Suchergebnisse

An economist in an international organization has certain obligations as a member of his profession, as a citizen of his country, and as an international civil servant. These are not always readily harmonized in the individual. For economists from different backgrounds (i.e., economies which are capitalistic, welfare-oriented, underdeveloped, etc.), of different nationalities, and working in different capacities with organizations of differing international functions, there can surely be no single prototype. There may nonetheless be some generalizations which can be made about the role of this sort of professional in this occupational setting. Where may the lines be drawn between the pursuit of truth, however relative it may be, and the advocacy of policies? To what extent must the economist align himself with the practical when that is the enemy of the desirable? Does an economist withdraw from the heady atmosphere of academic recognition into bureaucratic anonymity when he fills out the twenty-page employment form of an international organization; or does he escape from the pallid world of equilibrating models into the invigorating arena of problems, pressure and power? Is an economist trained in a particular school of thought—whether Marxist, Keynesian, Chicago or institutionalist—under any obligation to suppress or dilute the distinctive point of view he initially brings to bear on economic problems?

This special issue seeks to move forward the development of an empirical research agenda that takes seriously the complexity of how international organizations (IOs) function and the need to study that complexity at all levels of analysis by using robust research tools. We advocate for a broad empirical research approach that molds and sharpens theories about IOs by conducting systematic tests in large-sample environments. Two themes create a common thread throughout this issue. First, shifting the focus from whether IOs matter to how they work requires acknowledgment of the contingency of cause and effect. A second common thread lies in the authors' treatment of IO membership as an aggregate phenomenon—that is, as a set of institutions and relationships evolving over time and with many members rather than as a single organization.

Among the more interesting international publications that have come to the writer's attention recently is a five-volume set of Staff Regulations and Staff Rules of Selected International Organizations compiled by the World Bank Administrative Tribunal in Washington, D.C. As explained in the preface by the editor and Executive Secretary of the Tribunal, C.F. Amerasinghe, a need was felt to have ready access to a collection of staff regulations and rules in order to be able to compare administrative problems and situations in different international organizations. Thus, an effort was made to secure pertinent documents from both universal and regional intergovernmental agencies. The collection was made particularly for the judges of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal, but with the hope that the material would also be useful to others interested in international administrative law. The first four volumes were issued in January 1983; additional material subsequently became available and a fifth volume was issued in May 1983. The first volume (353 p.) includes reproductions of the regulations and rules of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Volume II (397 p.) covers Unesco, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Council of Europe, and the African Development Bank. Volume III (276 p.) covers the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (which became the International Maritime Organization in 1982), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Organization of American States. Volume IV (313 p.) covers the European Communities and the International Labor Organization. Volume V (369 p.) is devoted exclusively to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In every instance the rules are as up to date as could be obtained, and the introductory remarks in each volume provide brief details on the currency of the materials as well as information on major variations in the regulations of the organizations included. Because IGO staff regulations are difficult to obtain, this collection is a valuable work. The volumes are available free of charge as long as the supply lasts and may be ordered from the Office of the Executive Secretary, World Bank Administrative Tribunal, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433.

This paper explores why certain IOs officially categorize their member-states while others do not. It also examines the specific problems that categorization mechanisms are intended to solve. Building on theories of rational design, I argue that categorization is intended to provide a solution to cooperation problems in IOs and assist in preventing possible defections of participating member-states. I hypothesize that categorization is more likely to be incorporated and employed in IOs with heterogeneous membership in terms of capabilities and/or preferences; in IOs that deal with issues characterized by high levels of uncertainty about the state of the world; and in IOs that require deep cooperation and therefore are highly institutionalized. To test these hypotheses, I created a new dataset on categorization, encompassing information on 156 IOs established between 1868 and 2015 and ranging across 12 issue-areas. A multivariate logistic regression with robust standard errors is used to estimate the empirical relationships between the variables. This study finds that IOs may consider categorization as a proper alternative to other solutions, such as exclusion, for problems that stem from divergent power distributions; it assists in lowering states' uncertainties about the consequences of cooperation, as it clarifies current and future distribution of possible costs and benefits; and, it assists in minimizing the compliance costs of less powerful participant-states.

It is comparatively rare for academics to get together to discuss problems connected with teaching. A lively discussion however developed out of an ad hoc meeting at the 1978 BISA conference on the teaching of courses which could be loosely subsumed under the title of 'International Organization' (IO). The discussion made clear that this area of International Relations teaching is in a state of flux, and that considerable uncertainty exists both about what to teach and how to teach it. Many ideas and suggestions emerged at the meeting and the exchange of views was clearly useful.

As the world turns against international institutions, this article reviews evidence of the corrupting of global organizations. The review focuses on three international organizations that emerged from World War II: the Bretton Woods institutions [the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank] and the United Nations (UN). The article explores evidence of major shareholders (mainly the United States) using the Bretton Woods institutions to funnel money and other favors to strategically preferred countries. Then the review discusses vote buying across a range of issues debated at the UN and finally turns to dark scholarship on the use of UN human rights institutions by autocratic states as a veil to violate those very rights. The article concludes that government pursuit of strategic objectives may be a necessary part of global cooperation, but scholarship should continue to delve into the micro foundations underlying the macro evidence presented here to better inform reformers on how to limit corrupting influences.

International intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) play a significant role in contemporary life, and in the course of their functioning they produce a very large number of publications and documents. In a study published in 1979, Documentation of the United Nations System, the author estimates that of the United Nations organizations alone, counting all language versions, the yearly output is approximately 180,000 pieces, with 7,500 items, or five percent of the total, being publications properly so called. Although we have no real statistics on the use of international documents there is general agreement among specialists in this field that the vast bulk of IGO documentation goes unread. Many reports and studies are intended, of course, for a limited audience such as a single meeting's participants, but also included in the mass of IGO materials are items of potential value to researchers in most disciplines, including law. In the present column I hope, without overlapping other sections of IJLI, to provide news about new international information systems and projects, new publications or documents of the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), Unesco, and the World Bank, and information about international bodies outside the UN system. Fortunately, I am in a good position to see new IGO publications because they arrive daily at the Library of Congress from agencies scattered across the continents; I also obtain news from regular contacts in various organizations, particularly from individuals in Washington-based international agencies. Although my plan is to discuss specific organizations and documents, I shall also dwell a bit on the abstract subject of international documentation.