Suchergebnisse

Over the last quarter century, major changes in Southern social structure have been accompanied by more positive white attitudes on racial issues. Has voting behavior reflected these changes? The question has important consequences. The degree of racial bloc voting and political mobilization often determines outcomes not only of elections but also of voting rights lawsuits. Data from 130 black/white elections in South Carolina were used to determine rates of racial polarization and mobilization. Bloc voting remained high. Other variables had little explanatory power. Some secondary factors helped explain variations in the generally high levels of polarization by race.

This article focuses on Tito's effort to use foreign policy actions on behalf of his domestic goals. After a bitter rift emerged with the Soviet Union in 1948, Tito moved closer to the West for several years but never proved willing to shift to democratic politics. Although he did carry out reforms of Yugoslavia's Stalinist system in the 1960s, he maintained an authoritarian Communist polity until the end of his life. The article examines how Tito sought to use Yugoslavia's nonaligned status to boost his domestic legitimacy in the eyes of key elites and even, to a degree, in the eyes of the wider population. Yugoslavia's central role in the Bandung conference in 1955 and its subsequent hosting of the summit that formally set up the Nonaligned Movement in 1961 were used by Tito to try to legitimize the polity over which he presided. Yugoslavia's strategy of nonalignment is a valuable illustration of the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in Communist as well as non-Communist states.

In this piece I look at the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as rivals of the West, united more by circumstance than by intent. It emerged as a seemingly innocuous banker's gimmick referring to the 'emerging market' potential of the countries thus thrown together, but due to the aggressive Western response to independent policies, the BRICS have slowly moved towards solidifying their cohesion. Comprising half the world's population, the bloc on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008 was closing in on the West. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, China's GDP was three-quarters the size of the US economy, and India no. 4 behind Japan, whilst Brazil and Russia were catching up with the main EU states (Armijo 2007: 12). The 2008 financial collapse in the West contracted China's export markets and speculation that the BRICS were passé, was rife (Sharma, 2012: 6). However, China and India soon recovered, surpassing the US and Japan, respectively, whilst Russia and Brazil are trailing just behind Germany (World Bank 2016).This (uneven) recovery of the BRICS bloc in turn has provoked an even less benevolent response, increasingly amounting to a straightforward confrontation policy. My argument is that once the crisis forcedChina, the bloc's locomotive, to slow down and the global commodity boom ended, a Western strategy of isolating it from the other BRICS ensued. This is most obvious in the case of the NATO siege on Russia.

In this piece I look at the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as rivals of the West, united more by circumstance than by intent. It emerged as a seemingly innocuous banker's gimmick referring to the 'emerging market' potential of the countries thus thrown together, but due to the aggressive Western response to independent policies, the BRICS have slowly moved towards solidifying their cohesion. Comprising half the world's population, the bloc on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008 was closing in on the West. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, China's GDP was three-quarters the size of the US economy, and India no. 4 behind Japan, whilst Brazil and Russia were catching up with the main EU states (Armijo 2007: 12). The 2008 financial collapse in the West contracted China's export markets and speculation that the BRICS were passé, was rife (Sharma, 2012: 6). However, China and India soon recovered, surpassing the US and Japan, respectively, whilst Russia and Brazil are trailing just behind Germany (World Bank 2016).This (uneven) recovery of the BRICS bloc in turn has provoked an even less benevolent response, increasingly amounting to a straightforward confrontation policy. My argument is that once the crisis forcedChina, the bloc's locomotive, to slow down and the global commodity boom ended, a Western strategy of isolating it from the other BRICS ensued. This is most obvious in the case of the NATO siege on Russia.

