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This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from "international obligation", a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GATT‐DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.

Background of Studied In December 2003, Indonesia passed the final piece of legislation in its labour law reform program. One month later, this received presidential assent and was introduced as Act Number 2 of 2004 on Industrial Relations Disputes Settlement. To allow for the necessary preparations for the transition, this law came into effect in January 2006. This Act repealed the 1957 regulation on Industrial Dispute Settlement and Law Number 12 of 1964 on Termination in Private Enterprises, whereby disputes between workers and employers were to first be reported to the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration .Under the former system, an officer from the the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration would mediate the matter or refer it to compulsory arbitration by a Local Labour Dispute Resolution Committee. Appeals were then sent to the Central Labour Dispute Resolution Committee in Jakarta. These Committees consisted of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration officials, and representatives from employers and the AllIndonesia Workers' Union. The Committees operated through an informal process, but had the authority to make legally binding decisions. There were no time limitations on the settlement of disputes before the Committees and individual workers did not have legal standing to bring individual disputes to the Committees. The Indonesian Minister of Manpower could veto all decisions. Disputes are to be resolved by a range of methods, including: · Bipartite negotiation; · Mediation; · Arbitration; · Determination by a panel of judges of the Industrial Tribunal; and · Appeals to the Supreme Court. ACT No.2 of 2004 Page | 18 The Industrial Dispute Settlement Law in its present form may go a long way to assisting in the development of a fair and effective labour dispute settlement system in Indonesia. Methodology of normative juridical deduction, the judicial approach.

AbstractA move toward the use of alternative dispute resolution strategies has been quietly taking place in America. Disappointment with traditional ways of resolving disputes has led to a quiet revolution in how Americans are managing their conflicts. Alternative dispute strategies are now being used to resolve conflicts in business, between family members, between neighbors, in the international arena, and in government. Disputants who reach agreements by themselves without the help of the formal legal system are more likely to abide by them.

Arbitration has long been considered by people to settle disputes. Moreover, due to the specific advantages of this method, it has a particular place in different legal systems and it has been attempted to use it in important contexts, even family disputes. Nowadays, arbitration is a significant alternative to settle disputes in a business context. Exchange is one of the crucial fields of domestic and foreign trade. In this regard, the legislature with the goal of using arbitration advantages such as speed, accuracy and expertise, has considered this method to settle exchanged disputes and introduced a committee called "jury" in Securities Market Act enacted in 2005. But it has imposed criteria and rules that made it distinctive from arbitration. This study aimed to study this committee and clarify its legal nature and jurisdiction.