Suchergebnisse

In der Diskussion um praktikable Modelle zur Erklärung informeller Politikstrukturen und -mechanismen reorganisieren die Autoren das ursprüngliche Factionalism-Modell Nathan's unter Berücksichtigung der verschiedentlich vorgebrachten Kritik. Diese richtete sich v.a. auf die Frage des Einflußgrades kultureller sowie struktureller (institutioneller) Faktoren auf das Verhalten politischer Akteure. Die Autoren bezweifeln die modelltheoretische Meßbarkeit kultureller Einflüsse sowie die Exklusivität dieser Variablen und betonen demgegenüber die Dominanz struktureller Faktoren. Das neue Modell basiert auf den klassifizierenden Variablen "Motivation des Zusammenschlusses" und "Kommunikationsmuster in der Gruppe". Konsequenzen verschiedener Typen faktiöser Strukturen auf dem Gruppen- sowie Systemlevel werden diskutiert. (FUB/APCh-Emn)

China's economic model, commonly described as "state capitalist," is now better characterized as party-state capitalism, in which the political survival of the Communist Party trumps developmental goals. Its tools for managing the economy include not only state ownership and market interventions, but increasing use of party-state power to discipline private capital. China's entrepreneurs are now expected to adhere to the party line, as are foreign corporations operating in the country. The shift is fueling a backlash from foreign governments that view the fusion of state and private interests in China as a threat to their own national security.

"China's contemporary political economy features an emboldened role for the state as owner and regulator, and with markets expected to act in the service of party-state goals. How has the relationship between the state and different types of firms evolved? This Element situates China's reform-era political economy in comparative analytic perspective with attention to adaptations of its model over time. Just as other types of economies have generated internal dynamics and external reactions that undermine initial arrangements, so too has China's political economy. While China's state has always played a core role in development, over time prioritization of growth has shifted to a variant of state capitalism best described as, "party-state capitalism," which emphasizes risk management and leadership by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Rather than reflecting long-held intentions of the CCP, the transition to party-state capitalism emerged from reactions to perceived threats and problems, some domestic and some external. These adaptations are refracted in the contemporary crises of global capitalism."

""Adopts an evolutionary framework to examine how the Chinese state relates with non-state actors across several fields of governance: community, environment, public health, economics, labor, society, and religion; identifies areas where state-society interactions have shifted over time, ranging from constructive engagement to protracted conflict, thereby providing nuanced insight into the circumstances wherein the party-state exerts its coercive power versus engaging in more flexible responses"--Provided by publisher"--

Abstract
Contrary to expectations, economic interdependence has not tempered security conflict between China and the United States. In response to perceived domestic and external threats, the Chinese Communist Party's actions to ensure regime security have generated insecurity in other states, causing them to adopt measures to constrain Chinese firms. Security dilemma dynamics best explain the subsequent reactions from many advanced industrialized countries to the evolution of China's political economy into party-state capitalism. Party-state capitalism manifests in two signature ways: (1) expansion of party-state authority in firms through changes in corporate governance and state-led financial instruments; and (2) enforcement of political fealty among various economic actors. Together, these trends have blurred the distinction between state and private capital in China and resulted in backlash, including intensified investment reviews, campaigns to exclude Chinese firms from strategic sectors, and the creation of novel domestic and international institutions to address perceived threats from Chinese actors. The uniqueness of China's model has prompted significant reorganization of the rules governing capitalism, both nationally and globally.

Enthält Rezension von:‡‡Lardy, Nicholas R.: Markets over Mao : the rise of private Business in China. - Washington/D.C. : Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014

Part I. Labor relations: Variable forms of state capacity: state and labor in Shanghai and Mumbai in the 1950s / Mark W. Frazier -- Labor and state absenteeism: construction workers in India and China / T.G. Suresh -- Part II. Legal reform and rights protest: Contesting the right to law: courts and constitutionalism in India and China / Sanjay Ruparelia -- State-embedded villages: rural protests and rights awareness in India and China / Manjusha Nair -- Part III. Public goods provision: Parallel trajectories: the development of the welfare state in China and India / Nara Dillon -- Higher education reform in China and India: the role of the state / Devesh Kapur and Elizabeth J. Perry -- Part IV. Transnational migration and investment: Cosmopolitan capitalism: local state-society relations in China and India / Kellee S Tsai -- Foreign direct investment in China and India: history, economics, and politics / Min Ye