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We examine the impact of large-scale asset purchases of government bonds on real GDP and the CPI in the United Kingdom and the United States with a Bayesian VAR, estimated on monthly data from 2009 M3 to 2013 M5. We identify an asset purchase shock with sign and zero restrictions. In contrast to the impulse response analysis in previous work, the reactions of real GDP and CPI are left unrestricted, so as formally to test whether these variables are affected by asset purchases. We then explore the transmission channels to the domestic economy and emerging markets. Our results suggest that asset purchases have a statistically significant effect on real GDP with a purchase of 1% of GDP leading to a .36% (.18%) rise in real GDP and a .38% (.3%) rise in CPI for the United States (United Kingdom). In the United States, this policy lowers yields on long-term government bonds and the real exchange rate. In the United Kingdom, on other hand, interest rate futures and measures of financial market uncertainty are more affected. There is also some evidence that emerging market sovereign bond and corporate bond spreads decline, with industrial production rising in response a positive asset purchase shock in either country.

This article uses a dataset covering ten advanced economies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States) to explore the role of real wages as an influence on employment and unemployment in the Great Depression and more generally in the 1920s and 1930s. The distinction between employment and unemployment movements during the Great Depression helps to clarify the role of supply side influences on the national heterogeneity of unemployment increases during the Great Depression. We find little general econometric evidence for the idea that movements in product wages had strong influences on employment either during the period of rising unemployment associated with the depression of the 1930s or more generally with the data which exist for the 1920s and 1930s.

This article compares the performance of the UK economy since 1997 with that between 1979 and 1997 and with the performance of the other G7 economies in both periods. It concludes that Britain has done relatively well in terms of productivity growth, economic growth and national income per head but not very well in terms of labour market performance. Savings rates were too low to deliver sustainable economic growth over the period 1979–97 and there has been very little improvement since then. The performance of the economy during the recession and its immediate aftermath has been disappointing relative to the other G7 economies.

We set out a framework for measuring the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom by assessing the absolute level of savings based on individual preferences of different ages. We examine this relationship between age and savings using data from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2004–5. We show that, while the level of national saving is about 8.4 percentage points of net national income lower than is required if one assumes that each cohort pays its own way, wealth holdings are considerably higher than are required on the same basis. Looking at household, rather than national saving, the current pattern of benefits on public sector pensions removes the need to save for old age. While perhaps £4000m of household wealth holding can be accounted for by bequest and other transfer motives, our results suggest excess wealth holding of around £1600m in 2004.

The past few months have seen a growing debate on the question of migration. There is little doubt that there has recently been a sharp inflow of migrants into the United Kingdom, raising a range of both economic and social issues. In this commentary we consider the structure of recent immigration and assess some of its economic consequences.

We assess the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom from a macroeconomic perspective. We present conditions needed for wealth to grow in line with income and discuss the circumstances in which capital gains can represent a substitute for saving. We show that reference to balance sheets can be misleading because they fail to identify the cost of future consumption. A savings gap of between £16.5 bn and £66 bn is identified before taking account of the effects of demographic change. The outcome depends on whether one regards rising house prices as a consequence of fixed supplies of land or as the outcome of failing to invest enough in housing with the upper figure arising in the latter case. Policy measures to reduce the savings gap are discussed. These include appropriate use of fiscal policy and taxation of credit.

We estimate a model of consumption and money holdings with multiple means of payment, using data for the United Kingdom. The model describes a technology for transactions, where money and credit are imperfect substitutes. It allows us to identify shocks to the transactions technology. We evaluate the value of long‐term changes in the payments systems to the representative consumer, as well as the welfare cost of inflation from 1977 to 1998. The estimates allow us to evaluate the welfare costs of inflation of this period. The model also has implications for consumption‐smoothing in response to monetary shocks.