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This volume is part of the early systematic inquiry into the analysis of sport as a developmental device. The book features an international roster of global experts. The chapters represent three groups: theory and philosophy, empirical research in 'on-the-ground' case studies, and those using circumspection to construct cases regarding evaluation

The world of sport offers a deep--and often-overlooked--source for the study of deviance and its development. Deviance and Social Control in Sport challenges preconceived understandings regarding the relationship of deviance and sport and offers a conceptual framework for future work in a variety of sociological subfields. Drawing on their research in criminology and deviance in the discipline of sociology, Atkinson and Young provide a textured understanding of sport-related deviance through the application of various approaches to deviance in a sport context. Using extended case studies, the authors examine the subject of deviance through examples that are popular, understudied, or emerging. The text explains how forms of wanted and unwanted rule violation are produced by and mediated through social contexts in and around sport. As such, it explores - how deviance in sport is culturally constructed and ideologically framed in dynamic and interactive contexts; - the pathways certain athletes follow in becoming deviant and how they learn to associate those behaviors with their core identities; and - the social responses to deviant sporting behaviors, including the role of the media in disseminating images and messages about the behavior in question. By considering networks of social relationships and how they produce, define, and police rule violation and rule violators, Deviance and Social Control in Sport offers a nuanced and integrated explanation of sport deviance that accounts for the behaviors and practices of both individuals and teams

AbstractWhile organized business is a key actor in regulatory politics, its influence is often conditional on the level of unity or conflict occurring within the business community at any given time. Most contemporary regulatory policy interventions put pressure on the normal mechanisms of business unity, as they are highly targeted and sector‐specific. This raises the question of how business unity operates across a highly variegated economic terrain in which costs are asymmetric and free‐riding incentives are high. In this paper, we empirically assess patterns of business unity within regulatory policymaking across different regulated sectors. Our analysis utilizes data from hundreds of regulatory policy proposals and business community reactions to them in the telecommunications, energy, agriculture, pharmaceutical, and financial sectors over a variety of institutional contexts. We find considerable empirical support for the "finance capital unity" hypothesis – the notion that the financial sector enjoys more business unity than other regulated sectors of the economy. When the financial sector is faced with new regulations, business groups from other sectors frequently come to its aid.

Studies of the impact of social movements on government policy usually assume that the most effective strategy to win a reform is to directly pressure the elected politicians responsible for its legislation and implementation. We highlight an alternative, less intuitive way in which movements can exert political influence: by targeting the corporate and institutional adversaries of their proposed reforms. Such targeting can undermine their adversaries' ability or commitment to oppose the changes, thus relaxing the contrary pressure applied to politicians and reducing the resistance within government to progressive reform. We support this proposition by highlighting five instances in which mass pressure applied to institutional adversaries contributed to government policy change. Our analysis demonstrates that mass protest targeting large institutions whose leaders are not elected can be an effective and even primary strategy for compelling elected officials to enact and implement progressive policy change.

Studies of the impact of social movements on government policy usually assume that the most effective strategy to win a reform is to directly pressure the elected politicians responsible for its legislation and implementation. We highlight an alternative, less intuitive way in which movements can exert political influence: by targeting the corporate and institutional adversaries of their proposed reforms. Such targeting can undermine their adversaries' ability or commitment to oppose the changes, thus relaxing the contrary pressure applied to politicians and reducing the resistance within government to progressive reform. We support this proposition by highlighting five instances in which mass pressure applied to institutional adversaries contributed to government policy change. Our analysis demonstrates that mass protest targeting large institutions whose leaders are not elected can be an effective and even primary strategy for compelling elected officials to enact and implement progressive policy change. Adapted from the source document.