Since Imran Khan took office as Pakistan's Prime Minister (PM) in August 2018, there has been an obvious improvement in the ties between the civilian government and the country's armed forces. It is argued here that this new civil-military cordiality led to a constructive, less tensed working relationship between the army's top brass and the civilian administration; however, it did not translate into any reduction in the military's political influence, particularly over foreign affairs. […]
As discussed in an earlier SADF Comment, one of the immediate aims of Pakistan's Afghan policy is the establishment of an interim government in Kabul. In March 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan presented the idea of forming a transitional authority 'representing the entire people of Afghanistan'. This call for a 'new government', combined with the portraying of the then head of the so-called National Unity Government Ashraf Ghani as a major obstacle for national reconciliation and peace negotiations in Afghanistan, created harsh criticisms among the country's political leadership. However, Pakistani authorities still and persistently broach the topic – especially in times of rising tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. Now, amidst the current debate among decision makers in the US and NATO regarding either a troop withdrawal or a potential extension of military presence, and faced with a stalled process of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, the notion of an interim government becomes crucial. […]
It seems that relations between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lie in extraordinary flux. This SADF Working Paper starts by analysing the causes and consequences of that fact. The paper sheds light not only on possible dynamics in Pakistan's foreign policy in relation to Saudi Arabia but also on the repercussions of said foreign policy for the region. It is argued that Islamabad is currently realigning some foreign policy parameters, foremost so as to reduce its dependency on Riyadh and readjust some of its bilateral relations, particularly as regards Iran and Turkey. This Pakistani ambition is in line with Chinese interests and is thus supported by Beijing. The paper predicts a fundamental deterioration in the ties between Riyadh and Islamabad due to a substantial clash in interests; this deterioration is to be matched by new Pakistani initiatives aiming to engage collaboration with both Iran on Afghanistan.
Islamabad's political circles experienced a tumultuous week, even for Pakistani standards. On Saturday, March 6, 2021, Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan asked lawmakers from the lower house of the country's parliament for a vote of confidence. The PM secured 178 votes out of the 171 currently required to win the open ballot. Khan obviously felt that this move was necessary after a 'surprise' electoral defeat in the Senate polls three days earlier. Opposition parties – foremost the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of former PM Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of former president Asif Ali Zardari – were able to achieve majority (53 seats vis-à-vis 47 for the ruling alliance) in the upper house. Put simply and somewhat downplaying the whole complexity of electoral regulations, Senate elections seek legislators in the provincial assemblies to elect senators to represent their provinces – the National Assembly/NA also elects a Senator to represent the capital, Islamabad. It goes without saying that such elections, especially for the capital's Senate seat, are extraordinary contested. […]
For nearly a month, the coastal town of Gwadar has been witnessing the emergence of a protest movement called the Gwadar Ko Huqooq Do Tehreek (Give Rights to Gwadar Movement), 'considered one of the largest in Baluchistan's history'. The movement is led by Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Baluchistan's General Secretary and religious scholar Maulana Hidayat-ur-Rehman Baloch is rallying against various issues, from the presence of large illegal fishing trawlers and the ban on locals from engaging on deep-sea trawling to the lack of health facilities, adequate educational centres, and drinking water. In brief, protesters are demanding the basic rights denied to them by the central government and its subservient provincial administration since the country came into existence. The Baloch feeling of social and economic marginalisation as well as political side-lining gained additional momentum since the launch of the Beijing's initiated China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), roughly six years ago (Wolf, 2019). For regional communities in Gwadar and beyond, it becomes increasingly obvious that instead of the promised employments and improved overall living conditions, Chinese development projects (foremost the CPEC) increase socio-economic aberrations (especially the exploitation of local resources without adequate returns for autochthonous populations) and generally deteriorate living conditions. For experts, such massive protests do not come by surprise; however, the composition, timing, and leadership structure of these movement do raise some questions. […]
If one is to believe both those involved as well as relatively distant international observers, Afghanistan is currently witnessing an 'historic opportunity' to end an endless war. However, whether a sustainable peace process is feasible depends on numerous factors. One concerns whether neighbouring states will be able to play a constructive role in the process – or whether they will continue to spoil intra-national reconciliation. It is common knowledge that Pakistan has the longest record of interference in the internal affairs of its western neighbour. As discussed in an earlier SADF publication, the Doha peace agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban dated February 29, 2020 offered new opportunities to Pakistan. Ongoing Intra-Afghan Peace Talks (or Negotiations, IAN) between the Taliban (TB) and the Afghan government (GIROA) under President of Ashraf Ghani are constantly facing new challenges. These are leading to slowdowns - if not to an actual stalemate, thus providing Pakistani authorities with additional room to manoeuvre and ultimately extend their leverage over Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan intensified and even broadened its engagement in Afghanistan through a twofold strategy: continuing its close collaboration with the TB through both military and political-diplomatic means, and reaching out to other political and militant actors within Afghanistan. [.]
