Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity
In: Harming Future Persons; International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, S. 115-134
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In: Harming Future Persons; International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, S. 115-134
In: The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism, S. 233-248
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 52-66
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
This essay questions the self-sufficiency of abstract, non-consequentialist, principles as a defence of a libertarian regime. The argument focuses on the difficulties involved in attempts to defend the priority of negative rights if an attractive conception of freedom and an agent-relative view about our reasons to respect rights are to be upheld. The paper closes by suggesting how libertarianism could gain support from various, and perhaps mutually irreducible and even conflicting, considerations in a wide consequentialist system.
In: Western Political Science Association 2010 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: Minerva – An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 19 (2015) 1-24.
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In: Journal of global ethics, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 279-297
ISSN: 1744-9634
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 0, Heft 0
ISSN: 2194-5624
Abstract
As an indirect ethical theory, rule consequentialism first evaluates moral codes in terms of how good the consequences of their general adoption are and then individual actions in terms of whether or not the optimific code authorises them. There are three well-known and powerful objections to rule consequentialism's indirect structure: the ideal-world objection, the rule-worship objection, and the incoherence objection. These objections are all based on cases in which following the optimific code has suboptimal consequences in the real world. After outlining the traditional objections and the cases used to support them, this paper first constructs a new hybrid version of consequentialism that combines elements of both act and rule consequentialism. It then argues that this novel view has sufficient resources for responding to the previous traditional objections to pure rule consequentialism.
In: Oxford moral theory
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 212-231
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractIt is commonly claimed that rule consequentialism (utilitarianism) collapses into act consequentialism, because sometimes there are benefits from breaking the rules. I suggest this argument is less powerful than has been believed. The argument requires a commitment to a very particular (usually implicit) account of feasibility and constraints. It requires the presupposition that thinking of rules as the relevant constraint is incorrect. Supposedly we should look at a smaller unit of choice—the single act—as the relevant choice variable. But once we see feasibility as a matter of degree, there is no obvious cut-off point for how broadly we should think about the constraints on our choices. Treating "a bundle of choices" as a relevant free variable is no less defensible than treating "a single act" as the relevant free variable. Rule utilitarianism, rule consequentialism, and other rules-based approaches are stronger than their current reputation.
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Working paper
In: The political quarterly, Band 91, Heft 4, S. 806-813
ISSN: 1467-923X
AbstractThis article is about two ideologies. Welfare‐consequentialism holds that government should adopt the policies that can rationally be expected to maximise aggregate welfare. Populism holds that society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and asserts that public policy should express the general will of the people. The responses of world governments to the coronavirus pandemic have clearly illustrated the contrast between these ideologies, and the danger that populist government poses to human wellbeing.The article argues that welfare‐consequentialism offers a vaccine for populism. First, it rebuts populism's claims about who government is for and what it should do. Second, the pessimism and distrust that make people crave populism can be satiated by successful welfare‐consequentialist government. Finally, welfare‐consequentialism's sunny narrative of progress can be just as compelling to people as populism's dark story has proven to be.
Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of 'direct collective self-defeat' and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem.
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In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 161-181
ISSN: 1945-2837
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In: The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, S. 380-423