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The paper aims to explore which situations the state can exercise political power over its citizens. The art is to find the fine line between citizens' rights and state coercion. The best way to present an answer to this issue is by examining the principles when state coercion might be justified. Hence, wewill examine eight following principles: Harm Principle, Offense Principle, Legal Moralism, Legal Paternalism, Collective Benefits Principle, Justice Principle, Need Principle, Sufficiency Principle. In addition to defending liberal principles, wewill argue that Legal Paternalism and The Justice Principle can be adopted but only in specific situations. Finally, we suggest that The Need Principle and The Justice Principle cannot be used as justification to limit one's freedom but they might be translated and expanded into The Sufficiency Principle.

Explores the theoretical orientation of judge & author Richard Posner who describes his general philosophy as "pragmatism." Posner applies an empirically & economically oriented social science approach to issues of law & justice. A socially liberal but economically conservative libertarian, Posner claims the legal formalism & "academic moralism" of political philosophers like John Rawls & Ronald Dworkin fails to pay enough attention to facts or consequences. He argues that debates about such contentious issues as affirmative action are "unproductive when they concern the moral requirements of an abstract ideal like racial equality." Posner's views on questions of sexual morality & public policy utilize an "economic" analysis that supports a diminished role for government. It is contended that Posner is best described as a "quasi-rule pragmatist" in regard to the role of the judiciary because he rejects both "act pragmatism" & "pure judicial formalism" in favor of a narrower kind of pragmatism that limits judges' freedom to ignore traditional sources of law. Similarities are pointed out between Posner's theorizing & the theories he critiques. J. Lindroth

Abstract
We trace the origin of felony disenfranchisement from the colonial period through Reconstruction. On the eve of the Civil War, three-quarters of states had criminal disenfranchisement statutes. These laws were based on "legal moralism" principles, which limited the franchise to those in good standing with the community. Efforts at disenfranchisement grew as access to the ballot increased and criminal justice reforms replaced capital and corporal punishment for imprisonment. We highlight important transformations in felony disenfranchisement during Reconstruction, specifically in new state constitutions and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. All but one Southern state included felon disenfranchisement in their new constitutions that the Republican-controlled Congress ratified for readmission to the United States. Radical Republicans in Congress and state legislatures were in most cases advocates of felony disenfranchisement to exclude former Confederates from political participation.

The free will theodicy (a standard theistic response to the problem of evil) places significant value on free will: free will is of such substantial value, that God's gift of free will to humans was justified, even though this gift foreseeably (and regularly) results in the most monstrous of evils. I will argue that when a state criminalizes sin (by punishing producers of sinful materials such as illicit drugs, or punishing consumers), it can restrict or eliminate citizens' exercise of metaphysical free will with respect to choosing to partake in or refrain from these activities. Given the value placed on free will in the free will theodicy, theists who endorse this theodicy should thus oppose the criminalization of what I will call Millian sins—that is, actions which are immoral, but which do not directly harm another person. In other words, such theists should oppose legal moralism.

