Suchergebnisse

In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of libertarian morality in relation to the problem of climate change. This problem is explicated in the first chapter, where preliminary clarifications are also made. In the second chapter, I briefly explain the characteristics of libertarianism relevant to the subsequent study, including the central non-aggression principle. In chapter three, I examine whether our individual emissions of greenhouse gases, which together give rise to climate change, meet this principle. I do this based on the assumption that we are the legitimate owners of the resources we use in those activities. In the fourth chapter, I question this assumption and scrutinize libertarianism's restrictions on appropriations of climate-relevant resources, which leads me to distinguish between some different versions of the libertarian view. Toward the end of the chapter, I also examine libertarianism's answer to the political question regarding how emission rights should be distributed. The fifth chapter investigates libertarianism's verdicts for mere risks of infringement, as stemming from people's emissions and acts of appropriations. In chapter six, I investigate the libertarian right to self-defense against both the effects of climate change and other people's climate-relevant activities. In chapter seven, I discuss two intergenerational issues related to climate change: what libertarianism says concerning future generations and how libertarianism might deal with the problem of historical emissions. The eighth chapter explores the implications of libertarianism regarding collective moral wrongdoing in connection to climate change. In chapter nine, I take a look at the libertarian room for governmental responses for tackling climate change. The tenth and final chapter is a summary. The overall conclusion of the dissertation is that libertarianism recommends that we reduce our emissions and decrease our extraction of natural resources such as forests and fossil fuels. Furthermore, governments are permitted to undertake some quite substantial actions in order to fight the causes of climate change. I end with some bottom-up reflections on what these conclusions might say about the plausibility of libertarianism. I claim that although libertarianism after all manages to explain some of our moral intuitions regarding climate change, it is questionable whether libertarianism's explanation is better than those offered by alternative moral theories.

LIBERTARIAN ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE EMPIRICAL BENEFITS OF CAPITALISM ARE, AS YET, INADEQUATE TO CONVINCE ANYONE WHO LACKS LIBERTARIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONVICTION. YET "PHILOSOPHICAL" LIBERTARIANISM FOUNDERS ON INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS THAT RENDER IT UNFIT TO MAKE LIBERTARIANS OUT OF ANYONE WHO DOES NOT HAVE STRONG CONSEQUENTIALIST REASONS FOR LIBERTARIAN BELIEF. THE JOINT FAILURE OF THESE TWO APPROACHES TO LIBERTARIANISM EXPLAINS WHY THEY ARE BOTH PRESENT IN ORTHODOX LIBERTARIANISM--THEY HIDE EACH OTHER'S WEAKNESSES, THEREBY PERPETUATING THEM. LIBERTARIANISM RETAINS SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR ILLUMINATING THE MODERN WORLD BECAUSE OF ITS DISTANCE FROM MAINSTREAM INTELLECTUAL ASSUMPTIONS. BUT THIS POTENTIAL WILL REMAIN UNFULFILLED UNTIL ITS IDEOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE IS DISMANTLED.

Abstract
The present paper takes on the question of whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment is compatible with libertarianism. Despite Walter Block's recent arguments to the contrary, the paper argues that unless a gain is received in accordance with the libertarian principles of justice, it is without a basis and thus unjust. This fact alone proves that the concept of unjust enrichment is compatible with libertarianism. Besides, even though it is true — as Block claims — that forcing the recipient of an unjust gain to return it or pay for it involves positive duties and is therefore incompatible with libertarianism, the present paper argues that the practical consequences of this fact would be negligible, for compensatory schemes would develop on the free market anyway in justice-preserving steps.

Willis reviews 'Libertarianism: A Primer' by David Boaz and 'What It Means to be a Libertarian: A Personal Interpretation' by Charles Murray.

Thin (or pure) libertarianism is a political philosophy which claims that violence is justified only in defense, not for invasion of other people or their (justly owned based on homesteading) property. Thick libertarianism typically but not always includes this non-aggression principle (NAP) but adds to it a whole host of additional requirements: views on egalitarianism, free association, homosexuality, discrimination, and more. The present essay constitutes a defense of the former vis a vis the latter.

Thin (or pure) libertarianism is a political philosophy which claims that violence is justified only in defense, not for invasion of other people or their (justly owned based on homesteading) property. Thick libertarianism typically but not always includes this non-aggression principle (NAP) but adds to it a whole host of additional requirements: views on egalitarianism, free association, homosexuality, discrimination, and more. The present essay constitutes a defense of the former vis a vis the latter.

In this essay Loren Lomasky wryly proposes that the views of Rawls and
Nozick might not be as radically divergent as is conventionally supposed.
To demonstrate this proposition, Lomasky invents "Twin Harvard"
counterparts of Rawls and Nozick. The twist is that Twin Rawls turns out to
be a leading libertarian theorist while Twin Nozick endorses a regime of
sweeping redistribution. In each case the position follows from familiar
elements in the theories of their respective, real-world counterparts.
Lomasky concludes that Twin Rawls actually makes better use of familiar
Rawlsian themes-such as the veil of ignorance, strains of commitment, and
the priority of liberty-than does Rawls himself. Moreover, Rawls's own
attempts at combating libertarianism are seen to be weak, sometimes
embarrassingly so. Libertarianism is a specter that he devoutly wishes to
exorcize, but cannot. Conversely, the rejection of libertarianism by Twin
Nozick (and Nozick?) is striking but shallow.

Abstract
I argue that recent developments in my on-going debate with Jan Narveson have brought libertarianism to the brink where it is now able to cross over and join forces with welfare liberalism and even socialism. I summarize my debate with Narveson and then argue that a public concession Narveson made at recent meeting along with a new argument he advanced in response to that public concession have now brought libertarianism to this momentous brink where it can now be seen to cross over into the welcoming arms of welfare liberals and socialists.