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Among the most distinctive features of Southern African politics is the region's preponderance of one-party dominant systems. Considerable effort has been made to explain the unusual phenomenon with some analysts emphasizing the potential of such imbalances of power to undermine the effectiveness of a democracy's institutions. However, political science has only just begun to study the repercussions the status quo may have for political culture in the region. Using survey data collected across the continent, this paper shifts the focus to this unexplored link between dominance and culture, aiming to shed some light on the relationship by studying the effect dominant party systems have on three specific political attitudes in Africa: demand for democracy, evaluation of the supply of democracy, and pluralism. The academic literature on Southern Africa's dominant party systems has produced a theoretical distinction between two types of dominance. On the one hand is simple dominance, characterized only by long-term electoral success by a single party. On the other hand is dominance by parties who emerged from national liberation movements. Some analysts have argued that the ideological orientation of liberation parties and their unique claim to the right to rule renders them incompatible with essential features of democracy. This paper investigates the possibility that these distinct varieties of dominance have distinct effects on political attitudes. The results of the analyses conducted here offer strong evidence that dominant party systems do have implications for mass attitudes. Further, this research finds strong support for the argument that the nature of a party's dominance matters, as means comparisons and regression analyses showed that the effects of dominance on popular attitudes were considerably stronger in systems where the dominant party was descended from a national liberation movement.

This article draws on the authoritarian institutions literature to explain the role of dominant parties in constraining the ability of autocrats to reshuffle cabinet ministers. Dominant party leaders are constrained in their ability to frequently reshuffle ministers by the need to maintain credible power-sharing commitments with party elites. These constraints also produce distinct temporal patterns of instability where large reshuffles occur following elections. Conversely, personalist leaders face fewer power-sharing constraints and engage in more extensive cabinet reshuffles at more arbitrary intervals. Military leaders face complex constraints that depend on whether officers or civilians occupy cabinet posts and the extent to which leaders are dependent upon civilian ministers for regime performance and popular support. Empirical analyses using data on the cabinets of ninety-four authoritarian leaders from thirty-seven African countries between 1976 and 2010 support the theoretical expectations for dominant party and personalist leaders, but are inconclusive for military leaders.

In countries ruled by a single party for a long period of time, how does political opposition to the ruling party grow? In this dissertation, I study the growth in support for the Democratic Alliance (DA) party, which is the largest opposition party in South Africa. South Africa is a case of democratic dominant party rule, a party system in which fair but uncompetitive elections are held. I argue that opposition party growth in dominant party systems is explained by the strategies that opposition parties adopt in local government and the factors that shape political competition in local politics. I argue that opposition parties can use time spent in local government to expand beyond their base by delivering services effectively and outperforming the ruling party. I also argue that performance in subnational political office helps opposition parties build a reputation for good governance, which is appealing to ruling party supporters who are looking for an alternative. Finally, I argue that opposition parties use candidate nominations for local elections as a means to appeal to constituents that are vital to the ruling party's coalition. I find that where the DA is the incumbent party, improvements in household access to basic services such as piped water and proper sanitation are associated with increased support for the party. I also find that when DA-run wards perform better than their neighboring ANC counterparts, support for the DA in the neighboring ward increases in the next election. Next, I examine whether the DA's reputation for good governance convinces ANC partisans to support the party. I find that the DA's reputation as an anti-corruption party is a stronger predictor of vote choice than attitudes toward the DA mayor in the cities of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Finally, I examine the changes over time in the DA's nomination of local government candidates in Eastern Cape, Gauteng, and Western Cape provinces in all local government elections (2000 – 2016). I find that while the DA has been successful at increasing the representation of black candidates in its candidate pool, these candidates are not winning elections or seats at the same rate as the white candidates who reflect the party's voter base.

Victory in the 2012 election of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the formerly hegemonic party that ruled Mexico for almost a century, has generated concern about Mexico's democratic consolidation. As described below, the PRI not only won the presidency but also a majority of seats in Congress and most governorships. Given the party's authoritarian past, some analysts, political actors and civic organizations have warned against a possible deterioration of a still young democracy. These concerns notwithstanding, the following analysis of the election actually suggests there are grounds for some optimism. The economic environment is turning in Mexico's favour and the new configuration in Congress is conducive to passing structural reforms that might trigger faster growth. In addition, opposition parties, civic society and the international community will insist on the preservation of political freedoms and electoral competition. So while democratic institutions are still vulnerable, a full resurrection of the 'perfect dictatorship,' as the PRI's tenure had been called, is unthinkable today. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]