Suchergebnisse

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare (ex post), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles, as well as raising the retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds --although the conclusion is reversed when mortality strikes only after retirement.

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare (ex post), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles, as well as raising the retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds --although the conclusion is reversed when mortality strikes only after retirement.

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare (ex post), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles, as well as raising the retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds --although the conclusion is reversed when mortality strikes only after retirement.

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare (ex post), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles, as well as raising the retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds --although the conclusion is reversed when mortality strikes only after retirement.

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare (ex post), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles, as well as raising the retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds --although the conclusion is reversed when mortality strikes only after retirement.

AbstractIndividuals save for their old days, but not all of them enjoy the old age. This paper characterizes the optimal capital accumulation in a two‐period OLG model where lifetime is risky and varies across individuals. We compare two long‐run social optima: (1) the average utilitarian optimum, where steady‐state average welfare is maximized; (2) the egalitarian optimum, where the welfare of the worst‐off at the steady‐state is maximized. It is shown that, under plausible conditions, the egalitarian optimum involves a higher capital and a lower fertility than the utilitarian optimum. Those inequalities hold also in a second‐best framework where survival conditions are exogenously linked to the capital level.

The concept of regarding customers as assets that should be managed and whose value should be measured is now accepted and recognized by academics and practitioners. This focus on customer relationship management makes it extremely important to understand customer lifetime value (CLV)
because CLV models are an efficient and effective way to evaluate a firm's relationship with its customers. Assessment of CLV is especially important for firms in implementing customer-oriented services. In this paper we provide a critical review of the literature on the development process
and applications of CLV.

Abstract: In this paper we examine various aspects of the optimal lifetime redistribution policy within a cohort. We characterise optimal redistribution policy when society consists of individuals who do not differ only in productivity, but also in time preference or myopia. We extend Diamond's (2003) analysis on nonlinear taxation of savings into the three and four type models. Our results provide a rationale for distortions (upward and downward) in savings behaviour in a simple two period model where high skilled and low skilled individuals have different non-observable time preferences beyond their earning capacity. If we interpret our model so that there is no private savings, but public provision of pension in period 2, then in different versions (and different parameterization) of three type model we find the U-shaped pattern of the replacement rates. Our numerical results suggest that the retirement consumption is less dispersed than the first period consumption in a paternalistic case, whereas in a welfarist case the ordering is reversed. Our numerical simulations also show that consumption when old should be less dispersed than consumption when young when some individuals are myopic. Moreover our numerical results suggest that when there are myopic individuals in the economy, a paternalistic government policy increases saving and makes saving larger than with paternalist government policy where there are no myopic individuals.

The objective in this report is to better understand how the increased product lifetime option has been positioned in policies over the past twenty years. By means of policy document analysis, we explore product lifetime positioning in the EU's circular economy policies, Norwegian political party programs and official documents, environmental NGO documents, consumer organisation policies and product policies. Overall, we find little focus on product lifetime between 2000-2015, however, there has been a massive increase over the past five years. There is still a long way to go in developing appropriate policy instruments to address product lifetime. ; Formålet med denne rapporten er å få en bedre forståelse av hvordan produktlevetid har blitt posisjonert i politikken de siste tjue årene. Ved bruk av dokumentanalyse undersøker vi forekomsten og kontekstualiseringen av produktlevetid i EUs sirkulærøkonomipolitikk, norske partiprogrammer og offisielle dokumenter, dokumenter fra norske miljøorganisasjoner, forbrukerorganisasjoners politikk og produktpolitikk. Samlet finner vi at det er lite fokus på produktlevetid mellom 2000-2015, men at det har vært en stor økning i fokus de siste fem årene. Imidlertid er det fremdeles lang vei å gå i arbeidet med å utvikle tiltak som faktisk adresserer produktlevetid.