The most renowned substantive criminal law decision of the October 2002 Term, Lawrence v. Texas, will go down in history as a critical turning point in criminal law debates over the proper scope of the penal sanction. For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The court's ruling is the coup de grace to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations. As a matter of federal due process, courts reviewing penal legislation must now deploy some other principle to distinguish between permissible and impermissible majoritarian moral opprobrium. What that other principle will consist of is not clear. Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Lawrence offers a dizzying array of possibilities – a rhetorical smorgasbord of legal authority. Justice Kennedy's pastiche is, at a legal theoretical level, incoherent and under normal circumstances – in many other cases – would be internally contradictory. The theoretical incoherence and rhetorical overkill of Justice Kennedy's opinion lends credence to Justice Antonin Scalia's incendiary dissent in Lawrence, specifically to the idea that the majority's holding is no technical knock-out victory for liberal legalism, but rather a politically or culturally partisan decision. What is missing from Justice Scalia's dissent, though, are the important nuances and subtleties that shape the contemporary sex wars, that make them so fascinating and so unpredictable, and that both resignify and ambiguate the purported gay victory in Lawrence. This Foreword probes the fragmentation of sexual projects in the West and its implications for the sex wars and the penal law. It is intended as a guide or manual for the interpretation of the result in Lawrence and future sex battles. Part I focuses on the fracturing of sexual projects and demonstrates that it is, today, far too simplistic – in fact profoundly counterproductive – to describe the culture wars as a two-party conflict or to talk about a "homosexual agenda." In the Lawrence litigation, this point was brought home in the surprising coalition opposing the Texas statute. The question this raises is: what kinds of fissures split the gay community? What would it sound like to argue from a gay-friendly perspective against the ruling in Lawrence? Part II explores this question and develops, through a pastiche of radical statements, a politics that embraces the marginal, even criminal desire to transgress for the sake of transgression, that thrives on rebellion against hegemonic legal regimes. With this in place, Part III reconstructs Scalia's radical dissent and sharpens it to produce a keener interpretive framework to understand the result in Lawrence and future sex wars. Scalia is right that there is a culture war and that the courts are inextricably involved in those wars. He is also right that the court is shaped by the legal profession and that their decisions are largely shaped by the law profession culture. This culture and the legal academy that reproduces it are by and large more tolerant of homosexuality than many other sectors of society. The decision in Lawrence is the product of this law profession culture, and, at least on the surface, is gay-friendly – it favors the interests of liberal pro-gay-rights advocates. But it does not necessarily promote the interests of all gay-friendly. It is here that the Foreword probes the Lawrence decision – dark side and all.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. Sexual Ethics in the History of Philosophy -- 1.1. The Ancient Greeks and Virtue Ethics -- 1.2. Augustine, Aquinas, and Natural Law Theory -- 1.3. Kant and Kantianism -- 1.4. Utilitarianism: Bentham and Mill -- 1.5. Feminism -- 1.6. Post-Structuralism -- 1.7. Queer Theory -- 1.8. Conclusion: General Principles for Studying Sexual Ethics -- 2. Meeting, Dating, and Having Sex -- 2.1. Defining Sex -- 2.2. Casual Sex -- 2.3. The Ethics of Internet Dating -- 2.4. Dating and Discrimination -- 2.5. BDSM -- 3. Consent -- 3.1. The Limits of Consent -- 3.2. Defining Consent -- 3.3. The Harms of Non-Consensual Sex -- 3.4. The Capacity to Consent -- 3.5. Consent and Deception -- 3.6. Affirmative Consent -- 3.7. Concluding Thoughts on Consent: Alternative Models of Sexual Communication -- 4. Commitment and Marriage -- 4.1. Monogamy -- 4.2. Gay Marriage -- 4.3. Plural Marriage -- 4.4. Transforming Marriage -- 4.5. Concluding Thoughts on Commitment and Marriage -- 5. Sex and the Law -- 5.1. Legal Moralism and Sexual Liberty -- 5.2. Pornography -- 5.3. Sex Work -- 6. Sex and Technology -- 6.1. Access to Sexual Technology -- 6.2. Sex Robots and Second Wave Technologies -- 6.3. Digisexuality: A New Sexual Identity? -- 6.4. Virtual Child Exploitation -- 6.5. Love Drugs -- 6.6. Concluding Thoughts on Sex and Technology -- Conclusion: Philosophical Principles for Debating Sexual Ethics -- Index.

A moral Historiography without Moralism. Critical views on modern Church History Efforts for realism without moral judgments have identified morals with present law. This leads to positivistic positions, where moral questions are being answered with references to historical legal situations only, without moral implications. With the political changes 1989–1990 a change in historiography followed. This became a problem to historians who saw their task not only in judgment, but in understanding and explaining history. A reverse danger is re-perspectivation and political instrumentalisation. Post-modern theories may not excuse historical relativism. To avoid moralism, we must understand the difference between theological and political discourses. Moralism may be regarded as a secular confessionalism. Moralism in historiography will lead to immoral consequences. In moral historiography without moralism I find a position between moralism and relativism. Moral principles may be found in Natural theology or in the Declaration of Human Rights. We may encounter moral dilemmas both in history and in future. While making moral judgments, we must understand history as a moral problem with several possibilities.

Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Contract and the Law of Property -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Theories of Private Law -- 2.2.1 Law and Economics -- 2.2.2 Kantian Theories -- 2.2.3 Public Good -- 2.2.4 Theories of Flourishing -- 2.2.5 Legal Moralism -- 2.2.6 Putting the Theories Together -- 2.3 Contract Law -- 2.3.1 Promises and Contract Law -- 2.3.2 Good Faith and Contract Law -- 2.3.3 Distinguishing Contracts and Torts -- 2.4 Property -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Tort -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 A Historical Overview -- 3.3 Tort: Private or Public Law? -- 3.4 Tort as Appeasement, Justice, Punishment, and Deterrence -- 3.5 Can the Tort of Negligence be a Moral Agent? -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Family Law -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Enabling and Encouraging Relationships -- 4.2.1 Protection from Physical Abuse -- 4.2.2 Protection from Economic Unfairness -- 4.2.3 Divorce -- 4.3 Valuing Care -- 4.3.1 Defining Parenthood -- 4.3.2 Financial Orders -- 4.3.3 The Welfare of Children -- 4.4 Messaging -- 4.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5: Criminal Law -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Criminal Trials, Convictions and Punishment as a Moral Conversation -- 5.2.1 Censure -- 5.2.2 What Is Censured? -- 5.2.3 Treating the Defendant as a Moral Agent -- 5.2.4 The Constitutive Role of the Criminal Justice System -- 5.2.5 How the Criminal Justice System Could Work Better -- 5.2.6 Conclusion on the Communicative Nature of Criminal Justice -- 5.3 Permitting Virtue -- 5.4 Acts The State Must Criminalize -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: Medical Law -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Abortion and the Status of the Embryo/Fetus -- 6.3 Clinical Negligence -- 6.4 Consent Generally -- 6.5 Confidentiality -- 6.6 The End of Life -- 6.7 Organ Donation -- 6.8 Conclusion -- References.

