Suchergebnisse

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process and a sanctions program for fining employers for noncompliance. Few modifications have been made to the verification process and sanctions program since 1986, and immigration experts state that a more reliable verification process and a strengthened worksite enforcement capacity are needed to help deter illegal immigration. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report on the employment verification process and worksite enforcement efforts. In this testimony, GAO provides observations on (1) the current employment verification process and (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it faces in implementing that program."

The Reagan administration has been accused of setting back civil rights enforcement. This article reviews available data on the administration's enforcement efforts and discusses changes in emphasis, tone, and types of cases pursued. An emphasis on identifiable victims and a movement away from more punitive measures is apparent. Moreover, the large budget cuts and the administration's antipathy to goals and timetables raise questions concerning the "quality" of enforcement.

Politically motivated interference by politicians, or "politicised enforcement", is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this article develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron–client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote economic growth and carry out clientelistic exchanges affect government decisions on enforcement. Moreover, these correlations remain robust after the implementation of reforms that promoted administrative centralisation within the enforcement agency, suggesting that politicised enforcement reflects the strategic behaviour of the ruling elites of the Party. These findings contribute to the literature on enforcement in authoritarian regimes broadly and in China specifically.

Abstract: Four approaches to drug enforcement are appraised. Three of these are characterised as the conventional approaches which have been dominant through most of the past decade. The arguments for and the limitations of each are considered. It is argued that the shortcomings of these conventional approaches has led to renewed interest in enforcement aimed at the street or retail level of the market. Drawing on economic models of the drug market and the behaviour of drug buyers, the arguments for low level drug enforcement are described, and some problems with this approach indicated.