Conspiracy Theories and Democratic Legitimacy
In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 481-493
ISSN: 1464-5297
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In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 481-493
ISSN: 1464-5297
In: Harvard Journal on Legislation, forthcoming, 2024
SSRN
One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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In: Public policy and administration: PPA, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 21-29
ISSN: 1749-4192
In: Social research: an international quarterly, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 246-275
ISSN: 0037-783X
In: Contemporary security policy, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 140-160
ISSN: 1352-3260, 0144-0381
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 424-439
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 424-439
ISSN: 1369-8230
In: Vienna online journal on international constitutional law: ICL-Journal, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 123-125
ISSN: 1995-5855, 2306-3734
In: 4 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 1 (1994)
SSRN
In: Political studies, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 659-678
ISSN: 0032-3217
In a consideration of political philosophy & political science, a minimalization of the contrast commonly drawn between these two fields is urged, while at the same time calling for a more radical distinction between the activities of politics & philosophy. It is shown that the respective tasks of political philosophers & political scientists demand less of a division & more of an interpenetration of methods & ideas. It is also shown, however, that politics is a matter of opinion, & should thus be considered independent of philosophy.
In: Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: Political studies, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 28-53
ISSN: 0032-3217
In: American political science review, Band 96, Heft 2, S. 417-418
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: American political science review, Band 116, Heft 2, S. 751-767
ISSN: 1537-5943
Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have "directional motives" beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill equipped to hold politicians accountable. We develop a model of electoral accountability with voters as motivated reasoners. Directional motives have two effects: (1) divergence—voters with different preferences hold different beliefs, and (2) desensitization—the relationship between incumbent performance and voter beliefs is weakened. While motivated reasoning does harm accountability, this is generally driven by desensitized voters rather than polarized partisans with politically motivated divergent beliefs. We also analyze the relationship between government performance and vote shares, showing that while motivated reasoning always weakens this relationship, we cannot infer that accountability is also harmed. Finally, we show that our model can be mapped to standard models in which voters are fully Bayesian but have different preferences or information.