Suchergebnisse

The topic of authority only rarely figures into theories of deliberative democracy, no doubt owing to the widely held view that authority is inherently undemocratic. But deliberative democrats need a concept of authoritative decision making, not least because the scale and complexity of contemporary societies radically limit the numbers of decisions that can be made by deliberatively democratic means. I argue for an inherently democratic conception of authority, in large part by examining and rejecting the view—held by radical democrats, conservatives, and most liberals—that authority involves a surrender of judgment by those subject to authority. In contrast, I develop the view that authority, particularly in posttraditional contexts, involves a limited suspension of judgment enabled by a context of democratic challenge and public accountability. An important point is that democratic authority supports robust deliberative decision making by enabling individuals to allocate their time, energy, and knowledge to the issues most significant to them.

Entgegen weitverbreiteter Annahmen ist Autorität nicht per se undemokratisch. Der Autor vertritt eine demokratische Konzeption von Autorität, die einen überlegten, rationalen und verantwortlichen politischen Entscheidungsprozeß ermöglicht. (FUB-Hng)

The subdiscipline of political theory and political philosophy continues to suffer some misunderstanding within political science as a whole. Notwithstanding its renaissance in the last decade, political theory/philosophy is still too often characterized in terms that obscure its roles and functions within the discipline. Political theory/philosophy is often referred to as "normative theory" as a way of distinguishing its concerns with values from the "empirical theory" and research of political science proper. Where the concerns of political theory/philosophy are not just normative, political scientists often characterize it as "speculative theory" to distinguish it from "empirical theory" that can be confirmed or refuted by reference to observable data. The terms of such a distinction suggest, of course, that theories grounded in certainties can and ought to replace the speculative approaches of traditional political thought. And because political theory/philosophy relies heavily on the history of political thought, many see it as part of history and the humanities rather than political science—interesting and necessary for any culturally literate person, but fundamentally distinct from contemporary political research.Terminological distinctions such as these solidified in an era in which behavioralist agendas shaped subdisciplinary boundaries, and they reflect the influence that neo-positivist views of explanation once had within the discipline. Since that time, however, we have developed more sophisticated understandings of how theory and philosophy relate to empirical research. These developments have in turn affected the way we understand the explanatory concerns of political science, while also expanding political theory/philosophy beyond its traditional boundaries.