Suchergebnisse

Introduction: Law's autonomy / Stu Woolman & Michael Bishop -- The South African constitution as the last great modernist project / Stu Woolman -- Constitutional supremacy and appellate jurisdiction in South Africa / Frank Michelman -- On the reach of the constitution and the nature of constitutional jurisdiction: a reply to Frank Michelman / Kate O'Regan -- The principle of democracy in South African constitutional law / Theunis Roux -- Writing the law democratically: a reply to Theunis Roux / Danie Brand -- True in theory, true in practice: why direct application still matters / Stu Woolman -- Summarising Proust: a reply to Stu Woolman / Iain Currie -- Limitations: shared constitutional interpretation, an appropriate normative framework and hard choices / Stu Woolman & Henk Botha -- Sharing interpretation: a reply to Stu Woolman & Henk Botha / Johan van der Walt -- The widening gyre of dignity / Stu Woolman -- The soul of dignity: a reply to Stu Woolman / Laurie Ackermann -- Towards a substantive right to equality / Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt -- A cautionary note regarding substantive equality: a reply to Cathi Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt / Karthy Govender -- The 'arbitrary deprivation' vortex: constitutional property law after FNB / Theunis Roux -- Against regulatory taking: in defence of the two-stage inquiry: a reply to Theunis Roux / Frank Michelman -- Socio-economic rights: revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum core debate / Sandra Liebenberg -- On 'dialogue', 'translation' and 'voice': a reply to Sandra Liebenberg / Marius Pieterse

RESUMEN En el trabajo se reconstruye el pensamiento político liberal en cuanto a la formación del Estado constitucional de Derecho. En este sentido, se enumeran las fuentes de los derechos humanos, tanto en la Constitución como en los Tratados internacionales y se afirma la vigencia del principio de supremacía constitucional. Se identifican las ideas capitales que sintetizan la aportación Rousseauniana, la idea de libertad política, de cuerpo social y la idea del internacionalismo o cosmopolitismo. De esta forma, Rousseau, al plantearse el tema de la libertad política, superaba la tesis de la concepción metafísica y abstracta de la libertad iusnaturalista. A su vez, la libertad política para Rousseau constituye el punto de partida del derecho constitucional y se concluye, de conformidad con los argumentos del maestro De Vega, que es necesario volver a los planteamientos del gran erudito de la ilustración europea Rousseau, con la intención de situar al Estado constitucional. ABSTRACT The work rebuilds liberal political thinking on the formation of the constitutional rule of law. It is identified the source of human rights and ist treatmeant in the Constitution and in the Internacional Human Treaties, and it is affirmed the principle of constitucional supremacy. It is based on the capital ideas that synthesize the Rousseaunian contribution, the idea of political freedom, of social body and the idea of internationalism or cosmopolitanism. In this way, Rousseau, in raising the issue of political freedom, surpassed the thesis of the metaphysical and abstract conception of iusnaturalist freedom. In turn, political freedom for Rousseau is the starting point of constitutional law and it is concluded, in accordance with the arguments of Professor De Vega, that it is necessary to return to the approaches of the great scholar of the European illustration Rousseau, in order to place the Constitutional State.

This article considers the dilemma that constitutional judicial review presents to the most well-meaning of judges — that of navigating the narrow and difficult road between parliamentary supremacy and judicial oligarchy. It examines the Singapore Court of Appeal's delineation of legal and extra-legal considerations in view of Ronald Dworkin's theory of adjudication in determining the constitutionality of section 377A of the Penal Code in Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney General. It proposes an alternative natural law approach to constitutional judicial review based on Radbruch's formula, which helps courts to avoid the pitfalls of judicial idiosyncrasies and usurpation of legislative mandate while staying true to constitutionalism.

