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AbstractWe investigated both the direct and indirect political dividends of public policies by examiningMinha Casa,Minha Vida, a housing programme in Brazil that selects its beneficiaries by lottery. We surveyed the lottery participants and found that the winners were not more likely to support the incumbent politicians. Non-beneficiaries, a much larger group, were aware of the programme and thought well of it while the beneficiaries' responses to the programme were sometimes underwhelming. However, politicians considered the programme to be an electoral asset, and a difference-in-differences analysis of electoral results leveraging the roll-out of the programme across municipalities found that presidential and mayoral incumbent candidates performed better in localities that had implemented MCMV. Overall, when the beneficiaries formed a relatively small group, the benefits were conspicuous and the programme's objectives were widely supported. Government programmes can create electoral payoffs independently of how programmes are perceived or experienced by beneficiaries.

We know little about how coalitional strategy affects the electoral fates of political parties in presidential democracy. The literature on coalitions in parliamentary systems shows a negative impact of entering government, while the coattail effects literature on presidential systems suggests some benefits. Combining elements from both approaches, we argue that there is a conditional electoral effect of joining the cabinet under coalitional presidentialism. Even considering presidentialism's heightened attribution of responsibility to a unipersonal executive, we find that coalition parties do indeed place a meaningful electoral wager whenever they choose to enter the president's cabinet as identifiable allies. Leveraging data on Brazilian elections held at national and local levels over 24 years and employing an innovative measure of portfolio salience, we show that the payoff of this wager is contingent on control of the most highly-valued cabinet positions and on the popular approval of the president.

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have spread through the developing world in the past two decades. It is often assumed that CCTs enjoy political support in the population precisely because they impose conditions on beneficiaries. This article employs survey experiments in Brazil and Turkey to determine whether, and in what contexts, making government transfers conditional on behaviour of beneficiaries increases political support for the programmes. Results show that conditional transfers are only marginally more popular than similar unconditional transfers in nationally representative samples, but that this difference is substantially larger among the better-off and among those primed to think of themselves as different from beneficiaries. These findings imply that conditionalities per se are not as strong a determinant of support for transfers as the literature suggests, but that they can still be helpful in building support for transfers among subsets of the population that are least likely to support them.

AbstractThis paper studies the impact of microcredit in Brazil. We use a propensity score matching on original primary data on business and personal outcomes to compare veteran clients of BNDES—Brazil's largest government-owned development bank—to a matched sample of more recent clients. Based on administrative data as well as data from a survey of 2107 clients from the South and Northeast regions of Brazil, the findings show no significant impacts on income, employment generation, access to credit, and business formalization, except for the poorest Municipalities of the Northeast, where microcredit presented positive effects.

1 Introduction; Defining and Measuring Party-Building; Explaining Successful Party-Building: A Conflict-Centered Approach; The Centrality of Conflict; Organizational Inheritance; New Debates and Issues for Research; Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Party-Building; Party-Building and the State: A Double-Edged Sword?; The Role of Party Leaders; The Paradox of Populism; Structure of the Volume Part I Party-Voter Linkages and Challenges of Brand-Building2 Historical Timing, Political Cleavages, and Party-Building in Latin America; Linkages, Cleavages, and Party System Alignments; Critical Junctures and Party System Alignment; Programmatic (De)alignment and Party System Institutionalization in Comparative Perspective; Programmatic Alignments and Party System Stability; Conclusion; 3 Building Party Brands in Argentina and Brazil; Party Brands and Mass Partisanship; Building and Diluting the FREPASO Brand in Argentina; Building the PT Brand in Brazil Party Perceptions and Partisanship: Testing Individual-Level ExpectationsParty Brands, Timing, and the Success of New Parties; 4 Segmented Party-Voter Linkages; Sequencing Explanations of Party Origins and Consolidation; Linkage Segmentation and Harmonization: A Framework; Segmented Appeals in Unequal, Fragmented Societies; The Challenge of Harmonization; The Argument at Work: The Cases of Chile and Uruguay; The Case of the UDI; The Case of the FA; Comparing the Cases; Conclusion; Part II Challenges of Organization-.Building; 5 The Paradox of Adversity; The Argument: The Paradox of Adversity State, Media, and Incentives for Organization-BuildingMobilizing Structures and the Means for Organization-Building; Adversity and Activist Commitment; The Role of Authoritarianism; The Argument at Work: New Left Party Survival and Collapse in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina; The PT in Brazil; PT Organization-Building: State, Media, and Mobilizing Structures; Selection Effects and Activist Commitment; Surviving Crisis in 1982; The Institutio