Suchergebnisse

The Court's jurisprudence on the dissolution of political parties is not a very large one. It contains only four cases with Refah Partisi (RP) case not being definitive yet. However, the importance of the Court's judgements is not proportionate with the number of cases as they address to fundamental issues such as relationship between democracy and human rights and clarifies the Court's understanding about democracy. On the other hand, the Court's judgements on political parties bear a special importance in respect of the respondent States. In view of the serious implications of dissolution of a political party, almost all the member States adopted special procedures for such an act. In fact in all four cases the Court has decided the political parties are dissolved by the Constitutional Court of the respondent State. The Court's judgements have inevitable consequences for the Constitution of the respondent State and constitute a ruling on the compatibility of its constitution with the democratic principles which the Court upholds. Let us briefly examine the Strasburg organs' decisions regarding dissolution of political parties. ; peer-reviewed

Intro -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- THE COMMON GOODAND CIVIC VIRTUE -- 1. Liberalism and republicanism -- 2. The preference-aggregating model -- 3. The ethical model: the responsible voter -- 4. The ethical model: the relation between private and communal preferences -- 5. The ethical model: public debate and voting -- 6. On the relation of the two models -- 7. Liberalism and the descriptive claims of the ethical model -- 8. Virtue in politics -- 9. The politics of virtue and personal autonomy -- 10. Concluding remarks -- AGAINST THE COMPROMISE THESIS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The conflict -- 3. Constitutional constraints, constitutional review -- 4. Political equality and rule by the majority -- 5. Equality of votes and equality of voters -- 6. Contractarian theory: the selection of voting rules -- 7. A weakness of contractarian theory -- 8. The typology of preferences -- 9. Filtering the preferences of the contracting parties -- 10. Moral discussion before the contract -- 11. The mandate of the guardians of the constitution -- 12. Summary and restrictions -- CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Interpreting the constitution -- 3. Striking down legislation -- THE LEGACY OF THE FIRST HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT -- 1. The interpretive practice of the Constitutional Court -- 2. Summary and a glance to the future -- Index.

Don't be misled by the usual suspects' disingenuous
blather about "free speech." HB 737 by
Republican state Rep. Kellee Dickerson
doesn't inhibit that; rather, it promotes free expression.

The bill would prohibit picketing near a person's
residence which interferes with, disrupts, threatens to disrupt, or harasses
the individual's right to control, use, or enjoy his residence, and has passed
the Louisiana House of Representatives. Leftist critics have bemoaned its progress, calling its potential application overbroad by not allowing
protesting on the street or right-of-way and potentially an unconstitutional
restriction on free speech and assembly.

As to constitutionality, that's a moot point, because
Louisiana already has on its books a very similar law. R.S. 14:401, the law for
decades, prohibits demonstrations near residences of judges, jurors, trial
witnesses, or court officers, and it's never faced a challenge. Legally, the
judiciary recognizes that people engaged in official business of the state have
a right when not performing official business not to have their lives disrupted
at a nonpublic place.

Because those kinds of demonstrations occur not
for reasons of expressing an opinion nor involve gathering for right of redress.
Those just as easily can occur at the place where democratic debate occurs, or
in large public spaces where the presence of multiple people assembling
peaceably doesn't impede nonparticipants from enjoying substantially the same
space. The message still is delivered to policy-makers.

No, the point of protests at residences designed
to disturb the lifestyles of public officials is to intimidate, as the existing
Louisiana law regarding the judiciary recognizes. Even threaten, such as a thwarted
attempt on the life of Supreme Court Assoc. Justice Brett Kavanaugh a
couple of years ago, the stage for which was set by extended
protests outside of his house and those of other justices by pro-abortion
fanatics who believed those judges wished to overturn a previous decision on
abortion regulation.

Understand that the political left wants to be
able to intimidate who it sees as its opponents. When analyzed using logic and
fact, liberalism fails to persuade as to correctness of its view of the human
condition particularly compared to conservatism, so leftist activists rely much
more heavily on emotive appeals. Unable to win intellectual debates, over the
decades it steadily has expanded to shouting down any expression with which it
disagrees, deplatforming that, and performing cancel culture.