Nine Indonesian Constitutional Justices have the authority to annul a law drafted by 550 Parliament members and the President. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia ("the Court"), particularly in deciding cases of judicial review, has the capability to declare words, sentences, paragraphs, articles or the law unconstitutional. Consequently, it is essential for the Court to take into account legal arguments. The fundamental element of these legal arguments is constitutional interpretation, which serves as a parameter in determining constitutionality of the laws. However, in exercising its authority, the Court needs to interpret the Constitution as a basis for deciding a case. The standards for determining the constitutionality of a law must be the text of the Constitution, not what the judges would prefer the Constitution to mean. Constitutional supremacy necessarily assumes that a superior rule is what the Constitution says it is, not what the judges prefer it to be. [Craig R. Ducat: E3]. The Court period 2003–2008 were the Court's the formative years, and as such are important to understand the methodology and interpretative approaches adopted by the Court. Many observers of the Court's early decisions are still unsure of the overarching approach and methodology adopted by the Court. Thus, there is a need for a close analysis and criticism of the Court's early decisions to determine which methods and approaches it has adopted and whether these are appropriate in the Indonesian context. The Court has openly referred to the experiences of foreign jurisdiction in constitutional law, and therefore it would be appropriate to analyze the court's decisions in a broader comparative context of constitutional interpretative approaches from around the world.

Reflecting about the necessity of adopting a constitutional jurisdictional proceeding code is not a whim nor a foolishness, instead it is a compelling need in order to: (i) ensure by a legislative measure a jurisdictional safeguard of the Constitution; (ii) unify the contents of constitutional jurisdictional proceeding law (to gain clarity and coherence in constitutional jurisdictional proceeding statutes); (iii) make constitutional supremacy and human rights to become more effective; (iv) guarantee law certainty to constitutional justice. ; Reflexionar sobre la necesidad de expedir un código procesal constitucional no obedece a un capricho o necedad, sino más bien a la imperiosa necesidad de: (i) asegurar legislativamente la garantía jurisdiccional de la Constitución; (ii) unificar los contenidos del derecho procesal constitucional (se obtiene orden, claridad y coherencia en la legislación procesal constitucional); (iii) dar eficacia a la supremacía constitucional y a los derechos humanos; y, (iv) dotar a la justicia constitucional de seguridad jurídica.

AbstractThis article contributes to the emerging literature on the role of constitutional courts in consociational democracies. While most works have approached the topic from the perspective of regime dynamics, this analysis focuses on how courts relate to the constitutions they are mandated to enforce. Beyond addressing the empirical question of what choices courts make in their balancing between universal values and stability, this article also investigates how courts do this balancing. Through the analysis of seven cases from two consociations, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, I argue that courts embrace specific interpretive approaches (proportionality analysis, purposive interpretation, and the political question doctrine) to reconcile the ideas of constitutional supremacy and respect for political agreements. The analysis also demonstrates how—by their nature political—framework agreements establishing consociational settlements become primary reference points for interpreting constitutional documents.

Mediante la presente investigación se hace un estudio de la sentencia No. 11-18-CN/19 de la Corte Constitucional de fecha 12 de junio de 2019, a través de la cual se reconoce el denominado "matrimonio igualitario" en el Ecuador, y cómo el control de constitucionalidad como procedimiento empleado para arribar a esta resolución,incide en el principio de supremacía constitucional reconocido en la Constitución vigente.Con fundamento en la soberanía popular y en base a una primigenia democracia, el constitucionalismo nace como un medio para limitar el poder y posteriormente ampara el reconocimiento de derechos y sus garantías, y tiene como principal característica la promulgación de una Constitución que nace con la intención de plasmar la voluntad del pueblo. Tal es la importancia de la Constitución que su contenido se encuentra garantizado con el principio de supremacía constitucional y como elemento de ésta, la rigidez constitucional, que implica normas procedimentales estrictas y expresas para su modificación. Un cambio en el contenido de las normas constitucionales tiene que efectuarse en observancia a los principios referidos. En este contexto, empleando el método analítico-descriptivo,se ha determinado el alcance que tiene el principio de supremacía constitucional en el reconocimiento del matrimonio igualitario en el Ecuador, concluyendo que la forma empleada fue contraria al principio de supremacía constitucional incurriendo en una mutación constitucional e inobservando la democracia constitucional, y, por otro lado, se evidencia que el control de constitucionalidad efectuado no se enmarca en la naturaleza de la consulta de norma.