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The author has tried to prove that interethnic relations in democracy cannot be handled solely by means of legal, economic, & institutional means; political culture, ie, civic democratic political culture, can have a significant role. The analysis shows that there is room for the build-up of a transnational democratic citizenry, free from all ascriptive criteria & identities such as religion, ethnicity, etc. It also reveals how classic liberalism neglects various identities (ethnic, national, etc) while communitarian liberalism overlooks the excluding force of various identities. It has also demonstrated that there are several concepts of civic identities (liberal, communitarian, & social/group) & that each of these concepts can exert profound influence on the relationship between citizens & their political community. Finally, the relation between patriotism & interethnic relations in democracy are reviewed. Patriotism, in the circumstances of growing social pluralization, & despite a plethora of political integrations, can play a prominent role in bridging the political & cultural atomizations & conflicts in society. It can undertake this role only if constituted in the civic & not the crude (fixed) ethnic sense -- though the national defines the limits & the meaning of this constitution -- provided it evolves into loyalty to one's homeland & goes hand in hand with the development of democracy & human rights. In short, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that it is necessary to expand democratic political culture that might aid in resolving intricate & sensitive relations among various ethnic & cultural communities. Patriotism can assume a decisive role in this. It lays down the limits & legitimacy of each meaningful political discourse & each genuine political subject. Adapted from the source document.

Defining the dimensions of political culture is a precondition in the elaboration of the theory of this phenomenon & for its systematic empirical study. It has been demonstrated that Almond-Verba's concept of the dimensions of political culture, in the form of a matrix of the three orientations (cognitive, affective, & evaluative) times four political objects ("system," "input-objects," "output-objects," & "I" as an object) is not plausible. If political culture is defined as a set of beliefs about politics (which it indeed is), then it is clear that each belief at the same time contains an intricate mix of knowledge, emotions, & evaluations. This makes it difficult to determine the dimensions according to the mentioned orientations. It seems this was sensed by Almond himself in one of his later works. Using his more recent concept, we define the dimensions of political culture according to the "objects" of politics & not vice versa, according to the orientations in relation to these "objects." Thus, we have elaborated on the three fundamental dimensions according to the three fundamental objects of politics: the "system" as a universal object, the "process" as a dynamic object of politics, & the "conduct" as a manner of decision making & the outcome of governing. It has been found that each of these basic dimensions of political culture has a series of subdimensions (a total of about 25). Surely, this matrix may be added to or perhaps amended, but basically it is unassailable, since it represents a sort of map of political culture. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this essay is to prove the connection among political culture, political structure, & democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analyzed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture & structure, ie, within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims -- primarily in line with the functional theory of culture -- that there is a functional concordance between culture & structure, that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture, ie, that "culture is a structure's way of life," that culture determines the structure) & the contemporary interactional approach (in which -- primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" -- complex relations among various cultural variables & structural variables are analyzed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition" but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or the end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture & structure. The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate & useful in understanding & maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important & more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis has shown how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depend on the elements of the very political structure (party systems & coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc.). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently its role greatly depends on the relations among political actors & the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture & structure are extremely sophisticated & that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" & gradual development. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

The essay describes the evolution of the concept of political culture, from the concepts such as Comte's 'consensus,' Durkheim's 'collective awareness,' Weber's 'significance of individual actions,' to Parson's 'action frame of reference,' & Mead's 'national character.' The development began with Comte's search for differentia specifica of social sciences in relation to other positive sciences & finished in 1963 with the introduction of the concept of political culture into political science by G. Almond & S. Verba. Our analysis has shown that many definitions of political culture point out that its essence lies in people's beliefs since political culture is a set of beliefs regarding politics. As much as it may seem a paradox, it cannot be reduced to mere individual beliefs, but represents a system of inter-subjective opinions on various political objects. This explains the possible discrepancies between the political events & the political beliefs of the people, between their behavior & political culture, & so on. Contrary to the belief of some authors, it has been shown how political culture may & should be taken as a common denominator for a variety of opinions on politics. Political attitudes, values, norms, public opinion, & political ideologies are nothing but different manifestations of political culture. Thus, the concept of political culture includes diverse facets of the subjective attitude of people towards politics. This is the asset & not the downside of this concept, as some authors would have it. It is pointed out that the manifold manifestations of political culture do not carry the same 'weight' in explaining the political activism of people & the functioning of political systems. The relationship between these manifestations is extremely complex & a challenge for research. It is this very relationship that could explain the stable & less stable (ie, stable & vacillating) reactions of people in their political activity. Adapted from the source document.

