces pays ont récemment étendu leur présence militaire dans la région.

Our assumptions about the nature and conduct of contemporary international politics deeply impact how we view maritime disputes plaguing the East and South China Seas. In this article, our analysis of the push and pull factors that influence the extent and possible resolution of maritime disputes in East Asia reveals that war is neither opposed in principle nor completely forbidden as an alternative. Amid heightening maritime tensions in the region, we argue that the underlying forces sustaining complex interdependence are what prevent rival states from engaging into a realist-inspired, zero-sum warfare. However, this is not to suggest that economic interdependence creates an absolute power that completely eradicates these flashpoints, and neither do we imply that it faithfully reflects East Asia's maritime political reality. Although East Asian countries (particularly the more powerful ones) may think that open war can be justified, as a matter of practical utility, avoiding it is likely to be more effective in achieving the goals of a given conflict.

In this article we reassess the thesis of Lipset and Rokkan in a non-European context and thereby seek to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between social divisions and party creation. Political parties are usually generated by the politicization of social cleavages that exist within societies. The critical question is why certain divisions become politicized and others do not. Using the Philippines as a case study, we seek to explain how acute social dissensions could fail to give rise to competitive political parties. We contend that certain institutional forms could significantly influence whether social conflicts are translated into political form.