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This article discusses the compulsory liability insurance for AI-related harm proposed in the ongoing EU policy debate. We not only explain from the demand side why liability insurance would not be the only financial security needed to deal with the risks created by emerging technologies, but we also clarify from the supply side the obstacles concerning the application of liability insurance in the digital age. This article argues that, even if policymakers are determined to mandate liability insurance for AI-related risks, it must be established in a balanced and evidence-based manner. Compulsory financial security is only indicated when there is a risk that the activity may cause serious damage and could lead to insolvency. ; Peer reviewed

This article discusses the compulsory liability insurance for AI-related harm proposed in the ongoing EU policy debate. We not only explain from the demand side why liability insurance would not be the only financial security needed to deal with the risks created by emerging technologies, but we also clarify from the supply side the obstacles concerning the application of liability insurance in the digital age. This article argues that, even if policymakers are determined to mandate liability insurance for AI-related risks, it must be established in a balanced and evidence-based manner. Compulsory financial security is only indicated when there is a risk that the activity may cause serious damage and could lead to insolvency. ; Peer reviewed

AbstractCompel every automobile owner to procure a compensation insurance policy as a condition to obtaining a drivre's license, victims of accidents to be compensated from the insurance fund according to fixed schedules and without regard to fault

"Legislative Research Unit research response." ; Caption title. ; "February 20, 1987." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of social inefficiencies may occur; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with compulsory insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is more likely for those who have supplemented the compulsory insurance with substantial voluntary insurance. This second type of inefficiency is more important the less effective prevention is. It is therefore a puzzle that many countries have imposed strict regulation on the genetic information insurers have access to. A reason may be that genetic insurance is not yet a political issue, and the advantage of shared genetic information is therefore not transparent.

A discussion of health care reform in the US looks to past reform efforts for insights. Health reform is traced from the Progressive Era through Depression Era pursuit of universal health insurance to Truman's Fair Deal UHI to the fight for Medicare in 1965 to another quest for UHI, 1970-1974. This brief history highlights three important constants in US politics: (1) Compulsory health insurance is ideologically controversial with large symbolic, financial, & personal stakes. (2) The limits of political feasibility are much less distinct than many realize. (3) The role of language & emotive symbols cannot be underestimated. In this light, a proposal for health care reform is advanced, beginning with the establishment of a commission, a set of five common goals, & a set of five areas of common ground found among prominent extant reform proposals. In addition, the worst fears generated by each reform model should be addressed. Some remarks are offered on place of health care reform in the current political context as the 2008 US presidential election approaches. D. Edelman

We look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance (PuHI) to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market. PuHI redistributes with respect to risk and income, and the market is affected by adverse selection. We argue that making PuHI voluntary does not lead to its collapse since individuals always participate in it. Additionally, in some cases, a voluntary PuHI scheme increases market efficiency because participation in it sends a signal to private insurers of an individual's health-risk type. The welfare consequences depend on the status quo. If in the status quo no political support exists for a compulsory PuHI, making it voluntary constitutes a Pareto improvement, and in some cases all individuals are strictly better off. If, instead, the status quo implements compulsory PuHI, making it voluntary then results in less redistribution. Adapted from the source document.