Suchergebnisse

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal aliens to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process and a sanctions program for fining employers for noncompliance. Few modifications have been made to the verification process and sanctions program since 1986, and immigration experts state that a more reliable verification process and a strengthened worksite enforcement capacity are needed to help deter illegal immigration. In this testimony, GAO provides preliminary observations from its ongoing assessment of (1) the current employment verification process and (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it faces in implementing that program."

This research highlights a neglected paradox of migration policies: whereas narratives on migrants as a security threat in their countries of destination find little support in empirical studies, forcing migrants to return may increase violence and crime back home. Using migrants' exposure to deportation threats at destination as an exogenous source of identification, this paper traces the long shadow of immigration enforcement on violent crime in Mexico, recipient of more than 3.5 million deportees from the US over the period 2000–2015. Enforced return is associated with more homicides and a stronger presence of cartels in migrants' municipalities of origin, as well as a higher sense of insecurity among the population and a higher probability of being assaulted. Identifying these local effects of enforced return are a first step towards unpacking the various direct and indirect channels through which immigration enforcement generates unintended negative outcomes in migrants' communities of origin.

ObjectiveThis article measures Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers' punitive biases in immigration enforcement, comparing rates of dissent with low‐ and high‐risk classification scores. It provides evidence that contextual political factors alter dissent with risk classification assessment (RCA) scores and describes how such dissent informs more punitive versions of ICE's RCA scoring rules.MethodsWe implement a statistical decomposition technique that compares the gap between low‐ and high‐risk dissent rates in risk assessments. Historical and qualitative evidence describes the effect of punitive biases in algorithmic editing.ResultsResults of this investigation show that larger gaps in dissent rates between low‐ and high‐risk classifications result in more punitive scoring updates in later versions of the RCA algorithm.ConclusionOur article provides evidence that risk assessment tools implemented to reduce biases in immigration enforcement were updated to accommodate the punitive bias of ICE officers and supervisors.

Two seemingly different federal enforcement systems that affect the movement of unskilled workers — the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts and current state immigration enforcement policies — have remarkable similarities. Both systems are political stories that are demonstrative of the failure of federalism. The federal government's current failure to enforce immigration laws has encouraged state and local governments to pass their own laws. Alabama and Arizona have enacted far-reaching laws, which are similar to the federal Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g) programs. Both have been challenged on constitutional preemption and equal protection grounds. Recent scholarship has focused mainly on whether the state and local actions are constitutionally preempted. Current scholarship has overlooked ways the federal government has previously utilized state and local entities to enforce federal laws that govern individual rights. To date, legal scholars have not engaged in this comparison. This article challenges the notion of the Fugitive Slave Acts' irrelevance in this context by examining in detail the similarities of both systems and the results that are produced when the federal government is provided with unfettered discretion to abrogate individual rights. The article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the implementation and enforcement of the Constitution's Fugitive Slave Clause and the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts. This Part also explores the implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the evisceration of the Fugitive Slave Acts when subsequent immigration laws refused to recognize equal protection rights for immigrants. Part II explores the reverse immigration-federalism story in which states and localities are enacting immigration legislation against the backdrop of federal inaction. Part III explores how both the Fugitive Slave Acts and current immigration enforcement laws create outsiders by failing to protect individual liberty rights. The ...

We study the effect of two local immigration enforcement policies — Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Secure Communities Program (SC) — on the health and mental health outcomes of Latino immigrants living in the United States. We use the restricted-use National Health Interview Survey for 2000–2012 and adopt a difference-in-difference research design. Estimates suggest that SC increased the proportion of Latino immigrants with mental health distress by 2.2 percentage points (14.7%), Task Force Enforcement under Section 287(g) worsened their mental health distress scores by 15 percent (0.08 standard deviation), and Jail Enforcement under Section 287(g) increased the proportion of Latino immigrants reporting fair or poor health by 1 percentage point (11.1%) and lowered the proportion reporting very good or excellent health by 4.8 to 7.0 percentage points (7.8% to 10.9%). These findings are robust to various sensitivity checks and have long-term implications for population health, public health expenditure, and immigrant integration.