ABSTRACT Objectives: This paper aims to answer the question of how the relationship between law and moralism, as well as how to internalize moral principles in making laws and regulations in Indonesia. Methodology: This study used a philosophical approach that aimed to explore the relationship between law and morals from the perspective of John Austin, Kelsen, and H. L. A Hart. It also used the transcendental perspectives in exploring the importance of internalizing moral principles in making laws and regulations in Indonesia. The research method in the article used descriptive normative research methods, with interpretative data processing techniques regarding the importance of moral aspects in making laws and regulations in Indonesia. Findings: The dominance of the philosophy of positivism has broad implications. The closure of the law to morality raised by adherents of legalism, legal positivism, or reinerechtslehre does not only raise injustice everywhere but also appear with a face of totalitarian or repressive law. Law and moral relations, according to John Austin (1790-1859), are diametrically separated and tend to favor the law (the law negates morals), while Hans Kelsen and Austin place religious and moral inferiority while favoring positive law. According to Kelsen, the law deals with the form (formal), not the content (material); then, Hart tries to offer the principle of morality as a minimum legal requirement in which the pattern of the relationship is cooperative or independent dialogue. Whereas in the transcendent perspective, law and morals are in a dialogue-integrative relationship. The legislators should have spiritual intelligence; that is, they do not want to be bound and limited by existing standards but want to go beyond and transcend the existing situations (transcendental). With spirituality, the legislators, who are in accordance with the principle, can produce laws that show the emancipatory of legal transcendency. The laws do not only humanize humans but are also oriented to moral values that originate from God. Benefit: The benefit of this paper is to be the basis for guarding moral values in making the Law, starting from the preparation and initiative for the submission of the draft law, discussion of the draft law, and approval of the draft law. Originality/novelty: Internalization of moral principles in law can produce laws that can make people happy and answer the problems of human life. At least three elements are fulfilled, namely justice, efficacy, and legal certainty. Keywords: transcendency, morals, the formation of laws

This textbook introduces students to the various arguments for and against the prohibition of recreational drugs. The arguments are carefully presented and analyzed, inviting students to consider the competing principles of liberty rights, paternalism, theories of punishment, legal moralism, and the social consequences of drug use and drug laws. Meyers extends this examination by presenting alternatives to the prohibition/legalization dichotomy, including harm reduction, decriminalization, and user licensing or on-premise use. The presentation invites readers to think clearly about the reasons and principles that should determine public policy and law, while also delving into the deeper philosophical questions underlying the drug prohibition debate. Is it morally wrong to use drugs? If so, would that be reason enough to make it illegal? Are there good reasons in favor of using illicit drugs? Do addicts lack free will, and if so, would it be unjust to punish them? What is (or ought to be) the purpose of punishment? Is the state justified in limiting the freedom of competent adults for their own good? What should be the goal of drug policy, reduced use or reduced harm? The purpose of the book is twofold. First, it is a review of the arguments for and against drug prohibition, a useful tool for policy makers, activists, and concerned citizens with an understanding of the relevant considerations for determining how we should reform our failing drug policy. Second, the book serves as a case study in the deeper issues of justice, the nature of law, rights and liberties, and the public good. Students studying applied ethics, political science, or public policy will benefit greatly from Meyers' approach.

In this paper I reconstruct and discuss some of the central ideas of Bernard Williams' political philosophy, contained in his In the Beginning Was the Deed. In particular, I point out some minor weaknesses of his critique to (what he called) "Political Moralism" and develop his conception of political authority. Finally, I suggest that the form of political realism he proposes is closely related to a way of conceiving Legal Realism, which I call Normativist Legal Realism. ; En este trabajo reconstruyo y discuto algunas de las ideas centra- les de la filosofía política de Bernard Williams, contenidas en En el principio era la acción. En particular, señalo algunas debilidades menores de su crí- tica a lo que él llamaba "moralismo político" y desarrollo su concepción de la autoridad política. Finalmente, sugiero que la forma de realismo político que propone está íntimamente relacionada con una manera de concebir el realismo jurídico, que yo denomino realismo jurídico normativista.