Foreign Aid and Political Reform
In: Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, S. 84-116
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In: Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, S. 84-116
In: Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, S. 28-48
In: Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, S. 154-183
In: Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, S. 1-27
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 283-309
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties -- even when devised to quell internal threats -- can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization. Adapted from the source document.
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 283-309
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization.
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 283-310
ISSN: 0007-1234
SSRN
Working paper
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 2, S. 335-359
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 2, S. 335-359
ISSN: 1468-2478
This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other types of regimes. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression. Using data on sanction episodes and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes, however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability. Adapted from the source document.
In: Annual Review of Political Science, Band 13, S. 61-80
SSRN
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 2, S. 335-360
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: IBEI Working Papers 2009/25
SSRN
Working paper
In: IBEI Working Papers
SSRN
Working paper
Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This article assesses how human rights prosecutions influence autocratic regime change in neighboring dictatorships. We argue that when dictators and their elite supporters can preserve their interests after a regime transition, human rights prosecutions are less likely to deter them from leaving power. Using personalist dictatorship as a proxy for weak institutional guarantees of posttransition power, the evidence indicates that these regimes are less likely to democratize when their neighbors prosecute human rights abusers. In other dictatorships, however, neighbor prosecutions do not deter regimes from democratizing. ; This research is supported by NSF-BCS #0904478.
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