Suchergebnisse

There is no doubt that Esping-Andersen's three worlds' typology has been extremely valuable. However, the literature inspired by it shows signs of Kuhnian normal science, which is impairing empirical and theoretical progress. We explain normal science, demonstrate that it characterizes recent empirical regime studies and ask why this has come about. We show that the welfare regime literature has a tendency to confuse the terms 'typology' and 'ideal-types'. This has prevented the emergence of anomalies that are needed for progress. We argue that normal science is fostered by the combination of researchers' tendency to prefer certainty (e.g. to address solvable research problems) and the environmental pressures they face (especially the 'publish or perish' culture and the need to frame research problems in terms of variation rather than similarity). In the discussion section, we suggest several routes by which the welfare state literature can move beyond normal science.

Given the ill-fated political experience with the Third Way, one would not expect social democratic parties that return to office after long opposition spells to take up again the liberal, supply-side oriented policies that were so typical for the Third Way. A case study of Denmark, however, shows that that is precisely what happens and that it has the same disastrous electoral consequences. Taking a comparative perspective and learning from the Danish experience, we conclude that other future social democratic governments are likely to pursue many elements of the updated Third Way we found in the Danish case.

Populist parties increasingly take a welfare chauvinistic position. They criticize mainstream parties for cutting and slashing welfare at the expense of the 'native' population and to the benefit of the 'undeserving' immigrant. Given the electoral success of populist parties, we investigate whether and when mainstream parties ignore, attack or accommodate welfare chauvinism. Using key theories of party behaviour, we test whether mainstream parties (1) respond immediately to populist parties, (2) respond with a time lag, or (3) respond only when they lose elections or are in opposition. Our quantitative analyses of party manifestos, speeches and policies of European mainstream and populist parties (1980–2012) show that mainstream parties adapt to populist parties on welfare chauvinism, but which parties adapt and when varies significantly. In our in-depth examinations of the Dutch and Danish cases, we highlight important cross-country and cross-party differences.

Why are some governments able to push through radical welfare state reforms while others, operating in similar circumstances, are not? Why are some ideas more acceptable than others? We present an open functional approach to reform to answer these questions and illustrate it empirically by discussing the drastic reform of the Dutch disability scheme in the early 1990s. Ideas translate a functional pressure that existentially threatens a social insurance system into a drastic welfare state reform, such as a severe tightening of eligibility criteria. Functional requirements constrain the range of ideas that political actors can consider for welfare state reform, although they do not determine which ideas are adopted. But once adopted, ideas influence the reforms pursued. A government's choice of ideas and the political strategies to implement them determine the success or failure of the reform. Blame avoidance strategies mediate vitally between the functional pressure, the idea and the reform. Adapted from the source document.

Why are some governments able to push through radical welfare state reforms while others, operating in similar circumstances, are not? Why are some ideas more acceptable than others? We present an open functional approach to reform to answer these questions and illustrate it empirically by discussing the drastic reform of the Dutch disability scheme in the early 1990s. Ideas translate a functional pressure that existentially threatens a social insurance system into a drastic welfare state reform, such as a severe tightening of eligibility criteria. Functional requirements constrain the range of ideas that political actors can consider for welfare state reform, although they do not determine which ideas are adopted. But once adopted, ideas influence the reforms pursued. A government's choice of ideas and the political strategies to implement them determine the success or failure of the reform. Blame avoidance strategies mediate vitally between the functional pressure, the idea and the reform.

AbstractSince the late 1970s, the developed welfare states of the European Union have been recasting the policy mix on which their systems of social protection were built. They have adopted a new policy orthodoxy that could be summarised as the 'social investment strategy'. Here we trace its origins and major developments. The shift is characterised by a move away from passive transfers and towards the maximalisation of employability and employment, but there are significant national distinctions and regime specific trajectories. We discuss some caveats, focusing on the question whether the new policy paradigm has been established at the expense of social policies that mitigate poverty and inequality.

Theories on the role of norms in international relations generally neglect the possibility that after their adoption a new battle over their precise meaning ensues, especially when a norm remains vague and illusive. Norm implementation is not only a matter of internalization and compliance, but also of redefinition. Building on insights from rationalist and constructivist approaches, this article advances the idea of recurrent battles for and over norms in international politics. It argues that the analytical tools of international regime theory are instrumental in tracking such battles. This framework is applied to the history and role of subsidiarity as a norm in the competence regime of the European Union between 1991 and 2005. Its main finding is that the issue of subsidiarity was not a matter of norm internalization, but concerned a recurrent battle between old and newly empowered actors over its precise meaning, eventually favouring the member states' prerogative.