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ObjectivesThis article relies on data from 20,730 matches in 30 national soccer leagues in Europe to explore the determinants of penalties taken in elite soccer.MethodsWe run OLS cross‐sectional regressions using aggregated data.ResultsWe find that the variation in the number of penalties given across European soccer leagues is largely explained by the individualism versus collectivism dimension.ConclusionsThe more (less) collectivistic (individualistic) the culture of the country, the more likely soccer players are to fall intentionally in the penalty area to increase the chances of a foul being called.

AbstractWhile there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence on the impact of soccer wins on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, there is relatively little hard empirical evidence. It is expected that soccer stimulates more positive attitudes towards immigrants when it highlights immigration benefits rather than costs and increases exposure to famous members of an out-group. Individual-level data from the eight rounds of the European Social Survey (2002–16) in Spain and aggregate data from the Spanish professional soccer league, La Liga, were used to test the hypothesis that the more foreign players in the team of the club winning the corresponding season of Spain's La Liga, the more favourable the views of immigrants in the club's region in that year. The empirical evidence from linear and ordinal regression using different measures of opinions on immigration shows that soccer can affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.

This article examines the determinants of regional identifications in decentralized Spain. The main argument is that regional identifications change as a result of subnational parties mobilization strategies, and these depend in turn on the political competition context that they face. We rely on individual data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas to show that exclusive identifications with Baleares, Canarias, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarra, and the Basque Country increase when subnational parties participate in government, but not when they are the only party in power or have an electoral support above the 40 percent of the votes. Moreover, regional identifications are also exacerbated when there are two parties with a similar electoral support competing within the nationalist bloc. Decentralization per se does not affect regional identifications if there are no subnational parties or, in other words, when there is not a strong regional cleavage. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines how the partisan turnout bias (i.e. turnout rate differences across districts that are linked to the partisan vote shares in those districts) changes over time in PR districted electoral systems. We argue that the bias after the founding election is the unintended consequence of parties and voters' strategic behaviors when they respond to the incentives provided by the electoral system. By looking at the case of Portugal, one of the countries with the largest variation in district magnitude, we find that the increasing asymmetry in turnout rates across districts makes the bias more severe as time goes by. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

In this paper, we propose a new measure of party system nationalization based on a minimalist definition of the phenomenon. A perfectly nationalized party system is a party system with only national parties or, in other words, without sub-national parties. Instead of the homogeneity of parties' vote shares or the number of parties throughout the country, our measure captures the aspirations of parties to be national whose proxy is the proportion of districts (weighted by seats) that a party runs a candidate. The measure is compared with existing indicators through a longitudinal analysis of 256 elections in 18 Western European countries from 1945 to 1998.

AbstractThis article shows the existence of a coordination dilemma in multilevel countries that hold elections for different parliaments, at different territorial levels and with different electoral rules. With evidence from Spain, the analysis identifies interaction or contamination effects between national and subnational electoral arenas that generate, just as in most mixed‐member electoral systems, a centrifugal force that increases the number of electoral parties in national elections. The incentives that solve this coordination dilemma faced by small regional or local parties are theoretically discussed and empirically tested.