Suchergebnisse

Contends that US training of Latin American militaries to combat perceived internal terrorist threats reflects the expansion of US military training during the Cold War, acting an impediment to democratization. In this light, the role of the US training facility, the School of the Americas (SOA), now called the Western Hemisphere Instit for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), is explored, drawing on interviews with staff & instructors & analysis of school archives, 1948-2002. Focus is on tracing the evolution of the courses taught to the Latin American militaries & linkages to US foreign & defense policy. The nature of Latin American military civilian relations vis-a-vis internal threats is touched on before describing the SOA in the post-WWII, Cold War, & post-Cold War periods. The impact of the September 11, 2001, attacks on WHINSEC is then looked at in terms of the pressure to incorporate terrorism into its curriculum & the implications for democracy & human rights in Latin America. It is argued that an explicit shift toward counterterrorism would undermine WHINSEC efforts at developing a human rights curriculum. J. Zendejas

Since Latin American independence, U.S. presidents have consistently faced the issue of how to respond to domestic political conflict in the region. The purpose of this article is to examine U.S. recognition policy toward Latin American governments, to identify patterns in that policy, and to explain its decline. It might appear that the United States has come full circle and that we are currently seeing a return to Thomas Jefferson's de facto principle of recognition, wherein governments are recognized automatically regardless of their nature. Jefferson's policy was to avoid making political judgment on foreign governments. The current evolution (or devolution) of recognition policy, however, does not follow the tenet of nonjudgment.

This article looks at civil-military relations in Chile, focusing on the period between 1990 and 1998. It analyzes military interests and civil-military channels. The four main cases examined in this article are situations when civilians sought to make decisions the military opposed because they affected core military interests. (DSE/DÜI)

This is an ambitious but often frustrating book. Its goal, as laid out by Fred Rosen in the introduction, is to "explore the ways in which the contours of dissent and resistance have been generated by the activities of empire, as well as the ways in which the contours of empire have been given shape by opposition, resistance, and disaffection" (5). The ambition is to demonstrate the causal relationships between the empire of the United States on the one hand, and the resistance that has emerged as a result.My frustration stems primarily from the fact that the book offers no definition of "empire" despite its centrality to the chapters. Rosen does not define it in the introduction. Indeed, one has to dig deeply into Alan Knight's impressive discussion of U.S. imperialism and hegemony to find the following in endnote 24: "I have deliberately refrained from trying to define imperialism" (47; emphasis in original). Endnote 99 states very plainly that "I have made the prudent but cowardly decision to avoid attempting any definition or discussion of "resistance," a concept that, due to overuse, may be yielding diminishing returns" (52).

This article argues that political learning with regard to civil‐military relations in Chile has proved an obstacle to democratization. In the postauthoritarian period, both the armed forces and political parties have referred to history when considering civil‐military reform, especially with regard to how to avoid a repeat of the conflict of the Unidad Popular period. Meanwhile, the military also utilizes the Spanish example when resisting changes it feels are inimical to its interests. The 'lessons' each takes from the past directly influence political strategies and the overall result is that while civilian rule continues, democratic civil‐military relations are not necessarily advanced.