The intimidation strategy extends from this, its
methodology trying to make all aspects of life so miserable to those who refuse
to submit to its orthodoxy that they surrender the public square. In essence,
it operates as a form of censorship, discouraging the articulation and
enactment into law or policy the ideas it opposes either by keeping out of
public service those who would challenge it or causing its opponents to keep
quiet with their alternatives out of fear they will be targeted if they try to
resist.

Concerns about the bill's exact language, which
technically deals with disturbing the peace, also are overblown, if not a thinly-disguised
tactic to try to defeat it by irrelevant appeals. American judicial history and
its basis in common law ensures that its narrow construction will keep its
power to circumscribe behavior on a short leash.

Properly understood, HB 737 encourages free expression
by preventing bullying of those who don't subscribe to orthodoxy while it doesn't
affect free assembly that is designed to promote debate as part of the
democratic process. Not only is it constitutional, it's good policy, and the
Legislature needs to pass it.

This note examines the ways in which Montana Association of Counties concerns Montana law, elections, and history. While it is now nearly futile to suggest any regulation of campaign speech based on the speaker's corporate identity, it is possible to limit the influence of outsiders on the political process and fundamental text of the state. Part II discusses the historical development of the statutory initiative and referendum regime that existed under the 1889 Constitution and tracks its transition to the constitutional amendment by popular initiative process that emerged as part of Montana's 1972 Constitution. Part III describes the factual background, holding, and dissent of Montana Association of Counties. Part IV provides analysis of the separate amendment rule as articulated by the Court. Part V explains how invalidating a constitutional initiative supported by a majority of the electorate serves to protect the citizens of Montana from the pervasive influence of outside interests, but in doing so also runs the risk of blocking future generations of Montanans from enacting meaningful reform to their own Constitution.

This article considers constitutional arguments that would arise if a government at either federal or state level decided to ban dress often identified as having religious connotations. This is not a far-fetched scenario, with at least one current Member of Parliament calling for such a ban, and bans operating in some overseas jurisdictions. It concludes that there would be serious constitutional doubt about such a law.

"A-12." ; "October 1962." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Abstract
The world is experiencing a crisis of constitutional democracies. Populist leaders are abusing constitutional mechanisms, such as formal procedures of constitutional change, in order to erode the democratic order. The changes are, very often, gradual, incremental, and subtle. Each constitutional change, on its own, may not necessarily amount to a serious violation of essential democratic values. Yet, when examined in the context of an ongoing process, such constitutional changes may prove to be part of the incremental, gradual process of democratic erosion in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This Article explores how courts can respond to such constitutional changes. We argue the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine should be adapted to respond to existing constitutional practices that utilize incremental and subtle amendments to dismantle the democratic order. We suggest that an aggregated judicial review should be developed. We must also rethink the automatic immunity – the result of two hundred years of revolutionary constitutional theory – provided to complete constitutional replacement from constitutional restrictions and scrutiny. Finally, as opposed to the instinct to require judicial self-restraint with respect to constitutional changes that concern the judiciary itself, we suggest that this is perhaps the type of changes that require strictest scrutiny.

v. 1. An introduction to American Constitutional Law -- National power : Article I and the powers and limits of Congress -- Limits on federal power : the federal structure, the 10th Amendment, and state sovereign immunity -- Powers and limits of the federal courts -- The role of the President -- Limits on state power : preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause -- The incorporation of the Bill of Rights -- Substantive due process -- v. 2. Procedural due process -- Freedom of speech and press. pt. I. Overview : a graphic review of the 1st Amendment ; pt. II. The 1st Amendment and government control of the content of expression ; pt. III. The 1st Amendment : restrictions on time, place, and manner of expression--regulating governmental property ; pt. IV. The 1st Amendment and limits on political campaigns -- Freedom of religion -- Equal protection -- Governmental actors, private actors, and the scope of the 13th and 14th Amendments