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A simple model is developed to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups are defined as firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies & opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, & if they do, then they benefit exactly one of the two interest groups. 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 21 References. HA

These quarterly reports provide regular, detailed updates of the tobacco industry's campaign contributions to sitting members of Congress, candidates for federal office, political parties, leadership PACs and other political action committees. Each issue also provides additional information on the tobacco companies' political influence, including new analyses of the correlation between these payments and the tobacco-related legislation that members of the U.S. Congress support. Data reported so far in the 2001-2002 election cycle (from January 1, 2001 to January 3, 2003)1 indicate the tobacco industry has given $8,477,974 in soft and PAC money to federal candidates, political parties and other political action committees.

Using data obtained from the FEC, an exploratory empirical sketch of the determinants of individuals' contributions to congressional candidates for the 1980 and 1982 election cycles is constructed. There appear to be important differences between individual and institutional (PAC and party) campaign contributions. Individual contributions make up a much larger share of the challengers' finances than the incumbents' finances and because individual contributions require more time and effort to acquire, challengers face a cruel corollary to the incumbent advantage. Challengers have to work harder to receive less money. In addition, the data suggest individual contributors are not swayed by the race and sex of the candidate, which may not be true for institutional contributors. Finally, this work questions the validity of the classical assumption that challengers' fund-raising efforts are unaffected by the size of the incumbents' campaign chest.