In North-West Pakistan, that is in the global epicentre of Jihadism, Islamic extremism, and militancy, a new peaceful, socio-political movement has emerged. Facing a double threat, from regional and international terrorists on one side and from the federal government and its security sector agents on the other, local Pashtuns articulated their grievances and launched the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (Movement for the protection of Pashtuns, PTM). Led by liberal and secular politicians and activists, the civic grassroots initiative PTM gained much popularity in the region during the last few years and translated the human suffering incurred by the Pashtuns into a national discourse with growing international significance. Today, the PTM is one of the 'most powerful human rights voices' in Pakistan. […]
On June 25, 2020, Pakistan's military-backed Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan made a statement in the National Assembly in which he glorified Osama Bin Laden (OBL) as a 'martyr', using the term shaheed. This is without doubt a landmark event which needs a closer assessment. This SADF Comment aims to shed light on the rationale behind PM Khan's eulogy of the former Al Qaeda leader and contextualise it within both domestic and regional trajectories. In order to do so, the following points should be highlighted: By describing OBL as a martyr, PM Khan suggests that he 'was a victim rather than an aggressor'. This glorification of Jihadism and international terrorism was not just a slip of the tongue. The fact that there is no official clarification from the PM's office - nor a public comment by the country's powerful military – reveals that the remark indeed reflects the view held by most of the country's leading political decision-makers. Even more: it is a confirmation of the military's official policy, of the national political leadership's inclinations, and that of relevant state institutions. This is already well-known. What is new, however, is that such statements are proclaimed publicly - and in the national parliament, no less. […]
The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan is not only leading to severe economic and social impacts but is also accompanied by negative political ramifications, particularly for the country's civil-military relations. Pakistan is also presently hit by one of the worst locust plagues in decades. The federal government's incapability to adequately handle the affairs of the state is perceived as the cause for the slump in most formal sectors and the collapse of the informal economy. The latter is leading to a severe disruption in the livelihoods of large sections of Pakistan's society, especially the poor – those most vulnerable to political and religious radicalisation. Experiencing an advancing Islamisation, embedded in Prime Minister Imran Khan's growing authoritarian style of governance and in a notable seizing of power by the military at the expense of civilian institutions, Pakistan is once again at the edge of a critical juncture. Observers start to put in question the stability of the current civilian set-up in the light of one of the most severe crises in the history of this South Asian country.
Narco-terrorism is one of today's buzzwords in both foreign and domestic policy in South Asia, especially in the context of the contentious India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan's involvement in state-terrorism (Wolf, 2017) and sponsorship of international Jihadism are well-known and documented. Moreover, there are increasingly numerous reports regarding Islamabad's engagement in a phenomenon described as narco-terrorism. The notion of narco-terrorism originates from an understanding that the two occurrences of trafficking in narcotics and terrorism are interconnected. Narco-terrorism is here understood as an integral component of Pakistan's state-sponsorship of cross-border terrorism (Wolf, 2017) used so as to fund and conduct asymmetric warfare against its neighbours -foremost India- and achieve certain foreign policy goals. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is paying increasingly attention to the fact that 'terrorist organisations use narcotics trafficking for the purpose of gaining revenue' and fund their activities. It is argued here that, although state-sponsorship of terrorism is already deeply entrenched within Islamabad's policies towards New Delhi, the 'Narco-type' not only constitutes one of its most brutal forms (due to its far reaching and long-lasting consequences) but is also rapidly intensifying. Moreover, one can state that narco-terrorism in the Pakistani context blurs the line between narcotic traffickers, criminal networks (f. ex. D-Company), terrorists (f. ex. Lashkar-e-Taiba/LeT), and state agencies - foremost the country's military and intelligence services (Inter-Service Intelligence/ISI). […]
Iran and China have been exploring the possibility of a strategic alliance since 2016. If implemented fully, it will not only reshape global geo-economics and geo-politics but also have severe impacts on both the Persian Gulf and South Asia. According to a recently leaked draft agreement, the alliance amounts to an unprecedented economic, security-related, military, technological and developmental collaboration between Tehran and Beijing. Considering recent international trajectories, especially China's newly assertive foreign policy, there are growing concerns regarding the potential repercussions of a pact between two states known for their autocratic style of governance, bullying of neighbours and suppressing of citizens under their administrations. It is crucial to understand the nature of these new, evolving Sino-Iranian relations – and their related threats. […]
