Suchergebnisse

This paper deals with the concept of "small states" as opposed to "great powers". Both concepts are considered to be ideal types with peculiar behaviour characteristics. It is argued that in certain circumstances (i.e. within a "buffer system") small states may affect the behaviour of great powers in a way that mitigates the latter's rivalry. It appears that a buffer state jammed between two rivals is not a pawn but a pivot in great power games, which may choose from a range of strategies (balancing, bandwagoning, leaning to a third power, staying neutral, or hedging risks) to sustain its survival as an independent unit. By applying the game theory approach to analyse great power relationships, the paper demonstrates how a "win-lose" game transforms into a "win-win" game, and what is the role of small buffer states in this transformation. Touching upon the problem of unequal powers' interactions, this piece of research contributes to the extant literature on asymmetry in international relations mainly in a theoretical way, drawing attention to a virtually forgotten sphere of international relations — buffer systems — mostly overlooked by the current IR discourse.

Although the term "buffer state" is widely employed, it has received little scholarly treatment. This article investigates the buffer state and buffer system, using both expected utility theory and four case studies: Afghanistan (1870-1978), Cambodia (1954-1971), Lebanon (1943-1981), and Belgium (1831-1945). A definition is put forward stating what conditions of geography, capability distribution, and foreign policy orientations must be present for the system to be a buffer system. This definition has clear behavioral consequences for the larger powers in the system and the buffer state. One derivation from the definition is that multilateral declarations of neutrality and partition are phenomena related to each other and to the existence of buffer conditions. Another derivation is that the buffer state's diplomatic options are severely constrained—with neutrality the most likely policy. Clearly, the proposed definition gives us a better understanding of conflict and conflict resolution in a buffer system.

The Curzon Line is usually identified as the line of 8 December 1919 (similar to the current eastern border of Poland), running to the east of the Daugavpils-Vilnius-Hrodna railway. Typical historiographical texts state that the Soviet government decided to ignore the Curzon Line after 17 July 1920. But in fact, the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line on 13–14 July and continued to occupy Vilna (Vilnius). Another inaccuracy follows from this one. The prevailing trend is to interpret the Lithuanian state's situation in 1920 as facing one of two ideology-based alternatives: either Lithuania is sovietised, or it is 'saved' by Poland, which occupies Vilnius and separates Lithuania from contact with Soviet Russia. But this raises a whole swathe of questions: how should the Lithuanians' struggle for Vilnius dur-ing the whole interwar period be viewed? How should assistance to Lithuanians from other countries, such as Germany, the USSR and Great Britain, be assessed? Finally, how should the return of Vilnius to Lithuania in 1939 be viewed? There is no answer to these questions, but the possibility of Lithuania as a buffer zone thanks to the Curzon Line, is ignored or hardly analysed at all. Using historical documents from Lithuania, Great Britain and Russia, and referring to the studies by Alfred Erich Senn, this article aims to find an answer to the question, why was the idea of Lithuania as a buffer state not realised in the summer of 1920? The idea that it would be more appropriate to call the line alongside Lithuania established at the Spa Conference 'the Lloyd George Line' is also discussed.

The Curzon Line is usually identified as the line of 8 December 1919 (similar to the current eastern border of Poland), running to the east of the Daugavpils-Vilnius-Hrodna railway. Typical historiographical texts state that the Soviet government decided to ignore the Curzon Line after 17 July 1920. But in fact, the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line on 13–14 July and continued to occupy Vilna (Vilnius). Another inaccuracy follows from this one. The prevailing trend is to interpret the Lithuanian state's situation in 1920 as facing one of two ideology-based alternatives: either Lithuania is sovietised, or it is 'saved' by Poland, which occupies Vilnius and separates Lithuania from contact with Soviet Russia. But this raises a whole swathe of questions: how should the Lithuanians' struggle for Vilnius dur-ing the whole interwar period be viewed? How should assistance to Lithuanians from other countries, such as Germany, the USSR and Great Britain, be assessed? Finally, how should the return of Vilnius to Lithuania in 1939 be viewed? There is no answer to these questions, but the possibility of Lithuania as a buffer zone thanks to the Curzon Line, is ignored or hardly analysed at all. Using historical documents from Lithuania, Great Britain and Russia, and referring to the studies by Alfred Erich Senn, this article aims to find an answer to the question, why was the idea of Lithuania as a buffer state not realised in the summer of 1920? The idea that it would be more appropriate to call the line alongside Lithuania established at the Spa Conference 'the Lloyd George Line' is also discussed.

If you were to examine an 1816 map of the world, you would discover that half the countries represented there no longer exist. Yet since 1945, the disappearance of individual states from the world stage has become rare. State Death is the first book to systematically examine the reasons why some states die while others survive, and the remarkable decline of state death since the end of World War II. Grappling with what is a core issue of international relations, Tanisha Fazal explores two hundred years of military invasion and occupation, from eighteenth-century Poland to present-day Iraq, to