This is an important book. While I think that the argument in favour of a yen bloc is deeply flawed, C.H. Kwan's book is a must-read for those interested in East Asian regionalism and integration. It is one of the clearest and best-written expositions of those who propose deeper financial and monetary integration through the formation of a yen bloc. This topic needs to be debated more, and Kwan provides an excellent start. He makes two basic points. The first is that regionalism is on the rise in East Asia, manifest not just in political and trade discussions but also in thinking about finance, monetary systems, and exchange rates. The region is becoming more integrated economically. He describes a virtuous circle between interdependence and economic growth in East Asia. Through trade and investment, industrialisation has spread first from Japan to the newly industrialised economies of East Asia (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), and then to ASEAN and China. This has transferred technology, industrial know-how, and capacity. Combined with the waning of ideology, it has enabled countries like China and Vietnam to open their economies and exploit their great advantages in producing and selling labor-intensive goods. The result is an intra-regional growth dynamic and fundamental interdependence, secured by strengthening government ties. Kwan argues that the East Asian financial crisis revealed the need for regional monetary cooperation to support the economic links. Indeed, he senses a new appetite for cooperative exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. Kwan's second point is that Japan is the biggest economy in the region and it is the natural leader for cooperative exchange rate arrangements in East Asia, focused on the yen. He argues that a yen bloc would be good for Japan, good for East Asia, and good for the world. A yen bloc is good for Japan because it helps internationalise the yen, which helps Japanese firms manage foreign exchange risk, and it promotes Tokyo as a global and regional financial center. Moreover, it puts healthy policy discipline on Japan. A yen bloc is good for East Asia because it provides it with intra-regional exchange rate stability and promotes further integration in the region. While Kwan thinks that Japan has to do more reform in order to lead East Asia, he argues that it has actually made considerable progress, as shown by the 'big bang' of major financial and accounting reforms announced in 1996. He also thinks that a yen bloc would be good for the world because it would provide balance to Europe and, more importantly, the United States in international finance and in policy making. He reckons that an integrated East Asian yen bloc would be the third leg in an emerging tripolar world based on the Americas, Europe, and Asia.

This is an important book. While I think that the argument in favour of a yen bloc is deeply flawed, C.H. Kwan's book is a must-read for those interested in East Asian regionalism and integration. It is one of the clearest and best-written expositions of those who propose deeper financial and monetary integration through the formation of a yen bloc. This topic needs to be debated more, and Kwan provides an excellent start. He makes two basic points. The first is that regionalism is on the rise in East Asia, manifest not just in political and trade discussions but also in thinking about finance, monetary systems, and exchange rates. The region is becoming more integrated economically. He describes a virtuous circle between interdependence and economic growth in East Asia. Through trade and investment, industrialisation has spread first from Japan to the newly industrialised economies of East Asia (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), and then to ASEAN and China. This has transferred technology, industrial know-how, and capacity. Combined with the waning of ideology, it has enabled countries like China and Vietnam to open their economies and exploit their great advantages in producing and selling labor-intensive goods. The result is an intra-regional growth dynamic and fundamental interdependence, secured by strengthening government ties. Kwan argues that the East Asian financial crisis revealed the need for regional monetary cooperation to support the economic links. Indeed, he senses a new appetite for cooperative exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. Kwan's second point is that Japan is the biggest economy in the region and it is the natural leader for cooperative exchange rate arrangements in East Asia, focused on the yen. He argues that a yen bloc would be good for Japan, good for East Asia, and good for the world. A yen bloc is good for Japan because it helps internationalise the yen, which helps Japanese firms manage foreign exchange risk, and it promotes Tokyo as a global and regional financial center. Moreover, it puts healthy policy discipline on Japan. A yen bloc is good for East Asia because it provides it with intra-regional exchange rate stability and promotes further integration in the region. While Kwan thinks that Japan has to do more reform in order to lead East Asia, he argues that it has actually made considerable progress, as shown by the 'big bang' of major financial and accounting reforms announced in 1996. He also thinks that a yen bloc would be good for the world because it would provide balance to Europe and, more importantly, the United States in international finance and in policy making. He reckons that an integrated East Asian yen bloc would be the third leg in an emerging tripolar world based on the Americas, Europe, and Asia.