Suchergebnisse

Abstract. Some international tribunals, such as the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal and the trade dispute panels set up under GATT, are "dependent" in the sense that the judges are appointed by the state parties for the purpose of resolving a particular dispute. If the judges do not please the state parties, they will not be used again. Other international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, and the new International Criminal Court, are "independent" in the sense that the judges are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and serve fixed terms. The conventional wisdom, which is based mainly on the European experience, is that independent tribunals are more effective at resolving disputes than dependent tribunals are. We argue that the evidence does not support this view. We also argue that the evidence is more consistent with the contrary thesis: the most successful tribunals are dependent. However, selection effects and other methodological problems render a firm conclusion impossible. We support our argument through an examination of qualitative and quantitative evidence, and we argue that the European Court of Justice is not a good model for international tribunals because it owes its success to the high level of political and economic unification among European states. We conclude with pessimistic predictions about the International Criminal Court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, the newest international tribunals.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT -- Content -- Introduction -- Reviving the Nondelegation Principle in the US Constitution -- The Nondelegation Test Hiding in Plain Sight: The Void-for-Vagueness Standard Gets the Job Done -- Reinvigorating Nondelegation with Core Legislative Power -- A Private-Law Framework for Subdelegation -- A "Step Zero" for Delegations -- A Two-Tiered and Categorical Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine -- Executive Administration of the Government's Resources and the Delegation Problem -- The Sky Will Not Fall: Managing the Transition to a Revitalized Nondelegation Doctrine -- Can the Supreme Court Learn from the State Nondelegation Doctrines? -- A Judicially Manageable Test to Restore Accountability -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- About the Authors.

The Antiquities Act of 1906 grants the president the power to designate national monuments in order to protect historic landmarks and structures. Pursuant to this power, a president has the corresponding power to revoke prior national monument designations. Many scholars, however, have taken a different view. They place central reliance on a 1938 opinion by U.S. Attorney General Homer Cummings, which concluded that the statutory power granted to the president to create national monuments does not include the power of revocation. We think this opinion (and the subsequent work which has relied upon it) is poorly reasoned; misconstrued a prior opinion, which came to the opposite result; and is inconsistent with constitutional, statutory, and case law governing the president's exercise of analogous grants of power. Our analysis shows that a general discretionary revocation power exists. We argue that under traditional principles of constitutional, legislative, and administrative law, the authority to execute a discretionary power includes the authority to reverse it. No President (nor any Congress or Supreme Court) can permanently bind his or her successors in their exercise of the executive power. Apart from a general discretionary power to revoke monuments that were lawfully designated, the president has the constitutional power to declare invalid prior monuments if they were illegal from their inception. ; Gaziano, Todd and Yoo, John, Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations (July 18, 2017). Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2018; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3004821. Accessed on WSU Research Exchange at http://hdl.handle.net/2376/12887.