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Since the release of the 21st century policing report in the United States, the techniques of de-escalation have received a lot of attention and focus in political systems, policy changes, and the media. The challenge in professional peace officer education is that there is a vast range of defining de-escalation and understanding the various techniques involved, many of which are based on popular media. This research surveyed professional peace officer education university students on their definition of de-escalation and the techniques associated with de-escalation before specific communications coursework was completed. The students were then surveyed after the communication coursework was completed to determine the changes in defining and understanding de-escalation techniques. This research has found that clearly defining deescalation and emphasizing the broad range of techniques available enhances the students' understanding and application of proper deescalation. This research demonstrates the need for professional peace officer education to move students from media concepts of law enforcement to theoretical concepts.

The primary purpose of this study was to learn how and why information and communication technologies (ICTs) are used to initiate, maintain, and dissolve workplace romantic relationships, creating a new model. Workplace romantic relationships are different from traditional romantic relationships in several ways: those in workplace romances may face additional implications following workplace romance disclosure and need to be mindful of how they disclose, they risk damaging gossip that could result in negative professional consequences, and they are influenced by organizational culture. How and why people chose to date those they met at work has important implications for individuals, organizations, and society. Using a constructivist grounded theory approach and collecting in-depth qualitative data, we uncovered a model of ICT use in workplace romantic relationships. We also found privacy was a predominant concern in both the initiation and maintenance stages and that communication was generally avoided during dissolution. Technology was used to end many of these relationships including text messages and social networking sites because they are asynchronous and help both parties avoid more direct communication. Theoretical and practical implications for employees, managers, and organizations are discussed.

Since the release of the 21st century policing report in the United States, the techniques of de-escalation have received a lot of attention and focus in political systems, policy changes, and the media. The challenge in professional peace officer education is that there is a vast range of defining de-escalation and understanding the various techniques involved, many of which are based on popular media. This research surveyed professional peace officer education university students on their definition of de-escalation and the techniques associated with de-escalation before specific communications coursework was completed. The students were then surveyed after the communication coursework was completed to determine the changes in defining and understanding de-escalation techniques. This research has found that clearly defining de-escalation and emphasizing the broad range of techniques available enhances the students' understanding and application of proper de-escalation. This research demonstrates the need for professional peace officer education to move students from media concepts of law enforcement to theoretical concepts.

Parsi, from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, talks with Zach and Liz about the Israel-Hamas war.

AbstractTwo states in a dispute refuse to back down. One ties its own hands to strengthen its stand and gain advantage; the other tries to untie the tied hands to preempt disadvantage. Tying hands is a well-studied strategy, but it tells only part of the story, and the response strategy of untying hands remains unexplored. Can a state untie the tied hands of its opponent to give freedom back to its opponent—the freedom to concede? I identify three strategies of untying hands: counterthreat, reassurance, and normative framing. I show experimentally that these strategies can reduce the public costs of backing down and the perceived reputational damage from backing down. Tied hands and audience costs are not static and immutable, but dynamic and malleable by the other side.

Various efforts to initiate and negotiate de-escalating agreements in the U.S.-Soviet and Arab-Israeli conflicts are examined. Theoretical approaches regarding the role of noncoercive and coercive inducements are compared and applied to the cases. Six generalizations are inferred from the analysis. First, noncoercive inducements are particularly useful in initiating de-escalation. Second, positive sanctions are more likely to be effective if preceded by communications about them. Third, major de-escalating gestures are difficult to make at the initiation of de-escalation because of constituency concerns. Fourth, both consistency and persistence are important in the effectiveness of de-escalation efforts. Fifth, positive sanctions are more easily made in the negotiation rather than initiating stage and are relatively frequent then. Sixth, sequencing of coercive and noncoercive inducements is important for effective de-escalation.

Local ceasefire agreements are prevalent in modern civil wars, but we know little about their impact. This study analyzes geo-referenced data on 145 local ceasefire agreements declared during the Syrian Civil War, 2011-2019, exploring their short- and long-term effects on the intensity of armed violence. Drawing on scholarship on gradual confidence-building processes, we theorize the conditions under which local ceasefire agreements may generate trust and reduce conflict intensity. Using interrupted time-series analysis and spatial panel regression, we examine factors relating to the design and strategic context of ceasefire agreements. We find that local ceasefire agreements can trigger both escalation and de-escalation in the short term. De-escalatory outcomes are more likely in the long-term, when ceasefire signatories share a history of previous interaction, and when ceasefires are implemented in a stepwise fashion. We also find evidence of spatial diffusion: local ceasefire agreements in one area reduce conflict intensity in neighboring areas.

AbstractMoral hazard theory assumes that the responsibility to protect (R2P) raises expectations of third‐party intervention, thus creating a perverse motivation for vulnerable groups to act aggressively and incite a situation where foreign intervention becomes necessary to preserve their own safety. The promise of external intervention encourages vulnerable groups to rebel against their parent states under the assumption that intervention increases the likelihood of success and lowers the expected cost. Alan Kuperman describes moral hazard theory as the taking of risks that may inadvertently derive from trying to protect from risk, with unwanted results. This paper asks, if there are divisions, conflicts, or a security dilemma arising between factional leaders within a vulnerable group, how does that affect the decisions of the group with regard to taking risks? Taking the case of the PUK's decision not to fight Iraqi armed forces and thereby prevent conflict escalation following the 2017 independence referendum, this paper argues that divisions between factional leaders affect a group's choice to take risks, reducing its likelihood. Consequently, conditions are less likely to reach the point of existential danger where outside intervention becomes necessary.

Strategic rivalries are contests between states that view one another as threatening competitors and treat each other as enemies. A disproportionate amount of interstate conflict is generated by a relatively small number of these pairs of states engaged in rivalries that can persist for years. Thus, to understand interstate peace and conflict, it is useful to know how rivalries work in general and more specifically. In the past two decades, a strenuous effort has been mounted to introduce the concept of rivalry and demonstrate its utility in unraveling conflict situations. Yet all rivalries are not exactly alike. We need to move to a more rewarding differentiation of how they differ in general. Principal rivalries are those antagonisms that are most significant to the decision makers in a state. The main distinction on issues about which rivals dispute are positional and spatial concerns. Positional rivalries contend over regional and global influence. Spatial rivals contend over which state deserves to control disputed territory. Interventionary rivalries predominate in sub-Saharan Africa. Their primary focus involves neighboring states attempting to influence who rules and how co-ethnics are treated. This book updates the inventory of strategic rivalries from 1816 to 2020. Principal rivalries are identified for the first time and cover the same period. A theory stressing the two main types of rivalry (positional and spatial) is elaborated and tested. Regional variations on the origins and terminations of spatial rivalry are explored and interpreted. In addition, attention is paid to fluctuations in the intensity of positional rivalries by examining the working of the contemporary major power triangle (United States, Soviet Union/Russia, and China) and, more generally, the dynamics of regional power that are rising in terms of their relative capability and status in the system. Variations in cooperation and termination dynamics both in general and according to rivalry type are also examined. Overall, the emphases of the book are split between demonstrating the utility of distinguishing among rivalry types and examining selected rivalry dynamics.