The complex relationship between values & political tolerance is important for systematic research. Some researchers (P. Sniderman, 1988; J. F. Fletcher, 1990) have shown that attitudes supporting civil freedoms are rooted in the interaction of fundamental values. Our research in Croatia has shown that support for civil freedoms (citizens' rights) depends on increased political participation. While Fletcher showed that support for the powers of the state come from respect for the value of the community, our research sample (high school & university students) tended to express that support through respect for authority. This important difference is discussed in some depth in the article. 13 Tables, 1 Figure, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

This research on the political tolerance among youth (high school & university students) is based on the theory & concepts by J. Sullivan & his associates (1979). The level of political tolerance of our respondents toward the least liked group depends largely on the group itself & the content of political freedom that is tolerable or intolerable. Averaging the responses to the six questions of political tolerance, only 35% of the respondents displayed political tolerance. This level of tolerance is closer to that of Israeli citizens than US or British. 9 Tables, 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

This research on the political tolerance among youth (high school & university students) is based on the theory & concepts by J. Sullivan & his associates (1979). The level of political tolerance of our respondents toward the least liked group depends largely on the group itself & the content of political freedom that is tolerable or intolerable. Averaging the responses to the six questions of political tolerance, only 35% of the respondents displayed political tolerance. This level of tolerance is closer to that of Israeli citizens than US or British. 9 Tables, 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author demonstrates that the envisaged solutions for the conflict between the liberal concept of freedom & the common good differ greatly. Also presented is a miscellany of possible solutions as well as the related contentious issues. However, the analysis has shown that almost all the mentioned authors see the need for some common good, for a "measure of freedom," but their proposed ways for solving the issue vary: while some think that the universal common good is necessary for regulating procedures conducive to the achievement of freely chosen individual aims, others think that the tolerance of cultural & value differences is a sufficient condition for solving the said problem. For example, J. Raz emphasizes moral pluralism as the basis of autonomy, while S. Nathanson thinks that pluralist aims can exist, but not morally varied ways of their achievement. These different concepts of the relationships between freedom & common good can have different effects on the concepts & the practice of public politics in contemporary societies. That is why the need for looking into the conflict between freedom & common good, differences & unity, private & public interest, is highly topical & represents a true challenge for all those who want to contribute to solving the problems of modern age & liberal democracies. Adapted from the source document.

Tolerance is among the most crucial social & political values in the theory of liberal virtues. There are two basic ways of exploring political tolerance, as tolerance of the generally unpopular groups in the society (see S. Stouffer, 1955), & of the personally objectionable (least respected) groups (see J. Sullivan, 1979). We look into the tolerance of generally unpopular groups -- fascists, communists & "Yugoslavs." The results of the poll showed that among young Croatians (secondary-school students & university students), there is a high level of tolerance of communists & fascists (generally unpopular groups), since the percentage is higher than the so called democratic majority (50+%), while the percentage of tolerance for "Yugoslavs" is somewhat lower, below the said democratic majority. It is worth noting that tolerance of the same groups was lower when the poll participants themselves chose these groups as personally objectionable (ie, least respected). Education (regarding the tolerance of communists) & sex (regarding the tolerance of fascists) proved to have had a significant influence on the results of the poll. 9 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Two stages in the conceptualization of & research on political tolerance are addressed: the studies of Stouffer (1955), Prothro & Grigg, & others; & the work of J. Sullivan (1979) & his collaborators. In relation to earlier research, Sullivan & his collaborators have established a "contentual control" of tolerance by precisely distinguishing political attitudes toward generally unpopular groups in society from tolerance itself or from the readiness to put up with those groups with which individuals otherwise do not agree. We believe, however, that this does not sufficiently define political tolerance. We therefore define tolerance as the readiness to put up with certain groups with which individuals do not otherwise agree -- in correspondence with the ensemble of universal political liberties (ie, the general norms of democracy) -- but only up to certain limits. Tolerance can reach certain limits because political liberties are not absolute values but are restricted by other relevant values of society. This complicates also the methodology of the study of this very complex phenomenon. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.