Remittances and the informal economy
In: Journal of development economics, Band 133, S. 66-83
ISSN: 0304-3878
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 133, S. 66-83
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of human capital: JHC, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 26-75
ISSN: 1932-8664
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4536
SSRN
Working paper
In: European economic review: EER, Band 56, Heft 8, S. 1730-1745
ISSN: 1873-572X
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 88, Heft 2, S. 205-216
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 84, Heft 1, S. 507-533
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 84, Heft 1, S. 507-533
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Economica, Band 73, Heft 292, S. 725-748
ISSN: 1468-0335
Non‐excludable and excludable public inputs are introduced into an endogenous growth model. We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user‐cost structure, emphasizing the role of congestion and its consequences for the government's budget. The latter comprises fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the public inputs, although they may generate insufficient revenue to do so entirely. We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, but the CES technology is also considered.
Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability. This paper introduces both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model. We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure. Our results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government's budget. The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or may not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion. We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, although the case of CES technology is also considered.
BASE
Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability. This paper introduces both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model. We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure. Our results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government's budget. The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or may not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion. We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, although the case of CES technology is also considered.
BASE
In: Journal of international economics, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 267-295
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 112, Heft 476, S. 107-132
ISSN: 1468-0297