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Three obvious, superficially simple but actually intensely complex questions embodied in the title immediately confront the reader of Dagmar Herzog's important new book. First, what do we mean by the 'sexuality' that constitutes the subject matter? Second, what is demarcated by the Europe that provides the geo-political boundaries of this study? Third, does the 'twentieth century' provide a useful temporal unity for the narrative and analysis that is at the heart of the book? Such questions are not mere scholarly nit-picking or academic point scoring, but a tribute to the problematising of the body in space and time that has been a hallmark of the deconstructive and reconstructive energy of recent scholarship on the sexual, and that is now making a welcome entry into mainstream history.

THE QUESTION OF "SHOULD THE MILITARY BE INTERESTED IN HOMOSEXUALITY AS SUCH, OR IN AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONFORMITY TO THE DEMANDS OF SERVICE?" IS EXPLORED IN THIS ARTICLE. IT REVIEWS PAST RESEARCH ON THE SUBJECT AND MOVES ON TO EXPLORE THE STATE OF MEDICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT A PARTICULAR PERIOD IN THE INDIVIDUAL PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF YOUNG MEN, COINCIDING WITH THE STUDENT YEARS. THE AUTHOR FOUND NO EVIDENCE THAT HOMESEXUALITY MADE A MAN A POOR MILITARY RISK AND IS CRITICAL OF THE DEPRIVATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE MILITARY DISCHARGING PROCESS.

Law and Judicial Duty traces the early history of what is today called "judicial review." Working from previously unexplored evidence, Hamburger questions the very concept of judicial review. Although decisions holding statutes unconstitutional are these days considered instances of a distinct judicial power of review, Hamburger shows that they were once understood merely as instances of a broader judicial duty. The book's focus on judicial duty overturns the familiar debate about judicial power. The book is therefore essential reading for anyone concerned about the proper role of the judiciary. Hamburger lays the foundation for his argument by explaining the common law ideals of law and judicial duty. He shows that the law of the land was understood to rest on the authority of the lawmaker and that what could not be discerned within the law of the land was not considered legally binding. He then shows that judges had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land. These two ideals – law and judicial duty – together established and limited what judges could do. By reviving an understanding of these common law ideals, Law and Judicial Duty calls into question the modern assumption that judicial review is a power within the judges' control. Indeed, the book shows that what is currently considered a distinct power of review was once understood as a matter of duty – the duty of judges to decide in accord with the law of the land. The book thereby challenges the very notion of judicial review. It shows that judges had authority to hold government acts unconstitutional, but that they enjoyed this power only to the extent it was required by their duty. In laying out the common law ideals, and in explaining judicial review as an aspect of judicial duty, Law and Judicial Duty reveals a very different paradigm of law and of judging than prevails today. The book, moreover, sheds new light on a host of misunderstood problems, including intent, manifest contradiction, the status of foreign and international law, the cases and controversies requirement, and the authority of judicial precedent. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1029/thumbnail.jpg

A duty to vote may be many things. It may be no more than an obligation to cast one's ballot as self-interestedly or as altruistically as one pleases. It may a requirement to vote for the political party most likely to yield the highest social welfare. It may be a requirement to choose between competing parties in the interest of one's social class or with recognition of the needs of the poor. It may include a requirement to inform oneself about the issues in an election. This paper begins with a critique of the argument denying any duty to vote because, as with participants in the market, there is no conflict between selfinterest and public interest in the choice whether to vote or abstain. The core of the paper is a discussion of several interpretations of the duty to vote, and there is a brief review of pros and cons of compulsory voting.