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Drawing on a 2009 statewide telephone poll of registered voters in Texas, this study investigates how voters react to politicized campaigning, judicial experience and partisan cues when voting for judge. We analyze individual-level data by employing an experimental design in which respondents were provided information about a hypothetical judicial candidate (varying in both campaign theme and in partisanship) and then asked about the likelihood of voting for that candidate. We found that in a partisan election state such as Texas, individuals rely heavily on party as a shortcut when evaluating judicial candidates, even when accounting for judicial experience. We also found that respondents with greater levels of political sophistication were more likely to be influenced by a candidate's issue position on frivolous lawsuits. Adapted from the source document.

Drawing on a 2009 statewide telephone poll of registered voters in Texas, this study investigates how voters react to politicized campaigning, judicial experience and partisan cues when voting for judge. We analyze individual-level data by employing an experimental design in which respondents were provided information about a hypothetical judicial candidate (varying in both campaign theme and in partisanship) and then asked about the likelihood of voting for that candidate. We found that in a partisan election state such as Texas, individuals rely heavily on party as a shortcut when evaluating judicial candidates, even when accounting for judicial experience. We also found that respondents with greater levels of political sophistication were more likely to be influenced by a candidate's issue position on frivolous lawsuits.

The role of elections in promoting accountability to popular sentiment is a central tenet of democratic theory. The extent to which such accountability is enhanced in judicial elections in the American states, however, is threatened by low levels of citizen involvement in contests for the state judiciary—due in part to ballot roll‐off: many voters, though already at the polls, simply ignore judicial contests. Critics of elections as a means of selecting state judiciaries contend that high ballot roll‐off renders citizen participation too low for such elections to secure greater judicial accountability. This research—an analysis of seventy‐one Kentucky counties voting in recent state supreme court elections—suggests that an emerging electoral technology, the electronic voting machine, substantially reduces ballot roll‐off in judicial elections, thereby increasing citizen participation in state judicial elections. These findings have significant implications for the debate over judicial selection by popular ballot.