During the last few months, the security situation in Balochistan witnessed an increase in militancy. It seems that the escalating violence in the region is linked with the growing Chinese presence and intensified activities by the Pakistani armed forces and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). This SADF Comment subscribes to the following rationale: Locals feel exploited and deprived from the benefits obtained from the use of their provincial resources, as well as politically marginalized by the Pakistani state. The rising numbers of Chinese development projects, companies, workers and security personnel in Balochistan are perceived as threatening to the social and economic conditions of the Baloch people seem to be directly provoking further armed responses. The situation becomes more complicated due to the persistent suppression of the freedom of expression (along with other political and human rights) and the lack of a fair, adequate representation of the Baloch people and their interests on the national level – which prevents them from translating their concerns into the country's political processes. Chinese development projects in the framework of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are increasingly identified by the Baloch people as tools of exploitation (Wolf, 2019) of their natural resources (Coal, Oil, Copper, Gold etc.) – but also as measures supporting the central government's grip over the province. Chinese assets are becoming the main targets of Baloch guerrillas, through actions understood as retaliation measures. […]
Since the end of the British colonial rule over the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the subsequent restructuring of the political map of the region, and the transfer of power to the successor states, the former principle state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) turned into the major flashpoint in South Asia. Despite the fact that the then ruler of J&K declared its accession to India, Pakistan not only illegally holds large parts of the territory but also questions India's legitimate claims over said territory and tries to systematically destabilise Kashmir, the region under New Delhi's administration. Islamabad did realise that the dispute over Kashmir is in a political stalemate. Furthermore, Pakistan was not only defeated in all conventional armed confrontations with India but also was forced to realise that a military 'solution' is impossible due to the tremendous asymmetries in available economic and financial resources. In consequence, Pakistan started a three-fold strategy in its Kashmir approach: (1) To support destabilising activities in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir; (2) To portray India on the international level as a repressive force in Kashmir forced to conduct extra-ordinary security measures so as to maintain law and order; and (3) To portray itself as a 'protector' of the Kashmiri people. This article argues that there is a clear discrepancy between the Pakistani government's claims and true ambitions when it comes to the well-being of the Kashmiri people. The Pakistani leadership claims to be the 'champion of the right to self-determination' and other political freedoms as well as human rights of the Kashmiri people. Yet Islamabad denies these same rights to the citizenry living within its own administration – in Kashmir and elsewhere. It also systematically suppresses local communities. It seems clear that Pakistan's Kashmir agenda only aims to destabilise India, challenge its territorial integrity and target the basis of India's statehood, governance and political identity as a ...
Due to its geostrategic location, Nepal is extraordinarily exposed to external influence. As a small, land-locked country positioned between two major Asian powers, India and China, the country is permanently an object of regional ambitions and rivalries. Safeguarding its national security and independence, Nepal's foreign policy has centred on the not always reconcilable task of maintaining friendly relations with both sides. Therefore, Nepal's current attempt to follow a policy of non-alignment (Xavier, 2017), and to keep foreign influence at bay is nothing new. However, this article argues that Kathmandu's ongoing efforts in maintaining control in political decision-making through an increased cooperation with Beijing possesses severe risks for Nepal's national interests. In view of the challenging process of its democratic transition, weak institutional structure, and unhealthy civil-military relations, China has a multitude of opportunities to gain crucial leverage within Nepal's political-administrative structure. Furthermore, Nepal-China cooperation, especially in the field of defence and security, determines a severe issue for Kathmandu's relation with India. In sum, China's growing engagement in Nepal has remarkable security implications for New Delhi since it determines an intrusion in India's sphere of influence.
Historically, relations between India and Thailand have always been dominated by economic co-operation and cultural exchange. However, since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in May 2014 and the subsequent announcement of his 'Act East policy', not only is there intensifying co-operation of India with Thailand in general, but also a broadening of areas of collaboration. Most remarkable in this context is the new, strong focus of security-related issues as well as efforts to boost economic interaction. This article argues that India's increased interest in Thailand is a result of new international parameters, foremost of which is China's enhanced engagement in the Indian Ocean as well as the South China Sea. As such, it is stated that India-Thai relations must be understood in the wider context of New Delhi's attempt to define its new role in the larger Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, India's recent deteriorating relations with Pakistan and the consequent negative impacts regarding regional connectivity towards 'the West' urges the country even more to reassess its foreign policy towards the South-East Asian region, among which Thailand is identified as a natural gateway. On the other side, Thailand increasingly appears to be identifying India as a priority access to the West. Against this backdrop, the intensification of India-Thailand relations could serve as a catalyst for more regional co-operation between South Asia and South-East Asia.
