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The author has spent a lot of time preparing cases against the Government of Iran and its controlled entities. This Article will draw upon that experience to discuss the enforcement of judgments rendered in international litigation. The focus is on two aspects of judgment enforcement: (1) the enforcement of judgments of United States or other courts against the Government of Iran and (2) the enforcement by Iran of judgments obtained against United States companies in the courts of Iran.

Introduction -- What is political judgment? -- Foundations: Plato and Aristotle -- The Kantian Problematic -- The Arendtian Theory of Judgment -- Hermeneutics, tacit knowledge and neo-rationalism

 Exactly a year ago, I had a post about a survey question from 1993 on whether members of Congress should follow public opinion or their own judgment when voting on issues.  I wasn't planning on marking the anniversary, but by coincidence I recently ran across other questions on the same issue, from 1939 and 1940.  They aren't identical to the 1993 question, but seem similar enough to be compared.  The overall distributions:            Own       Public     1939     38            59          A1940     32            64          A1940     35            39          B1993     23            70          CThe exact questions:A.  Should members of Congress vote according to their own best judgment or according to the way the people in their districts feel?B.  In cases when a Congressman's opinion is different from that of the majority of people in his district, do you think he should usually vote according to his own best judgment, or according to the way a majority of his district feels?C.  When your representative in Congress votes on an issue, which should be more important:  the way that voters in your district feel about the issue, or the Representative's own principles and judgment about what is best for the country?The percent choosing the "own judgment" option is substantially lower in the 1993 question than in all three of the 1939-40 questions. It seems to me that the addition of  "what is best for the country" in the 1993 question made the "own judgment" side sound more favorable, so if the differences in question wording mattered they probably understated the change.  In looking at the 1993 question, I had found that education didn't make much difference.  The 1939 and 1940 surveys didn't ask about education, but they had variables for occupation and interviewer's rating of social standing.  People of "higher" position were a bit more likely to say that representatives should follow their own judgement, but it was only a small difference.  I tried a few other demographic variables, which didn't make much difference.  So the major story is simply the difference in the overall distributions.  Of course, 1993 was 30 years ago, so we don't know what's happened since then.   It seems strange that no one has asked about the issue since then, so I'll make another attempt to find questions.The 1939 survey also asked about a question I've written about before "Do people who are successful get ahead largely because of their luck or largely because of their ability?"  The same question was also asked in 1970 and then in 2016.  My previous post on this question reported the distribution (16% said luck in 1939, 8% in 1970, and 13% in 2016), but didn't look at group differences.  In 1939, there were large differences by economic standing:                                         Luck     AbilityWealthy                           3%          97%Average +                       7%           93%Average                         11%          89%Poor+                             17%          83%Poor                                23%         77%On relief                         30%         70%Unfortunately, the individual data for the 2016 survey is not available in the Roper Center or ICPSR--I will try to track it down, although I think the odds are against me.[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

The major conclusions in Georgia Warnke's illuminating Essay, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate are persuasive, but some that appear almost self-evident instead rest on controversial evaluative judgments. Many of my comments deal with these complexities, drawing from her book on interpretation and political theory as well as her Essay. Other remarks develop subjects Warnke barely touches. My thoughts are, thus, some combination of clarification, supplementation, and disagreement. My initial effort is to refine in just what senses interpretations of texts, social practices, and legal rules must speak to our concerns. I next explore how interpretations of legal texts that are applied in the present and are backed by coercive force differ from portrayals of literature; then I inquire how these differences bear on strategies of interpretation. I endorse Warnke's rejection of a jurisprudence that focuses exclusively on original meaning, but I argue that this rejection cannot be grounded in general hermeneutic theory standing alone. Crucial moral and political judgments have to be made about allocating public functions. I then turn to Professor Warnke's analysis of debate over great constitutional issues. I emphasize the multiple levels of legal analysis of a subject like abortion. The terms of public debate usually connect to the terms of legal analysis, but these forms of discourse are not identical. Relatedly, interpretation of relevant legal texts will not always track broader interpretations of social meaning. I next consider Professor Warnke's account of legitimate constitutional interpretation. I question some of her conclusions about illegitimate interpretations, and raise doubts about how far the two criteria she offers for legitimate interpretation apply to legal interpretation. Finally, I address the theme that there may be something like "the nature of the thing," and offer brief suggestions about how a hermeneutic approach to interpretation like Warnke's may fit with belief in natural law.

AbstractTwo commonly used elicitation modes on strength of preference, equivalence and ratio judgments, were compared in an experiment. The result from the experiment showed that ratio judgments were less effective than equivalence judgments. Based on an iterative design for eliciting multiattribute preference structures, equivalence judgments outperformed ratio judgments in estimating single‐attribute measurable value functions, while being nearly more effective than ratio judgments in assessing multiattribute preference structures. The implications of the results from the experiment are that multiattribute decision‐making techniques should take advantage of the decision maker's inclination of making effective equivalence trade‐off judgments, and that useful techniques should be devised to incorporate different commonly used techniques, such as multiattribute utility theory and the Analytic Hierarchy Process, to elicit and consolidate equivalence trade‐off judgments.

Hannah Arendt's conceptualization of judgment may only drive political theorists further from the phenomenon. Throughout her life, Arendt's work on judgment was guided by Kant's thought. Arendt's reading of Kant's work raises two difficulties to which contemporary political scientists should attend. First, Arendt's reading of Kant is a systematic misreading of his texts. Second, Arendt's misreading of Kant pushes her toward a misreading of the phenomenon of judgment. More important, Arendt's misreading has led political theorists to assume a divide between the points of view of the actor and of the spectator, which cannot be reconciled given the resources of Arendt's thought.