Suchergebnisse

Abstract. Studies of federal judicial appointments made before 1988 discovered significant partisan ties between judicial appointees and the governments appointing them. In 1988, in response to criticism of these "patronage appointments," the Mulroney government introduced screening committees to the process. This article explores the impact of these committees. Using information gained from surveys of legal elites, we trace the minor and major political connections of federal judicial appointees from 1989 to 2003 in order to determine whether patronage has continued despite the reform to the process. We discover that political connections continued to play an important role in who was selected for a judicial appointment. However, these connections were not quite as common as those found before 1988, and the new process does appear to have prevented the politically motivated appointment of completely unqualified candidates. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that the impact of patronage varies by region and interacts with other, newer influences, in particular, concerns for group representation on the bench. The paper concludes by briefly discussing these results in the context of the relationship between judicial selection and politics with a comparative perspective.Résumé. Les études sur les nominations judiciaires fédérales réalisées avant 1988 ont découvert des liens partisans étroits entre les juges nommés à la cour et les gouvernements les nommant. En 1988, en réponse aux critiques sur le favoritisme entourant les nominations, le gouvernement Mulroney a introduit des comités d'évaluation dans le processus. Cet article explore l'impact de ces comités. En utilisant de l'information recueillie lors de sondages menés auprès de la communauté légale, nous retraçons les connexions politiques mineures et majeures des attributaires judiciaires fédéraux de 1989 à 2003 en vue de déterminer si le favoritisme a persisté malgré la réforme du système. Nous découvrons que les connexions politiques continuent à jouer un rôle important dans la sélection des juges. Toutefois, ces connexions ne sont pas aussi importantes que celles qu'on a identifiées avant 1988 et le nouveau processus semble avoir réussi à prévenir les nominations partisanes de candidats entièrement non qualifiés. Les résultats de notre recherche suggèrent également que l'effet du favoritisme varie par région et dépend aussi d'autres facteurs plus nouveaux, en particulier le souci de représentation de certains groupes au sein de la magistrature. L'article conclut en discutant brièvement ces résultats dans le contexte de la relation entre la sélection judiciaire et la politique dans une perspective comparative.

Using an original dataset of appointments to Ontario's provincial and superior courts from 1972 to 2012, this article explores whether the system of judicial appointment affects the representation of women on the bench. In addition to providing a comprehensive review of judicial appointments in Ontario, the article finds that since the introduction of new judicial appointments systems by the federal and Ontario governments in 1989, the provincial system appointed approximately 5 percent more women judges. The data also reveals that Conservative parties were less likely to appoint women to the bench than the Liberal Party and NDP over this forty-year period. If diversity on the bench is to be a serious policy objective for governments, this research indicates that certain approaches may prove more effective than others. In particular, Ontario's provincial nominating committee system has been more successful in appointing women judges—especially in the years it actively recruited women applicants—than the federal government's review committee system.

AbstractThe influence of party connection on the selection of judges has long been an issue in Canada This article considers whether such connections adversely affect the appointment of women judges to federally appointed courts. The answer appears to be yes. Using political donations as a proxy for party connection, the data analyzed here suggest that as the number of appointees with connections to the government rises, the number of women appointees falls. However, for appointments to provincial courts by the government of Ontario, the prevalence of political connections among judicial appointees is less prominent, suggesting that different systems of judicial appointment may help to lessen these effects.

This article assesses recent reforms of the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Justice and the General Court. We evaluate the effects of the establishment of the Article 255 TFEU Panel. Next to a discussion on the transparency of the Panel's opinions, the criteria set and the role it plays in reappointments, we present case studies of the selection procedure in fourteen Member States, representing new and old, and small and large Member States. Our analysis shows that far from being a paper tiger, the Article 255 TFEU Panel has proven to have a significant impact: it has had a chilling effect on a number of national nominations but also indirectly influenced the selection processes in some Member States, thus limiting arbitrariness. However, opening up judicial appointments to scrutiny at both the EU and the national level has resulted in a subtle move into the direction of judicial self-government.